What is conservatism? Which U.S. president do conservatives most admire?
For many people, the answer to the second question is Ronald Reagan. For
more than a few people, Reagan is also the answer to the first question: Reagan
embodied American conservatism or the return of American conservatism or ...
Marcus Witcher investigates just what it was that Reagan embodied in the
period between Reagans first election in 1980 and Donald Trumps election in
2016. Its hard for me to be objective or dispassionate about all this because in 1982
I was assigned as a research assistant to Murray Weidenbaum, who was fresh back in
St. Louis from his two years as chair of Reagans Council of Economic Advisers. And
in 1984, partly with Murrays help, I started as a staff economist at the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), working in regulatory analysis in Wendy Gramms edition
of the Bureau of Economics.
I was a Reagan revolutionary. We were not stodgy conservatives but classical
liberal econo-gods in Washington to cut red tape and smite the regulatory and tax
barriers to growth and prosperity. In the election of 1984, Reagan won 525 Electoral College votes, running the table except for the District of Columbia and the Peoples
Republic of Minnesota. Now, we were really going to be able to get some things
done: a mandate! It was morning again in America!
Except that not much really happened. Reagan made a lot of speeches, and
there were some tax cuts and some typically time-wasting task forces. (I spent at
least thirty hours in FTC small-business red-tape task force meetings just in 1985;
we had to pay for our own coffee.) But trade barriers were raised, not lowered, and
the Voluntary Restraint Agreement on steel and autos was actually tightened. This
didnt seem like a revolution; it seemed like our job was to talk about congratulating
ourselves on a revolution that had just disappeared like a puff of smoke on a
Marcus Witchers thesis is that Reagans success as a politician was his ability to
make speeches from the right but govern from the middle. It is tempting to contrast
Reagan with Barack Obama along these lines, but Obama only did the speeches
part, from the left. There was a difference: Obama was not pragmatic and was for the
most part satisfied to bypass the legislative process and use his phone and pen to
govern through executive order. Reagan seemed driven to get laws passed and was
willing to make compromises and cut deals to get legislation done.
In fact, Reagans pragmatism was even deeper than that, as Witcher shows. The
book argues that there are three ways to think of Reaganall of them wrong!that
have come to represent the received wisdom of politics, though not of historians.
Reagan was an aggressive, demagogic imperialist who sought to expand U.S.
power through bluster and threats of force. He forced an expansion in the scope
and intensity of the Cold War and caused it to last longer than was necessary,
long after the leaders of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations were willing
to negotiate and de-escalate tensions.
Reagan was an economic scythe, cutting taxes beyond all reason and chopping
out regulations and welfare programs based on an outdated laissez-faire ideology
and without regard to the devastating consequences.
Reagan was a rock-ribbed conservative, consistent in his principles in spite of
public criticism from the craven left. The result was that Reagans aggressive economic
and military program bankrupted the Eastern bloc and forced Gorbachev
to the bargaining table because socialist nations simply could not keep up with
the might of capitalism.
The first claim doesnt pass the laugh test, though it is true (as Reagan himself
freely said and with the support of Margaret Thatcher) that Gorbachev was
someone the West could do business with. But the end of the Cold War was
brokered by the relationship of trust built, in many ways at the personal level,
between Reagan and Gorbachev. The occasional Tear down this wall! public
statement notwithstanding, Reagan had a change of heart and strategy after he
came to understand (in the aftermath of NATOs Able Archer exercise in 1983) that the evil empire rhetoric implied an immediate existential threat in the eyes
of the Soviet leadership. Further, the downing of Korean Airlines flight 007, which
the Soviets had tracked for two full hours without contacting NATO for information,
made Reagan think that direct, personal communication with the Soviet
leadership was imperative.
The second claim, usually made by the modern American Left, is nonsensical
on two grounds. It is simply factually untrue, as my own disillusionment as a Reagan
revolutionary illustrates. There were some tax cuts, and the tax reform of 1986
was a positive step, but there were little more than surface cuts and posturing in
most areas of economic regulation. Further, and perhaps more importantly, the move
toward deregulation was largely a product of the Carter administration (as was the
agreement to place Pershing missiles in northern Europe); Reagan simply carried out
the policy initiatives that had been established by his predecessor. And the dramatic
cuts in welfare programs either didnt happen at all or were carried out by the Clinton
administration in the 1990s.
The third claim is remarkable because it is now embraced by the American
Right and repeated almost as a catechism. It is sheer triumphalism: Reagan won
the Cold War by obstinate anti-Communist policies and in the face of criticism by
wimps. (See, for example, Dinesh DSouza, President Ronald Reagan: Winning the Cold War, October 2003) So today we should follow our principles
without compromise. But as Witcher shows abundantly (and a little gleefully,
though perhaps for this he can be forgiven), conservatives hated, full on hated,
Reagans policy of negotiations and détente with the Soviets. Typically, conservatives
now will repeat George Wills bon mot, The Cold War is over and the
University of Chicago won it (The Wit Who Won the Cold War,Baltimore
Sun, December 1991). But Witcher claims that conservatives remember
that George Will also said that December 8, 1987the day that the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Force Treaty was signedwould be remembered as the day the
Cold War was lost (emphasis added).
What Witcher shows is that Reagan himself never claimed to have won the
Cold War, and he wouldnt have claimed that the University of Chicago did, either.
There were instead three broad forces at work: the revolutionary labor and civil
movements in the Eastern bloc, especially in Poland; the difficulties of maintaining
the awkward and repressive governance arrangements, toward which citizens were
growing increasingly restive; and Gorbachevs ability to develop enough trust in Reagans
and NATOs commitments that he could persuade the Politburo and other
stakeholders to stand down.
In other words, almost nothing you thought you knew about Reagan is true
unless you lived through that period, in which case its still true that most of what
you thought you knew about Reagan is untrue. I am going to read this book again. Its a genuinely significant contribution to the history of conservative thought and to
scholarship on the American presidency.