Many Americans mistakenly believe that the exploitation of labor is inherent in the employer-employee relationship. Debunking this falsehood and other myths related to the role of labor unions is the first step toward understanding a sensible labor policy for the twenty-first century.
Many Americans embrace fundamental misconceptions about the
exploitation of labor that is supposedly inherent in the employment
relationship and more generally about the role and background of labor
unions in America. Economists, historians, and legal scholars have in the past
undertaken thorough critiques of the American model of collective bargaining, and
I do not purport to supplementor even to summarizethat literature. I do,
however, hope to revive interest in a body of work that has tended to fade in the
public consciousness. To that end, I discuss seven discrete aspects of the prevailing
narrative that animates labor law. My thesis is that much of American labor policy is
based on myths, which I endeavor to debunk.
The portion of the private-sector workforce in the United States represented by
labor unions has steadily declined in recent decades. What, then, is the point of talking
For one thing, the subject is both vitally important and poorly understood. Labor
relations necessarily requires exploration of first principles: What is the origin of
rights, and how should individuals interact in a free society?On a more concrete level,
class differences are embedded in modern political thought and animate much of the
current progressive agenda. Many people reflexively believe that individual employees
are powerless and oppressed and therefore need either collective action or external
assistance (i.e., government intervention)or bothto ensure fairness in the labor
market. This type of thinking is behind many of the living wage, guaranteed income,
and $15 per hour minimum wage proposals or behind even more radical
proposalsthe redistributionist agenda of democratic socialism.
Moreover, despite their declining membership in the private sector, unions have
beenand remainimportant forces in American life, both economically and politically.
Labor unionsin both the private and public sectorsremain potent players in
the political process, making endorsements, using members dues to support political
candidates, providing manpower and infrastructure support (such as phone banks and
membership communications) for get out the vote drives, and the like. They are
among the largest contributors to political campaigns, with expenditures amounting to
hundreds of millions of dollars each election cycle. Union members tend to vote at a
higher rate among registered voters overall. For these reasons, organized labor wields
considerable political clout. Unions are a powerful special-interest group and a major
component of the Democratic Partys electoral coalition.
Yet due to the decline in private-sector union membership, labor unions receive
less attention from academics and public-policy think tanks than they did in the past. As
a result, the subject of labor relations has largely receded from the spotlight. Despite its
importance, the topic is increasingly overlooked in the nations colleges and even law
schools. The power and influence of organized labor persist, even as public awareness of
the subject continues to fade. Unlike other major interest groups in America, labor
unions receive scant scholarly and media scrutiny. Many of the leading works in the field
were written decades ago. The role and background of labor unions are rarely questioned.
The conventional narrative, hearkening back to the New Deal, is simply assumed
to be correct.
This is unfortunate. Understanding the background of the union movement in
America requires some knowledge of neglected aspects of politics, economics, government,
history, and law. One of the challenges in the area of labor law is to overcome
the pro-union (or anticapitalist) bias that is prevalent among many labor-law scholars
and labor historians (see Hayek  1963; Moreno 2008). As written by progressive
academics, the history of labor unions in America is as full of fiction as Aesops fables or the Grimm brothers fairy tales. This article attempts to dispel some of those
Terminology and Concepts
I proceed from the classical liberal premise that in the state of nature all people are
born free and are endowed by their creator with self-ownershipthat is, their labor and
the direct fruits of their labor belong to them. The opposite of self-ownership is slavery,
servitude, or serfdom. Self-ownership leads to recognition of the institution of private
property. In a free society, one owns what one produces or acquires through consensual
exchange. When entering into civil society, pursuant to a fictitious (but essential) social
contract, people surrender some of their natural rights in exchange for the protection of
laws. Our state and federal constitutions represent the terms of this bargain. These
concepts are reflected in our Declaration of Independence and are consistent with the
Lockean concepts that influenced the Founding Fathers.
In a society based on individual liberty, limited government, and the protection of
private property, the ideal form of interaction among people is consensual economic
exchanges, which protect personal freedom and maximize economic efficiency. Force
and coercion are the opposite of voluntary actions. In a free societyas opposed to a
centrally controlled (and therefore authoritarian) statethe only entitlement one has
is the right to engage in consensual exchanges with willing participants on mutually
acceptable terms. Private ordering in this fashion must be free of coercion, fraud, and
predation. No one has a right to take anothers property, to compel transactions, or to
force another to accept terms involuntarily. Any of these actions is simply unfair.
Conversely, no one has the right to interfere with or prevent consensual exchanges by
others on terms that are agreeable to them. This type of action, too, is simply unfair.
From an economic perspective, labor is like any other commodity bought and sold
in the market (see Pulliam 1981). Wages are the price of labor, and in a free market they
would be determined by a consensual exchange between buyer (employer) and seller
(employee) as the result of competition. In a free society, an employment relationship
must be between willing parties on terms acceptable to both, without fraud or coercion.
The fairness of a particular transaction between an employer and an employee can be
judged only by whether it was entered into voluntarily and without fraud or coercion. Terms that are objectionable to one person may be acceptable to another. Such differences
are inherent in competition.
What is a labor union? A union is not a social group or a fraternal organization, like
the Rotary Club or Kiwanis Club. It is the collectivized agent of workers, organized to obtain higher wages and more favorable working conditions than workers could obtain
on their own through competition and consensual exchange. How, exactly, does this
happen? A union essentially operates as a cartel, fixing the price of its members labor by
internal collusion rather than by market competitionjust like members of the Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) work to increase the price of
oil rather than letting the competitive market set the price. The internal price fixing for
labor is called collective bargaining.
Like OPEC, a labor union threatens to withhold supply if the buyer does not agree
to pay the fixed price. This withholding is called a strike. Unlike OPEC, however, a
union attempts to prevent other sellers (who are not members of the cartel) from selling
at a lower price, sometimes with the threat of violence. This is called a picket line.
Strikers not only collectively withhold their own services (which is consensual) but also
seek to prevent other workers from crossing the picket line (through force or coercion).
Unions call these other workers strike breakers or scabs, but they are merely sellers
willing to accept a lower wagea function of competition and consensual
exchangewhich is entirely legitimate in a free society.
If OPEC countries tried to blockade shipping to the United States to prevent the
delivery of oil from non-OPEC suppliers, we would quite properly regard this blockade
as an act of aggressioneven war. Among unionized workers, however, the same
behavior is celebrated as solidarity.
Also, unions, unlike OPEC, depend on government coercion. Federal law requires employers to recognize unions once they are elected by a majority of the employees;
requires employers to negotiate exclusively with the union before taking action
regarding the employees; prohibits employers from firing employees because of their
union involvement; and prohibits employers from replacing striking workers under
certain circumstances. All of these requirements and prohibitions are significant restrictions
on the common-law rightsand economic freedomsenjoyed by employers
prior to the enactment of federal labor laws beginning in 1935.
The reason we have labor unionsto establish what unionists euphemistically call
industrial democracyis purportedly to overcome the inherent inequality of
bargaining power that is thought to exist between capital and labor. The legislative
findings in support of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA, also known as the
Wagner Act) of 1935 so state. As will be seen, this controversial notion has dubious
origins and has had far-reaching implications for labor law.
Myth Number 1: Inequality of Bargaining Power
In a competitive market, workers sell their services to employers at a wage rate that is
determined by competition among both buyers and sellers. The specific wage bargain
struck will depend on the workers perceived value to the employer and the existence of
competing offers by other employers. In the world of free markets, the governments main role is to punish fraud, enforce contracts, and prevent collusion. Labor unions,
which exist to facilitate collusion among sellers, are unnecessary in a free society.
Nothing inherent in labor markets prevents consensual arrangements between employers
and individual employees on mutually agreeable terms. However, critics of freemarket
economics have a different viewsometimes radically different.
Karl Marx is often credited as the intellectual father of modern socialism. Marx
believed that capital (the owners of businesses) and labor (the workers employed by
businesses) represent separate, antagonistic classes and that the employment relationship
is inherently exploitative because workers in a capitalist society are forced to
sell their labor power to capitalists for less than the full value of the commodities they
produce with their labor. Capitals ownership of the means of production allows
business owners to extract the full value of workers labor (i.e., the price of the
finished product) while paying them for only the commodity value of their services
(i.e., an hourly wage rate). In this theory, the added value is assumed to belong to the
workers, and the employers resulting profit is wholly undeserved. Marxist theory
assumes that capital owners contribute nothing to the process of production.
From a Marxist perspective, profiting from capital is illegitimateequivalent to
stealing. By retaining the surplus value of workers labor, capital exploits the workers,
an injustice that can be corrected only if the workers seize ownership of the businesses
and therefore dispense with the parasitical role of capital. For Marx, class struggle,
leading to revolution and seizure of the means of production, is the only way to
prevent the exploitation of labor. Private-property ownership is therefore incompatible
with Marxist theory. Employment by a profit-making business constitutes oppression.
This extreme form of socialism is the foundation of communism. One can just imagine
how militant workers would be if they sincerely believed Marxist rhetoric, as many did
during the heyday of the Industrial Revolution. They were incited to revolt and
overthrow the established order, by force if necessary.
In the late nineteenth century, as industrialism was burgeoning, Marxs conception
of socialism began to become associated in the public mind with violent
anarchisman unfavorable connectionleading nonrevolutionary socialists to embrace
kinder, gentler versions of Marxs theory, some of them predating Marx. This
school of thought, symbolized by the Fabian Society in London (founded in 1884),
became the basis for Englands Labour Party. Some of the prominent figures associated
with Fabian socialism include Sidney and Beatrice Webb and, in the so-called second
generation, Harold Laski.
Nonrevolutionary socialism, or democratic socialism, inspired much of
twentieth-century labor-union theory. The more moderate brand of socialism did not
call for outright worker ownership of the means of production but emphasized the
need for concerted action by employees to rectify the purported inequality of bargaining
power between labor and capital (sometimes blamed on capitals ability to
organize into corporate entities) and to exercise some control of the business through
union negotiations. Empowering workers in this way would, it was thought, prevent capital from earning excessive profits. This is the genesis of the modern American
labor-union movement and forms the gist of trade-union rhetoric even today.
Marx and his successors were dead wrong. It is a fallacy to ignoreor denythe
crucial role of capital in the creation of goods and services. Prior to industrialization and
the division of labor in the form of specialized trades, nearly every man toiled on the
land. If he owned the land outright, the crops he grew were his property. If he toiled on
the land of another, he either paid rent or shared his crop with the owner. As trades
developed, blacksmiths, cobblers, weavers, and the like either had the resources to
acquire their own tools and supplies or had to rely on another to furnish these
itemscapital goods. In the former situation, he was his own master; in the latter, he
was an apprentice or workman in the employ of another. The workman had to share the
bounty of his labor with the provider of capital on terms agreeable to both. This is the
conceptual origin of the modern employment relationship.
It is intellectually dishonest to skip from an agricultural economy to the factory
system and deny the factory owner any credit for amassing the capital, devising the
machines, and incurring the risk that made the enterprise possible.
In any event, is there an inherent inequality between labor and capital? The
classical economic model shows otherwise. As long as there is competition among
buyers and sellers as well as the absence of external coercion, the market-clearing wage
will favor neither siderather, both employers and employees will gain from the exchange.
It doesnt matter whether the buyer (employer) is an individual, sole proprietorship,
partnership, or corporation. The principle is the same. Absent monopsony
powerthat is, domination of the market by a single buyer or small group of
buyerscompetition among employees and employers will yield the optimal result, and
workers will be paid equal to the value of the marginal product of laborthat is, the
value of the last unit they have produced for the employer.
The legal form of the buyer or seller is irrelevant. All that matters is the existence of
competition among uncoerced market participants. Does an individual consumer have a
disadvantage at Walmart or on Amazon as compared to in a Middle Eastern bazaar? Of
course not. As a matter of economics, labor is a commodity, and the proclamation to the
contrary in the Clayton Act of 1914 is simply a protectionist measure reciting the
vernacular of socialist dogma. The conceptual basis for the trade-union movement rests
on an empty political slogan.
Depending on the employees skill, experience, industry, and productivity, wage
rates will vary across the workforce and across different industries. In todays economy,
without union representation some brand-new lawyers earn starting salaries
approaching $200,000 per year; computer programmers can demand valuable stock
options from the high-tech companies they work for; and welders and other trades in
the oil patch earn in the six figures. Hollywood stars, professional athletes, and recording
artists sometimes earn tens of millions of dollars annuallyor more. These
astronomical salaries are not the product of collective bargaining. Judge Judy makes $47
million a year, more than any other TV host. LeBron James, who never attended college, recently signed a four-year, $154 million contract with the Los Angeles Lakers.
Twenty-six-year-old free agent Manny Machado just signed a ten-year deal with the San
Diego Padres worth $300 million. Another ballplayer, Bryce Harper, recently inked a
deal with the Philadelphia Phillies worth $330 million over thirteen years. Where is the
inequality of bargaining power?
In a free society, compensation is determined by supply and demand. Some
peoples labor is more valuable than others, so they are paid more. The notion that
individuals are inevitably at a disadvantage vis-`a-vis corporations and that employment is
inherently exploitative is a vestige of Marxist theory that has been discredited by
historyincluding the vast increase in wages of those not represented by unions. Yet
this notion is still the conceptual foundation for the NLRA.
Myth Number 2: Capitalism Oppressed Workers
Why, then, does the mythology of industrial democracy persist? There are many
explanations, but in keeping with my iconoclastic theme I contend that the myth aids
the political Lefts self-serving defense of rent seeking by one of its major constituent
groupsunion members. Unions are a core member of the Democratic Partys political
coalition. The working class has functioned as a faction for hundreds of years and has
been romanticized for just as long. Charles Dickens made his career by sympathetically
depicting the plight of the downtrodden in Victorian Britain. Class conflict is a favorite
theme for liberals. The Left has developed a narrative that the rise of capitalismin
particular the Industrial Revolutionresulted in the oppression of workers, but this
story is false. Capitalism liberated the long-suffering peasant class.
With the advent of the Industrial Revolution, a population that for centuries had
subsistedsometimes barely or not at allprimarily on labor-intensive agricultural production increasingly became engaged in factory production. This was a momentous
shift. Technology, enabled by capital investment and the profit motive, transformed the
economy. Factories, machinery, innovation, and inventions (including the steam engine)
wrought dramatic social changes. These developments concentrated workers in
centralized activities (in mills and factories) and shifted the population mix from rural to
urban locations. Cities grew rapidly. Trade expanded. People often relocated to pursue
opportunities, and the sheer number of people vastly increased due to sharply declining
mortality rates. Capitalism transformed society in many ways, most of them quite
Even though industrialism in the long run improved workers standard of living
significantly, living in closer quarters and observing the prosperity enjoyed by the
emerging business and professional classes created tensions and resentments among the workers. Unionism was primarily a manifestation of workers dissatisfaction with relative
Although wage-paid factory workers were generally better off than prior generations
of serfs and tenant farmers and miners and wool spinners and weavers, who had
barely eked out a living by piecework, they saw others with more and were prompted to
demand a greater share for themselves. Increased class consciousness and the proximity
of large groups of similarly situated workers begat industrial discontent. This process
ultimately explains the rise of unionism in England and in the United States a century
later with the coming of the Industrial Age there.
As a matter of history, the oppression of the worker as a result of the Industrial
Revolution was instead a steady improvement in the average standard of living, along
with a declining incidence of child labor. In the United States, average real wages grew
substantially in the decades before the passage of New Deal legislation, an era of largescale
immigration, immense capital investment, and technological change, whereas the
percentage of the labor force that was unionized was minuscule. This is exactly the
opposite of what oppression theory would have us believe. The main goal of unions,
then and now, is to artificially increase economically efficient wage rates (and simultaneously
to reduce productivity) by threatening to disrupt the employers operations
through strikes and other forms of work stoppages.
Regardless of the myth, the political struggle between the haves and the have
nots animated the Progressive movement, coalesced during the New Deal, and
continues to this day. Envy, once regarded as one of the seven deadly sins, is now a
centerpiece of the progressive agenda.
Myth Number 3: Employers Were Wrong to
Union advocates often cite as evidence of industrial oppression the resistance of
employers to unionization, which they claim was typically characterized by violence.
(I discuss the myth of systemic employer violence in labor disputes in the next
section.) Congress cited some employers refusal to recognize unions and to engage
in collective bargaining as a justification for enacting the NLRA. It is a fallacy,
however, that employers violated employees rights simply by declining to accede
to union demands. Recall the previous discussion of competition and free
markets. Absent force or fraud, consensual economic arrangements violate no ones
Consumers are entitled to make decisions where they shop or eat or what they buy.
Some shoppers prefer Whole Foods to Kroger or Safeway. Some drive Priuses instead of
SUVs. Some are vegetarians or vegans instead of omnivores. In a free society, all such
preferences are permissible, and disfavored sellers can have no complaint that buyers
choose another product or supplier. This is the essence of consensual exchangeit
promotes freedom of choice. Prior to the New Deal, businesses could operate largely as
they pleased, subject to antitrust laws and common-law rules. Employers could hire
whom they chose on the terms they set, so long as willing employees agreed. A
unionized workforce was legitimately viewed as a serious impediment to operating a
profitable business. It is entirely understandable why a business ownerthen and
nowwould oppose unionization.
Without a union, employment is at will, or on other terms agreed to between
the individual worker and the employer. The worker was generally free to quit at any
time, and the employer had the concomitant right to terminate the employment relationship.
The employer set the work schedule, which commonly was much longer
than today, and job security was negotiablenonexistent in many cases. If business
slowed down, employees were often laid off. Federally mandated overtime laws and
similar protections were decades off. Terms and conditions of employment were determined
by the competitive labor market.
A union claiming to represent the workers would typically demand higher wages
and more generous benefits, a shorter workweek, protections against layoffs, and
restrictions on operations. Employers understandably viewed such demands as
meddlesome interference with their businesses and usually refused to negotiate with
the unions. Agreeing to such terms would raise labor costs and place a business at a
competitive disadvantage vis-`a-vis other firms. Even small differentials in cost between
firms could be ruinous. When the unions went on strikeengaged in a
concerted refusal to work and usually interfered with other workers ability to take the
strikers placeemployers often hired private security and understandably made sure
the replacement workers could fill the jobs. This response was neither unreasonable
nor morally objectionable because a cessation of production could often be
During the period of immense economic growth between the Civil War and the
early twentieth century and even as late as the 1930s, many employers conditioned
employment offers on employees agreement not to join a union. These arrangements
are pungently referred to as yellow-dog contracts on the grounds that signing such a
pledge supposedly reduces a worker to the status of a yellow dog, but it is merely the
flipside of a closed-shop agreement, which limits employment to union members.
(The closed shop, once common, was not prohibited until 1947.) There was nothing
intrinsically wronglet alone immoralabout employers requiring workers to agree to
refrain from union membership as a condition of employment, so long as the agreement
was consensual. Workers unwilling to sign such contracts were under no legal compulsion
to do so and could look for employment elsewhere.
Myth Number 4: Employers Were Primarily Responsible for the Violence in Labor Disputes
One of the most outrageous myths of labor is that brutal employers, often with the
assistance of private militias in the form of Pinkertons or other detective agencies,
commonly suppressed peaceful concerted action by employees through unprovoked
Although it is true that many labor conflicts were violentespecially during the
tumultuous late 1800s and early 1900s, at the peak of the so-called Gilded Ageit is
also true that labor unions were responsible for most of the violence. Violent conflict was
most common when replacement workers, or scabs, tried to cross union picket
linesas they had a legal right to. The very term scab expresses the extraordinary
contempt that union sympathizers had for workers who did not share their collective
goalsthat is, who were willing to work on terms that the union refused. The vilification
of scabs, including the incitement of violence against them, is an essential
element of unionist lore.
Much is said about employers hiring private security forces to protect their
businesses, which they sometimes did in the absence of adequate local police forces to
protect their property during labor disputes in an era of lean government, but one must
not overlook the militant leadership of many labor unions in the Gilded Age, which
included a radical faction of socialists, communists, and anarchists who sought to
overthrow the capitalistic system. Unionists, many of whom embraced the Marxist
belief that private ownership of businesses was illegitimate, were willing toand often
didresort to extreme measures. Bombings were not uncommon.
Lets quickly review one of the most notorious labor conflicts, the riot in Chicagos
Haymarket Square on May 4, 1886, in which eight people (including seven Chicago
police officers) were killed when someone threw a bomb into a crowd of policemen who
were breaking up a protest rally. Conventional wisdom holds that xenophobia and
antiunion hysteria led to a hasty investigation and an unfair trial, resulting in the
unwarranted conviction of eight foreign-born anarchists, four of whom were hanged.
The Haymarket trial was a travesty of justice, according to the overwhelming consensus
of historians sympathetic to the labor movement. This pro-union sentiment has hardened into something approaching religious dogma, which proponents tirelessly
proselytize with evangelical fervor.
The prevailing narrative is deeply entrenched. In 1893, Illinois governor John
Peter Altgeld, a Progressive activist who later practiced law with Clarence Darrow,
pardoned the three surviving Haymarket bombing convicts. In 1972, the City of
Chicago removed a statue of a policeman from Haymarket Square, where it had stood
for more than eighty years as a monument to the fallen officers. In 1998, the U.S.
National Park Service declared the convicted anarchists gravesites and the Haymarket
Martyrs Monument to be a National Historic Landmark. In 2004, Chicago mayor
Richard Daley dedicated a state-funded sculpture in Haymarket Squarea replica of the
wagon from which the agitators were speaking prior to the bombingas a memorial to
the bombing in 1886. The unmistakable symbolism is that the anarchists were
innocentthe victims of capitalist oppression.
The historical record, if reviewed objectively, tells quite a different story. Timothy
Messer-Kruses scrupulously balanced account, The Trial of the Haymarket Anarchists (2011), offers an alternative version based on a review of the actual trial
transcriptastonishingly unexamined by historians before then. His assessment: the
investigation was thorough, the lengthy (six-week-long!) trial was fair; the evidence
against the anarchists was overwhelming; the jury verdict was sound; and the appeals
were properly denied. Messer-Kruses book, subtitled Terrorism and Justice in the
Gilded Age, has not received the scholarly attention it deserves because it runs counter
to the pro-union mythology that union leaders and labor historians have worked hard to
The Haymarket Square bombing was not an aberration. The history of labor
unions in America brims with many radical outfits that advocated and engaged in
extreme violence, including the Industrial Workers of the World (Wobblies), the Iron
Workers Union (responsible for bombing the Los Angeles Times building in 1910), the
Western Federation of Miners (charged with assassinating former Idaho governor Frank
Steunenberg in 1905), and the United Mine Workers of America, which led an armed
insurrection in West Virginia in 192021, resulting in up to one hundred deaths before
being suppressed by federal troops. The Pullman Strike (and boycott) in 1894 was a
violent affair led by socialist Eugene Debs, then president of the American Railway
Union, who was imprisoned for defying court orders. And there are many other examples. I do not wish to suggest that employers were always blameless or that peaceful picketers were never the victims of violence, only that both sides bear responsibility.
Unions have rarely hesitated to resort to force or physically to interfere with the
employers business operations, often in violation of the law. The American labor movement was founded in lawlessness. The United Auto Workers obtained General
Motors recognition in Flint, Michigan, by staging an illegal sit-down strike in 193637
and defying federal court orders that they vacate GMs premises. Historian Howard
Dickman explains the genesis of the mythology of labor-union victimhood: [W]hat is
really at stake in blaming the violence on employers or the government . . . is simply the
belief that a union, on the basis of their members presumed property right to their jobs,
had a right to shut down a plant or industry or even an entire economy ( 1987,
381). These violent tactics continued after the enactment of the NRLA in 1935, which
was putatively designed to eliminate themas seen in the history of the Teamsters
Union under Jimmy Hoffa and others (see Russell 2003).
Employees do not own their jobs, and working conditionsno matter how
horrendousdo not justify the use of violence to prevent a worker from crossing a
picket line. By todays standards, it is undeniable that many coal mines, sweatshops, and
factories in the Gilded Age were awful places to work: harsh, low paying, and sometimes
unsafe. Conditions were often grim and got worse during periodic recessions. Yet the
immigrants who were working in mines, employed in sweatshops, or living in urban
squalor were typically escaping even worse living conditions in their countries of origin.
They came to America in unprecedented numbers to escape famine and misery. The
working conditions they encountered in Americahowever unpleasantwere an improvement. That is why so many immigrants came here and continued coming.
Presentism does not excuse union aggression. Nor does the presumed success of
organized labor justify the mythology that sympathetic historians and legal scholars
have spun to enshrine unions. Working conditions in America improved primarily as a
result of market forces and rising productivity, not through collective bargaining or
strikes. Labor unions were not victims, and it is either delusional or mendacious to
Myth Number 5: Courts in America Improperly Issued Injunctions against Unions
Lets now consider the period in American history when employers availed themselves
of legal remedies for union misconduct. Prior to theNew Deal, employers could and did
file lawsuits against unions when the unions violated other peoples rights, and
sometimes employers obtained injunctive relief against union conductjudicial orders
forbidding certain conduct. One of the most widely embraced myths of labor law is the
canard that prior to passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932 federal courts
routinely issued injunctions to restrain peaceful labor disputes between employees and
According to twentieth-century trade unionists, labor injunctions, the focus of
Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greenes fabled book The Labor Injunction (1930), were
a tool of capitalist oppression and industrial tyranny. In New Deal mythology, the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which withdrew jurisdiction from federal courts to issue injunctions
in most labor disputes, representsalong with the NLRAthe Magna
Carta of organized labor.
Proponents of the Norris-LaGuardia Act claim that it was necessary to prevent the
issuance of abusive injunctions restricting peaceful union activities. Critics view this law
differentlyas the first step down the road to granting legal privileges to unions and
abrogating employers long-standing legal rights. The notion that federal courts were
one-sided in issuing injunctions and that peaceful picketing was routinely enjoined has
been accepted as gospel. But was the epoch of government by injunction myth or
Prior to 1932, it is true, employers sometimes availed themselves of legal remedies
for union misconduct that included engaging in violence, forcibly interfering with the
employers business, and preventing willing workers from performing services during a
strike. The use of such legal remedies was not an abuse of the legal system but a legitimate
assertion of rights under state and federal law that prohibited coercive and
anticompetitive conduct. Before the NLRA was passed in 1935, drastically altering the
legal landscape and ushering in an era of federal preemption, state law governed the
employment relationship (and in many cases proscribed conduct deemed to constitute
common-law restraints on trade).
The common law was surprisingly hospitable toward union activity. Unlike
merchants and manufacturers, whose collusion was deemed to constitute a tortious
restraint of trade, peaceful wage fixing by labor unions in the guise of collective
bargaining and other concerted activity was never proscribed in the United States (at
least not since Commonwealth v. Hunt [5 Mass. 111] in 1842). Concerted action, such
as strikes and picketing, was not regarded as unlawful so long as strikers did not use force
or violence to interfere with an employers business. But the common law did not
countenance thuggery, threats, and intimidation of recalcitrant employers and nonunion
workers. Employers could and did file lawsuits against unions when the unions
violated other peoples rights, and sometimes employers obtained injunctive relief
against violent or coercive union conduct.
In the late nineteenth century, employers learned to combat labor violence and
disruptive tactics (such as secondary boycotts) by seeking injunctions against unions
under common-law rules forbidding conspiracies and restraints of trade. After the
Sherman Act was enacted in 1890, unions were also subject to the federal antitrust laws
and were sometimes enjoined on that basis. Radical union leader Eugene Debs was
jailed for violating such an injunction during the infamous Pullman strike in 1894.
When the Supreme Court explicitly applied the antitrust laws to unions in 1908 (Loewe
v. Lawlor [208 U.S. 274]), organized labor successfully lobbied for passage of an
antitrust exemption in the Clayton Act of 1914, but unions remained subject to injunction
for violations of state law. Moreover, in Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering (254
U.S. 443 ), the Supreme Court ruled that the Clayton Act did not protect secondary activitythat is, union pressure against third-party employers who were not
parties to the labor dispute.
Labor-union advocates coined a pejorative slogan to demonize employers exercise
of their legal rights, government by injunction, which the Democratic Party
platform rallied behind as early as 1896. This political slogan eventually supplanted
employers common-law rights. After an abortive effort at reform in 1914 with passage
of the Clayton Act, union pressure ultimately led to the enactment of federal legislation
in 1932 forbidding federal courts to issue injunctions in labor disputes in most cases.
President Herbert Hoover signed the Norris-LaGuardia Act into law.
The goal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to prevent federal courts from issuing
injunctions against labor unions for any reasoneffectively granting them a legal
privilege (see Moreno 2008, 3140). Harvard Law School professor Felix Frankfurter,
an ardent champion of organized labor (among other progressive causes), was the
principal drafter of what became the Norris-LaGuardia Act before President Franklin D.
Roosevelt appointed him to the Supreme Court in 1939 (Pfander 1991). Frankfurter
and a former student, Nathan Greene, also wrote an influential book in 1930 entitled
The Labor Injunction, contending that federal courts granted such injunctions with
excessive zeal. Frankfurter and Greene cataloged the issuance of injunctions in labor
disputes but failed to analyze the circumstances in which they were granted, in effect
presuming that all disputes involved peaceful primary activity. This assumption was
The Labor Injunction was tendentious enough to be called a brief for the Norris-
LaGuardia Act yet is now cited reverentially by pro-labor scholars, as PaulMoreno points
out (2008, 24). Unions had long sought immunity from federal court injunctions, and in
1932 with the aid of Frankfurters one-sided scholarship, they finally obtained it.
Sylvester Petro, who taught labor law at New York University and Wake Forest for
decades (and whom I profile in my blog Misrule of Law), argued that it is a myth. He did
this in a series of articles published in the Wake Forest Law Review and the North
Carolina Law Review from 1978 to 1982. Petro meticulously reviewed every reported
state and federal court labor-injunction case from 1880 to 1932numbering 524to
determine if the courts acted in accordance with traditional principles of equity (see,
e.g., Petro 1978, 345). Petro concluded, based on his exhaustive research, that, on the
whole, courts faithfully followed the well-established common-law rules and relevant
Rather than finding class bias in favor of employers, as claimed by union advocates,
Petro found that courts most often ruled in favor of nonunion workers who were wishing to accept employment on terms that union employees had refusedthat is, the courts
protected the right of scabs to work during a strike. Specifically, Petro concluded that
not one primary strike for better terms and conditions of employment was ever finally
enjoined merely as such (1978, 345). The same is true for peaceful primary picketing
and other forms of strictly peaceable persuasion: courts granted relief to the employer
only when such conduct was intertwined with violence.
Like the other crusaders, Messrs. Frankfurter and Greene in The Labor
Injunction were very quiet about the principal feature of the labor-disputes
brought before the courts of equity between 1880 and 1932. Violence,
vandalism, property destruction, and intimidation dominated the cases. A
discussion of the labor-injunction cases which ignored that fact amounted to
staging the play Hamlet without the character which gave it meaning. When
forced to recognize this, the crusaders typically blamed employers either for the
violence itself or for bringing it on. But the facts of the hundreds of violence cases
collected here are clearly to the contrary. The aggressors were the unions and the
organized workers; the victims were mainly and directly nonunion, antiunion,
or rival-union employees, and secondarily the investors in the
businesses which violent unionists so frequently besieged, bombed, and
vandalized. (1978, 34546, emphasis added)
Petro concludes: Those unaware of the pervasive violence in the cases cannot properly
understand let alone appraise the rulings of the much maligned judges in the age of
government by injunction. . . . [H]ad the unionists pursued their objectives peacefully
and lawfully there would have been no government by injunction. In short, Petro
believes that the judges who administered equity in labor disputes between 1880 and
1932 ranked high among the most faithful and gallant public servants that the United
States has ever had (1978, 34546). Richard Epstein concurs with Petro:
Petro has much the better of the historical argument. The chief flaw of the
Frankfurter and Greene study is, as Petro points out, that it never asks the
question of whether the issuance of the labor injunction was a use or an abuse of
power. Where there is the threat of force by workers, it is the failure to grant the
injunction that is the abuse of discretion, not its issuance. And as Petro rightly
points out, the application of the injunction to labor cases did not involve any
departure from the well established equitable principle that injunctions are an
appropriate response to threats of irreparable harm. (1983, 1407 n. 149,
emphasis added, citations omitted)
And yet in the mythology of American labor history, judges granting injunctions against
unions have been reviled as despicable tyrants and bullies. This characterization of them
is a specious delusion. Labor unions and their advocates complain about employers legal abuses, but organized labor enjoys remarkable privileges under federal law, including
the Norris-LaGuardia Act (on this point, see Pulliam 1981, 42, 5557; Moreno 2008;
Myth Number 6: The Model of Collective Bargaining Used in the Wagner Act Is beyond Reproach
The Great Depression wrought the New Deal, including the Wagner Act (the NLRA)
passed in 1935. The New Deal is now often regarded as inevitable and visionary, but in
reality it was haphazard and messy. Some of it, such as the central economic controls
represented in the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933 and the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1933, both of which were ultimately declared unconstitutional
by the U.S. Supreme Court, was plainly borrowed from Benito
Mussolinis corporatism. We tend to view our current model of collective bargaining
as preordained, consistent with other nations practices, and beyond reproach, yet it
rests on some unique and highly controversial features.
For one thing, the NLRA created an administrative agency, the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), to enforce the law and adjudicate labor cases in lieu of
submitting such disputes to the federal courts. We have grown accustomed to the
alphabet soup of federal agencies that now dominate policy making (and even lawmaking)
in Washington, D.C., but this sprawling bureaucracy was largely a creation of
the New Deal. Administrative agencies marked a significant expansion of the federal
government. The NLRB was a pioneer in this dubious genre. Critics of unaccountable
government by bureaucrats justifiably question whether administrative agencies
comport with the Constitutions separation of powers. Congress is supposed to make
law, and the judiciary is supposed to decide cases, but unelected agencies such as the
NLRB do both. Long regarded as partisan, fickle, and inefficient, the NLRB is emblematic
of the bloated administrative state.
From a substantive perspective, one of the most significantand uniquefeatures
of the NLRA is the concept of exclusive representation, set forth in section 9(a). This
controversial concept lies at the heart of collective bargaining. Exclusive representation,
which had never previously been adopted anywhere in the world, allows a labor
union to act as the bargaining representative for all employees in a unit that selected the
union by majority rule. (Unlike in political elections, in union elections representation
does not have a finite term; union representation, once selected, can last for decades without any further expression of employee support.) Exclusive representation represents
an extraordinary interference with the ability of individual employees to enter into
consensual arrangements with their employer (and vice versa). Employees are forced to
participate in a union-controlled labor cartel in lieu of being able to contract on their own
behalf. Exclusive representation is, therefore, a shockingly coercive mechanism that
strips both employees and employers of their contractual autonomy.
Here is a simplified illustration of how exclusive representation works. If the
shipping and receiving department of ABC Company has one hundred employees, and
a fifty-one-person majority of the employees voting in a union election favor union
representation, the union would become the exclusive spokesperson and bargaining
agent for all one hundred employees, even the forty-nine of them who opposed unionization. Exclusive representation forbids the employer from having any separate
negotiations with those employees as individuals. The minority of employees in the
unit are effectively stripped of their individual bargaining rights for the duration of their
employment. They cant ask the employer for a raise or a promotion or a bonus or even a
private meeting to discuss a grievance. They must accept the terms and conditions of
employment negotiated on their behalf by the unioneven if they object to those terms
and even if could have obtained more favorable terms on their own.
This remarkable subjugation of individual rights to the collective interests of the
bargaining unit as a whole, represented exclusively by the union, is an inevitableand
intendedconsequence of unionization under the NLRA. Collective bargaining
literally supersedes individual rights in the workplace. Exclusive representation forces
the minority to accept the terms negotiated by the union, a position that unions call
being a free rider but more accurately amounts to being a forced rider. Unions cite
the free-rider phenomenon as a reason to be able to force the minority to join the
union or pay the equivalent of union dues (called agency fees) as a condition of
employment, but if union representation were voluntary, or nonexclusive, there would
be no free riders.
The requirement that even objecting employees must submit to employment
terms negotiated by the union, including the payment of union dues , has led to decades
of unnecessary litigation regarding compelled financial support of the unions political
activities, the unfair treatment of individual employees through the union-controlled
grievance process, and other disputes that would be avoided in the absence of exclusive
representation (see Pulliam 1984). For example, in Steel v. Louisville & Nashville
Railroad Co. (323 U.S. 192 ), the U.S. Supreme Court concocted the duty of
fair representation, a judge-made doctrine found nowhere in the NLRA itself, to
combat rampant racial discrimination by union officials in the railroad industry (Aaron
1968, 167). The alternative would have been to render black employees helpless in the
face of union mistreatment.
Likewise, in a series of decisions beginning with Railway Employees Dept. v.
Hanson (351 U.S. 225 ) and continuing with Machinists v. Street (367 U.S. 740
), Railway Clerks v. Allen (373 U.S. 113 ), Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education (431 U.S. 209 ), and Comunications Workers v. Beck (487 U.S. 735 ), the Supreme Court has struggled to protect the First Amendment rights of
objecting employees. The recurring scenario is that the union, as exclusive bargaining
representative, invariably negotiates a contract with the employer requiring all employees
(including those who do not wish to join the union) to pay dues (or agency fees) to the
union as a condition of their employment. These payments are typically quite substantial
and are usually deducted automatically from employees paychecks. Employees who
object to this arrangement face termination of employment. The union then uses those
monies for political purposes that dissenting (or nonunion) employees often find
Even though the NLRA does not expressly prohibit this practice, the Supreme
Court has developed creative workarounds, such as rebate procedures, to avoid the
compelled-speech dilemma created by such mandatory payments. In the private
sector, compelled financial support of unions has been reduced but not eliminated
altogether (which is the main reason why unions remain a major political force).
In the public sector, the First Amendment issues are harder to avoid because of the
existence of state action: the employer is a governmental entity subject to the First
Amendment, not a private business. Hence, an agreement requiring that all government
employees pay union dues or agency fees when the union is engaged in political activities
is a direct abridgement of objecting employees free-speech rights. In Janus v. AFSCME (585 U.S. ___ ), the Supreme Court finally disallowed agency-fee provisions in
public-sector union contracts, forty-one years after initially condoning them in Abood (1977). (Janus will have a profound impact on public-sector unions by banning coerced
financial support; only voluntary payments, by employees who choose to be union
members, will be permitted.)
The so-called free-rider issue has led to considerable litigation before the NLRB
and in the U.S. Supreme Court as well as to the passage of so-called right-to-work
legislation at the state level. Without the concept of exclusive representation in the
NLRA, these controversies could have been avoided altogether. An alternative model
would allow employees who wish to be represented by a union to do so, while not
forcing their coworkers to go along with the majority. The majority-rule model,
necessary in the operation of government, is not essential in the workplace (particularly
when union representation, once selected, has a potentially unlimited duration).
Employment is not the state. Subordinating the rights of dissenting employees
through exclusive representation only engorges labor unions with monopoly power.
Former Harvard president Derek Bok (1971), who was also a labor-law scholar,
noted the uniqueness of exclusive representation in the United States. The doctrine
is more than unique; it is fraught with coercion and prone to numerous legal objections.
It was derived from the ill-fated NIRAs codes of fair competition and is a vestige of Mussolini-era labor cartels (Petro 1974a; Moreno 2008, 4143). Exclusive
representation is outdated and should be eliminated.
Myth Number 7: Government Employees Should Be Allowed
to Unionize Also
The final union myth is the most outlandish of alland potentially the most destructive.
As we have seen, collective bargaining was not legally required in the United States until
the NLRA was enacted in 1935, and, even then it was limited to private-sector employees.
Government employees were intentionally excludedfor a reason. Recall that
the rationale for unions was to rectify the supposed inequality of bargaining power
between employees and corporate employersto level the playing field for capital and
labor. Unions seek to obtain a fair share of the employers profits through labor
negotiations. The primary justification of collective bargaining is to remedy the supposed
Marxian exploitation of labor by profit-making businesses.
At the time the NLRA was enacted, even New Deal liberals, such as Franklin D.
Roosevelt, properly viewed government employees as a fundamentally different situation.
Government employees were thought to be public servants, not part of an
economic struggle. The New Dealers were right. It is highly ironic that even the architects
of the administrative state, hostile to capitalism and enamored of central
planning, had a clearer conception of government than todays policy makers do.
The government represents the citizenry, not investors. The government does not
generate a profit. The amount of compensation paid to government workers is a political decision, not the product of economic competition. In a democracy, we elect
representatives to allocate finite taxpayer resources among various needs: public safety,
roads, education, parks, and so on. Unlike a market transaction, paying taxes is not
optional. Government entities are monopolies that do not depend on competition or
consensual exchanges. FDR and other New Dealers rightly thought that the right to
strike was totally incompatible with government employment: unthinkable and intolerable,
in FDRs words. Public-sector unionization is indefensible. It is naked rent
seeking, and nothing more.
FDRs wisdom regarding government workers has been lost. Even though the
NLRA did not cover public employeesand still does notbeginning in the 1960s the
growing number of government employees at the state and local level lobbied for and
obtained collective-bargaining rights and in some cases the right to strike. Public-sector
unionization is subject to statenot federallaw, and many states have permitted it.
From a public-choice perspective, the explanation is clear. The growing number of
government employees (especially at the state and local level) have organized as a faction and have sought to increase their compensation, benefits, and job security at the
expense of taxpayers.
The results are dramatic. In contrast to organized labors steadily declining representation of private-sector employees, public-sector unionization sharply increased until the 1990s (although it has subsequently declined a bit). Several factors account
for the differential.
Because unionization in the private sector is constrained by economic competition
among employers and even among different countries (witness the collapse of the U.S.
automobile industry in the face of foreign competition, especially from Japan), privatesector
employers have an economic incentive to strenuously resist union organization.
When possible, auto manufacturers have moved production to right-to-work states that
disfavor unionization and aggressively resist organizing efforts in those plants
frequently with success.
Union avoidance is often regarded as a matter of economic survival in the private
sector. Notwithstanding the one-sided rules governing representation elections
favoring unionsthe global economy has steadily reduced the portion of the privatesector
workforce in the United States that is represented by a union. Union membership
among private-sector employees has steadily declined since the mid-1950s, and the
percentage of unionized employees in the private-sector workforce6.4 percentis
now less than one-fifth of its peak of about 35 percent in 1954.
In contrast, the public sector faces no such economic or market constraint.
Government employers have almost no economic incentive to resist union organizing
and sometimes even encourage it. Labor costs are simply passed through to taxpayers.
Governments do not have to compete for customers or earn a profit. Taxes are
compulsory. Taxpayers have no choice whether to pay. Consumers of government
services at the state or local level have no marketplace alternatives other than moving
elsewhere. Taxpayers are captive customers. The public is terribly vulnerable to strikes
by government employees, a weakness exploited by public-sector unions to extract
absurdly one-sided contract terms. As one might expect, for all the foregoing reasons,
the rate of union membership in the public sector has grown considerably.
Government employees now account for about half of the total union membership
nationwide. Public-employee unions undermine democracy by using union dues to
help elect candidates to state and local office who will be sympathetic to their demands.
These candidates, once elected, sit across the bargaining table from the unions who
helped elect them. The negotiations are a farce. The unions write their own ticket,
and the taxpayershaving no one to represent their interestsfoot the bill. The result
is inflated government payrolls, excessive salaries, and public-employee pension benefits so generousbordering on plunderthat many state and local governments are deeply
It is now taken for granted that government workersteachers, police officers,
firefighters, and the restshould have the same rights as their private-sector
counterparts, without considering that the inequality of bargaining power has no
application to public servants. Even FDR knew better. States should disallow the folly of
America has changed dramatically since 1935, when the NLRA was enacted. The
economy has shifted from blue-collar to white-collar jobs. Employees are much better
educated than they were eighty years ago and enjoy much greater mobility. In the gig
economy enabled by smart-phone apps and similar technology, many workers prefer
the flexible hours of independent-contractor arrangements in lieu of traditional employment.
Many employees telecommute, work part-time, or even share jobsoptions
that were unimaginable in 1935.
Moreover, an extensive array of lawsnonexistent in 1935have been adopted
to regulate employment practices, working conditions, and employee benefits. Union
representation and collective-bargaining agreements are not necessary to assure that
workers receive protections such as minimum wages, maximum hours, overtime,
workplace safety, and remedies for workplace discrimination and retaliation. In some
states, nonunion employees even enjoy legal recourse for wrongful termination or
unjust dismissalsomething once available only through union representation.
A fairly static and purely domestic economy has been replaced by a dynamic global
model. The unemployment rate is at a fifty-year low, and employers compete intensely
for labor. We are no longer reeling from a great depression. A strong case can be made
that collective-bargaining rights are neither necessary nor warranted. The NLRA is an
archaic relic of a prior era. The nation desperately needs a complete rethinking of the
role of government in the workplace that reflects contemporary technological, economic,
social, and other realities.
American labor unions developed in the early twentieth century as an outgrowth to
the Industrial Revolution and in response to the Great Depression. The conditions and
circumstances that existed in that era no longer obtain. Much of our thinking about
organized labor is based on outdated concepts, misconceptions, Marxist economics,
andin many caseshistorical fabrications. Our instinctive sympathy for the downtrodden
tends to make us receptive to simplistic rhetoric resting on class conflict. Facts and
logic must be summoned to dispel the lazy embrace of pro-union tropes. Fashionable
opinion has a tendency to harden into orthodoxy, sometimes bordering on mythology.
Much of what is accepted as dogma in the area of labor law and labor history is
simply falsethe equivalent of fairy tales. Inertia is not a substitute for critical thinking. Debunking myths is the first step toward reaching a new understanding of a sensible
labor policy for the twenty-first century. We must take off the ideological blindfold and
consider the issues anew.
 As Richard Posner explains, labor law is founded on a policy that is the opposite of the policies of
competition and economic efficiency that most economists support. Accordingly, the field is unlikely to
attract, as a subject for teaching and scholarship, the lawyer who is deeply committed to economic analysis; it
is likely to repel him (1984, 990).
 Although it is true that many entertainers and professional athletes are covered by union contracts,
individual performers (unlike employees in typical bargaining units) are free to negotiate a better deal for
themselves with the studio or sports team.
 See Carter et al. 2006, especially figure Ba-L on the real wages of unskilled workers in the United States.
It also shows that other common measures of oppression, such as the average number of hours worked per
week, child labor, and life expectancy, continued to steadily improve in the early twentieth century, before the passage of New Deal legislation. Robert Whaples finds an overwhelming consensus among economic
historians that unions werent the cause of the decline in the length of the workweek (1995, question 33).
 The degree of contempt in which unionists hold strikebreakers is hard to describe. Jack London reportedly
had this to say about scabs: After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, he
had some awful substance left with which he made a scab. A scab is a two-legged animal with a corkscrew
soul, a water brain, a combination backbone of jelly and glue. Where others have hearts, he carries a tumor of
rotten principles. When a scab comes down the street, men turn their backs and angels weep in heaven, and
the devil shuts the gates of hell to keep him out. No man (or woman) has a right to scab so long as there is a
pool of water to drown his carcass in, or a rope long enough to hang his body with. Judas was a gentleman
compared with a scab. For betraying his master, he had character enough to hang himself. A scab has not.
Esau sold his birthright for a mess of pottage. Judas sold his Savior for thirty pieces of silver. Benedict Arnold
sold his country for a promise of a commission in the British army. The scab sells his birthright, country, his
wife, his children and his fellowmen for an unfulfilled promise from his employer. Esau was a traitor to
himself; Judas was a traitor to his God; Benedict Arnold was a traitor to his country. A scab is a traitor to his
God, his country, his family and his class (1913).
 See Dickman  1987, 11518, 37879, 381; Savage  1990; Lukas 1997; Irwin 2013. Noted
union advocate Clarence Darrow, who defended the Los Angeles Times bombers at trial, was subsequently
charged with jury tampering (bribery) in the caseand prosecuted himselfa tale well told in Cowan 1993.
Legal scholar Thomas R. Haggard (1980, 1981, 1982) has exhaustively documented violence by unionized
 The Clayton Act, designed to exempt labor unions from antitrust liability, declared that [t]he labor of a
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be
construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations, . . . or to forbid or restrain
individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall
such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies
in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws (15 U.S.C., sec. 17).
J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 33436 (1944). Here is how the Supreme Court approvingly
described the NLRAs collectivist goal: The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective
agreement is to supersede the terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the
strength and bargaining power and serve the welfare of the group. . . . The practice and philosophy of
collective bargaining looks [sic] with suspicion on . . . individual advantages (at 338, emphasis added).
 Many other industrialized nations, mainly in Europe, conduct labor relations through works councils
or multiemployer associations or on an industry-wide basis, or they regulate labor conditions by centralized
 The literature on this point is vast. See, for instance, Petro 1974b; Summers 1976; Pulliam 1984 (and
authorities cited therein); DiSalvo 2010.
 See Carter et al. 2006, figure Ba-U, p. 2-56, for historical private-sector, nonagricultural unionization
rates. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2019), unionization among government employees
is at 33.9 percent.
Aaron, Benjamin. 1968. The Unions Duty of Fair Representation under the Railway Labor and
National Labor Relations Acts. Journal of Air Law and Commerce 34: 167207.
Bok, Derek. 1971. Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor Laws. Harvard
Law Review 84: 13941463.
Carter, Susan B., Scott Sigmund Gartner, Michael R. Haines, Alan L. Olmstead, Richard Sutch,
and Gavin Wright. 2006. Work and Welfare. Vol. 2. of Historical Statistics of the United States:
Millennial Edition. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Cowan, Geoffrey. 1993. The People v. Clarence Darrow: The Bribery Trial of Americas Greatest
Lawyer. New York: Times Books.
Dickman, Howard. 1987. Industrial Democracy in America: Ideological Origins of
National Labor Relations Policy. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court.
DiSalvo, Daniel. 2010. The Trouble with Public Sector Unions. National Affairs 40 (Summer):
Epstein, Richard. 1983. A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor
Legislation. Yale Law Journal 92: 13571408.
Summers, Robert S. 1976. Collective Bargaining and Public Benefit Conferral: A Jurisprudential
Critique. Ithaca, N.Y.: Institute of Public Employment, New York State School of Industrial
and Labor Relations, Cornell University.