The regulatory state, some writers claim, arose in response to failures of the legal system. In the case of blood markets, however, regulation came about not from public outcry caused by faulty laws and courts, but from lobbying by interest groups who expected special benefits from regulation.
Michael D. Thomas is Assistant Professor of Economics at Creighton University.
Diana W. Thomas is a Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute, Associate Professor of Economics and Director of the Institute for Economic Inquiry in the Heider College of Business at Creighton University, and Co-Editor of The Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy.
EconomyFDA and Drug RegulationFree Market EconomicsHealth and Healthcare
Other Independent Review articles by Michael D. Thomas
Fall 2020 Markets against Modernity: Ecological Irrationality, Public, and Private
Spring 2018 Inside Job: How Government Insiders Subvert the Public Interest
Summer 2014 Sin Taxes and Sindustry: Revenue, Paternalism, and Political Interest
Other Independent Review articles by Diana W. Thomas
Winter 2022/23 Plutocratic Socialism: The Future of Private Property and the Fate of the Middle Class
Winter 2010/11 Bootleggers, Baptists, and Political Entrepreneurs: Key Players in the Rational Game and Morality Play of Regulatory Politics