New Anti-Merger Theories
Abstract: This paper discusses two recent innovations in federal antitrust enforcement of mergers: unilateral effects and innovation markets. These instruments of merger analysis, despite increasing usage by federal regulators, are inconsistent with modern economic theory, and lead to erroneous and overly restrictive enjoinments of potential mergers. Antitrust regulators should avoid using these and similar instruments in future merger evaluations.
A paper based on this work has now been published as: Lopez, E.J. 2001. New Anti-Merger Theories: A Critique. Cato Journal 20 (3): 359-378.
Edward J. López is BB&T Distinguished Professor of Capitalism at Western Carolina University.
Antitrust, Competition, and MonopolyBanking and FinanceBureaucracy and GovernmentBusiness and EntrepreneurshipEconomic PolicyEconomyFree Market EconomicsGovernment and PoliticsPublic ChoiceRegulation
Before posting, please read our Comment Policy.