ATF’s “Firearm” and “Frame or Receiver” Rules Invalid

The Supreme Court in Bondi v. VanDerStok (2025) rejected a challenge under the Administrative Procedure Act to a 2022 Final Rule by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (ATF) expanding the definitions of “firearm” and “frame or receiver.”  See my post here.  However, the Court did not entertain the constitutional challenges brought by Defense Distributed.  In a decision issued on August 17 in Defense Distributed v. Blanche, Judge Reed O’Connor of the Northern District of Texas declared the regulations unconstitutionally vague and violative of the Second Amendment.

In 1968, Congress defined “firearm” in the Gun Control Act to include “any weapon … which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive” and “the frame or receiver of any such weapon.”  18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3).  Contemporaneously, ATF’s predecessor agency defined “frame or receiver” as “that part of a firearm which provides housing for the hammer, bolt or breechblock, and firing mechanism, and which is usually threaded at its forward portion to receive the barrel.”  33 F.R. 18558 (1968).  There things stood until 2022 when the Biden ATF decided to reinvent the wheel by “improving” these longstanding definitions under the fake issue of “ghost guns.”

Just quoting the Final Rule’s definition for “frame or receiver,” 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c)(c), itself exposes the vagueness thereof.  It includes “a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver … that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted” into one, but not “a forging, casting, printing, extrusion, unmachined body, or similar article that has not yet reached a stage of manufacture where it is clearly identifiable as an unfinished component part of a weapon (e.g., unformed block of metal, liquid polymer, or other raw material).”  As the court notes, “when a hunk of metal or plastic” reaches that stage is “is left to the subjective determination of the ATF.”

The Biden-era regulation further states that ATF “may consider any associated templates, jigs, molds, equipment, tools, instructions, guides, or marketing materials that are sold, distributed, or possessed with [or otherwise made available to the purchaser or recipient of] the item or kit.”  But it does not say “exactly what set of materials ATF thinks are relevant to this inquiry.”

In addition, the rule added a gloss to the definition of “firearm” as “a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive.”  27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (“firearm”).

The term “readily” is problematic enough when used in the statute—what “may readily be converted to expel a projectile”—but is hopelessly vague when used in the Final Rule.  As the court states, “It is hard to see how ‘readily’ in the context of an already formed weapon and ‘readily’ in the context of a block of metal or plastic and a jig or template are synonymous.”

The parties did not dispute that making or repairing firearms is protected by the Second Amendment.  Under Bruen, the burden shifted to the government to demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.  But the historical analogues cited by the government failed to do so.  A mere two states in the early republic required firearm barrels to be “proved” (tested) and stamped to certify their strength and safety. In Bruen, the Supreme Court doubted that “three colonial regulations could suffice to show a tradition of public-carry regulation.” The “why” was to protect the user from harm in the form of an early consumer-protection theory, while the “why” of the Final Rule was to enable ATF to engage in fighting crime by tracing firearms and (in theory) prohibiting their acquisition by prohibited persons.  The “how” of the proving laws was to inspect and mark a barrel and collect a fee, while the “how” of the modern regulation was to impose regulation of parts and raw material to make firearms.  Similar reasons distinguished gunpowder storage rules at the Founding that protected the public from volatile explosives from today’s rule meant for crime control.

Not only does the Final Rule lack historical analogues, the court found, it “contradicts the actual historical tradition of personal gunsmithing. Self-manufacture of firearms in America was common and indeed foundational to establishing our Nation.”  During the colonial, revolutionary, and early republic periods, Americans were admonished to make firearms in order to arm the population.  The court cited Joseph Greenlee, “The American Tradition of Self-Made Arms,” 54 St. Mary’s L.J. 35 (2023).

Accordingly, the court declared that 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 and 27 C.F.R. § 478.12(c) are unconstitutional under the Second Amendment and the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The court further enjoined enforcement thereof against Defense Distributed, the Second Amendment Foundation (SAF), or any of SAF’s current or future members, but only with respect to the products raised in the complaint—M1911 80% Frames and the G80 Build Kit, Unfinished Receiver, and Grip Module.  The practical effect is that the company may sell the items and SAF members may buy them without requiring them to be distributed as a firearm through a federal firearms licensee.

Defense Distributed could have a broader impact, particularly if affirmed and further exposited by the Fifth Circuit, by challenging courts to strictly construe terms like “readily,” whether found in a regulation or the statutes.  The vagueness of “readily” may be ameliorated somewhat by the requirement that the government must prove that a party “knew the weapon he possessed had the characteristics that brought it within the statutory definition….”  Staples v. U.S. (1994).

Some of the “assault weapon” definitions include reference to parts that can be “readily” assembled into one.  In a case I litigated years ago, it was decided that “the phrase ‘may be readily assembled’ does not provide sufficient information to enable a person of average intelligence to determine whether a particular combination of parts is within the ordinance’s coverage.”  Peoples Rights Organization v. City of Columbus (6th Cir. 1998).

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On September 4, President Trump granted a pardon to Navy veteran Patrick Tate Adamiak, who was serving a 20-year sentence after being convicted of violations of the National Firearms Act.  The case involved cut-up machinegun parts and an inert, incomplete grenade launcher.  He filed a cert petition arguing that the NFA’s definitions of “machinegun” and “destructive device” each have multiple definitions, 26 U.S.C. §5845, but the indictment was defective for not alleging which specific definitions applied.  The petition was denied on May 18.