If implemented, the 1997 Kyoto Accord on greenhouse gases would affect some interested parties more than others. These differential effects help explain why some energy firms, trade associations and countries jumped eagerly on the Kyoto bandwagon—and why others view the Accord as a “protectionist” cartelization device.
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Bruce Yandle is Alumni Distinguished Professor of Economics, Emeritus and Dean Emeritus, Clemson University and co-editor of Regulation and the Reagan Era.
| Other Independent Review articles by Bruce Yandle | ||
| Fall 2022 | Gaining Ground: Markets Helping Government | |
| Summer 2020 | The Next Fifty Years: Optimistic or Pessimistic? | |
| Spring 2020 | Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral and Drive Major Economic Events | |
| [View All (14)] | ||
