Among the Syrians

During a recent trip to the Middle East, I witnessed the devastation that Israel has inflicted upon Lebanon by the indiscriminate response to Hezbollah’s attacks across the border. That response has gone well beyond the Shia strongholds and has displaced one million people who might never be able to go home.

I also visited Damascus and ventured briefly outside of Syria’s capital, where room for optimism exists, provided two conditions are met: that the more sophisticated analyses of what the post-Assad actors are up to prevail over simple-minded, prejudiced observations, and that the current leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, tames the factions that do not share his vision.

The unlikely figure of Sharaa is Syria’s best hope of change. He is a former Islamist who was part of the radical insurgency in Iraq. Later, he participated in the Syrian civil war on al Qaeda’s side, but broke ranks with it and the Islamic State to establish a governorate in the northwest before toppling Assad’s Ba’athist regime.

He has sought to incorporate various political and religious groups into the new Syria; distanced himself from Tehran; adhered to the 1970s agreement with Israel, which, while not a full peace treaty, is a goodwill document; and established working relationships with Western countries, including the United States.

So far, Sharaa has succeeded in his main challenges except one. He has obtained the benefit of the doubt regarding his conversion from Jihadism to tolerant, pluralistic governance, including the incorporation of the Kurds, who until recently controlled a third of the territory. He has managed to avoid a multiparty civil war in a country where each armed faction has more experience fighting than governing.

The question of the Druze remains, however. They control the Suweida province in the south with the overt protection of Israel, which wrongly attributes sporadic attacks against the religious minority to Sharaa. In fact, those attacks have been carried out by a disruptive faction of the army that is not under his control. This opinion is backed by none other than Walid Joumblatt, the historic leader of the Lebanese Druze, with whom I met in Beirut. He has travelled to Syria to instill some sense into them and has good relations with Damascus. He concludes that the radicalized Hikmat al-Hijri, the warlord who is seeking to break away from Syria, “is out of his mind.”

After years of war and isolation, the collapse of Syria’s infrastructure and industrial base, and widespread insecurity, have made it impossible to reverse the calamitous decline. This, despite the recent lifting of some international sanctions and efforts to allow a market economy to flourish. Since 2011, Syria has lost 85 percent of its gross domestic product; 90 percent of the population is poor and relies on black-market imports from Turkey.

The potential for improvement, nonetheless, is significant. I met a group of businesspeople who are betting on the tourist industry, convinced that the country’s ancient cultural treasures could make it a jewel of the eastern Mediterranean. They also envision Syria as a major logistics hub and facilitator of trade between East and West, as it was for thousands of years, thanks to its privileged location connecting the Mediterranean, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and the Silk Road from Asia.

Sharaa seems more interested in development than in theocracy or war, but forces conspire against him, including some of his allies who fought Assad alongside him, convinced they were aiming for an Islamic state. Certain signs, such as the recent decree by the municipal authorities of Damascus confining the sale of alcohol to Christian neighborhoods, are ominous. Nobody believes they will enforce this norm, just as many rules are ignored in the relatively tolerant cities (unlike the more traditional countryside), but the decree indicates the challenge Sharaa faces.

The dangers implicit in a modernization dependent on one man are twofold: the potential transformation of the government into an authoritarian machine bent on quashing rebellion, and the possible reaction triggered in more traditional quarters, perhaps plunging the country into a new internecine struggle. So far, this has not happened.

Sharaa, who has signed a five-year transitional document that serves as a de facto constitution, seems aware of the risks and has thus far been able to outflank his potential rivals and saboteurs, keeping his country out of the ongoing regional war.