Despite Newsweeks astonishing cover story announcing Victory at Last, the results of the Iraqi election could destabilize the country, as they did five years ago.
In 2005, the disaffected Sunnis boycotted the vote and resorted to violence during and after the long interregnum in which Iraqi factions bickered and bargained to form a government. Burned by under-representation in the Iraqi parliament as a result of their boycott, the Sunnis participated this time around. So everything should turn out better, right? Not likely.
Despite the veneer of multi-ethno-sectarian election groupings, Iraqis still vote mostly along ethno-sectarian lines. A foreign power imposing a foreign system of democracy at gunpoint will always have several major problems in a country such as Iraq. All of these have to do with underlying societal forces that undermine the superstructure of democracy, rendering it artificial.
The first is that history shows that democracy is most likely to survive in countries that have reached a certain economic level and have thus developed a powerful middle class. Iraq--the victim of the most grinding economic sanctions in world history, three devastating wars since 1980, and ethno-sectarian rebellion as far back as the eye can seehas seen its economy plummet past the point where democracy is likely to prove sustainable.
Second, Iraq, since becoming independent of British rule, has largely been ruled by a series of dictators, the latest of which was Saddam Hussein. As demonstrated by Prime Minister Nouri al-Malikis invocation of his title as Commander-in-Chief of Iraqi security forces and his demand for an electoral recount (even before the official results were announced), Iraqs political culture is still one of threats, intimidation, and accusation. This is a fact that cant be changed just by holding a few elections.
Third and most important, the underlying ethno-sectarian fissures in the country render a successful federal system of government almost impossible. Such a system requires close cooperation between the national, provincial, and local levels, which is very difficult when groups fight for power at all levels on an ethno-sectarian basis. A very loose and more decentralized confederation might be a better form of government for a fractured Iraq.
The results of the recent election indicate a very close race between Prime Minister al-Malikis faction, which was supported mainly by Shia, and Ayad Allawis group, which was primarily backed by Sunnis. Since the majority Shii vote has been split, it is possible that Allawi could try to form the next government. If that happens, the Shia and the Kurdslong oppressed by the minority Sunnismight anticipate that recurring, and they could react violently.
If instead al-Maliki ends up trying to form a government, then the Sunnis could again feel politically marginalized, reigniting their insurgency. Also, returns indicate a strong showing by the anti-American radical Shii Muqtada al-Sadr, which could also cause a major problem for al-Maliki since he helped repress al-Sadrs militias in Basra and elsewhere. The Kurdsnow less unifiedare a wild card.
Lastly, no matter what final coalition ends up controlling the Iraqi government, the close election could mean another protracted interregnum before that negotiated grouping gels. The gap could be filled with more ethno-sectarian strife.
Thus, it is too early for the U.S. elites self-congratulation that democracy has finally been solidified in Iraq. Defeat could yet be snatched from the jaws of victory after U.S. forces leave, and even before that if the latest election is as destabilizing as was the one in 2005.
|Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at the Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office.|
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