The Shortest History of Economics
Book Review
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This book review is a web exclusive for the Fall 2025 issue of The Independent Review.
The Shortest History of Economics aims to simultaneously tell 1) the story of capitalism (of how our market system developed), 2) the story of the discipline of economics, and 3) the story of how economic forces have shaped world history—all in about 50,000 words.
The author is neither an economic historian nor a historian of economic thought—nor even an academic economist. Andrew Leigh is, however, very widely read and downright brilliant. He is currently Australia’s Assistant Minister for Productivity, Competition, Charities and Treasury, has served in its parliament for nearly a decade, holds a Ph.D. in public policy from Harvard, and has authored (or co-authored) fifteen books since 2002. (Two of these books, What’s the Worst That Could Happen?: Existential Risk and Extreme Politics and Randomistas: How Radical Researchers Are Changing Our World have been reviewed in The Independent Review.)
If you don’t know much about the three intertwined subjects of The Shortest History, you are likely to learn a lot from it. Likewise, if you do know a lot about the subjects, you are likely to learn quite a bit too. I did. However, that’s not meant to be an endorsement of the book, because you’ll also get a skewed view of things in crucial places. You’ll pile up a nice treasury of important big-picture insights and interesting tidbits, but at a potentially steep cost—as I discuss below.
As Leigh explains in the introduction, the “secret of our discipline is that the most powerful insights come from a handful of big ideas that anyone can comprehend” (5). Three of these are straight out of Intro to Econ and/or Adam Smith: incentives really matter; specialization leads to big productivity gains; and as specialization flourishes, trade becomes invaluable. The fourth is that the “big events are rarely driven by sudden shifts in norms or culture” (7) but more often by new technologies or changing policies. A couple of notable economic historians would dispute this. In A Culture of Growth, for example, Joel Mokyr argues that the primary driver of the Industrial Revolution was a cultural shift towards valuing and disseminating useful knowledge. In Bourgeois Dignity, D. N. McCloskey makes a similar argument—that the unprecedented economic growth of the modern era was primarily due to a shift in societal values and rhetoric, particularly the rise of liberalism and the revaluation of the “bourgeois” virtues. Leigh might reply that these changes weren’t “sudden,” but in the long history of humanity which this book covers they do appear to be rather sudden. Instead of grappling with these critical ideas about what sparked the “Great Enrichment,” Leigh’s chapter on “The Industrial Revolution and the Wealth of Nations” tells a much simpler and more compact story. It brings in important ideas from Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham, William Stanley Jevons, John Stuart Mill and even Frédéric Bastiat—along with interesting thoughts on the importance of clocks and mirrors, among other things. Writing a short history like this is a delicate balancing act. Another balancing act is temporal. The chronological plot of The Shortest History moves very quickly at first, before decelerating. One senses that Leigh really cares much more about the present, its immediate roots, and his agenda for the future. Surprisingly, to me at least, it takes only fifteen short pages to get from the dawn of humankind to the year 600 AD and we zip to the beginning of the twentieth century in another forty-eight pages.
Leigh discusses the threat of monopoly several times, beginning with the case of Standard Oil. However, I fear that he doesn’t understand the historical implications of monopolies very well. While he cites the arguments of nearly fifty economists—Gary Becker, Raj Chetty, Ronald Coase, Milton Friedman, John Kenneth Galbraith, Henry Hazlitt, Friedrich Hayek, Daniel Kahneman, John Maynard Keynes, Thomas Malthus, Elinor Ostrom, David Ricardo, Thomas Piketty, Joan Robinson, Paul Samuelson, Amartya Sen and many others—there are two glaring omissions. One is Joseph Schumpeter, who ranked fifth among twentieth century economists in a 2011 survey of economists in Econ Journal Watch. Had Leigh grasped Schumpeter’s ideas about entrepreneurship, the “gale of creative destruction,” and the ebb and flow of monopoly power, the reader would have a much fuller picture of the primary goal of Leigh’s book—understanding the history of capitalism and markets. (Interestingly the other notable economist Leigh ignores is Karl Marx.)
While Schumpeter is banished from The Shortest History there’s an interesting page-long discussion of the origins of the game Monopoly. He explains that it traces back to the “Landlord’s Game,” which was patented in 1904 by Lizzie Magie, who was outraged by the “robber barons” of her time and inspired by the ideas of economist Henry George. If you think that Monopoly illustrates the plight we consumers face, you might want to focus on the “rules of the game” and not the monopolists themselves. The rules of the game are that you roll the dice and move forward to a property without any choice in the matter. Your demand curve is vertical. No matter the price the owner charges—$2 for visiting Mediterranean Avenue or $400 for Boardwalk or even $2000 for Boardwalk with a hotel—you must pay it. That’s not how real markets work. In them you have choice, including the choice of doing without. Next time you play, try a variant I used to play with my kids. When you roll the dice, you get the choice of going forward or backward. This gives you choice. When playing by these rules—Duopoly rather than Monopoly—I’ve never seen anyone bankrupt all the other players. This kind of makes the game no fun in practice, but it’s much more like a real market.
However, a far more glaring omission comes in Leigh’s discussion of the Great Depression—which, like much else in the book, is very US-centric (despite the fact that the publisher is British and the author is Australian). The narrative of the Great Depression opens with and stresses the stock market crash and brings in other causes like the paradox of thrift, the Smoot-Hawley tariff, and immigration policy. It omits mention of weaknesses in the banking sector due to unit-banking laws, the contraction of the money supply, the missteps of the Federal Reserve, and problems with interwar gold standard as emphasized by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz in their Monetary History of the United States and Barry Eichengreen in Golden Fetters. These omissions border on malpractice. Did Leigh throw away the memo when Ben Bernanke said, “Regarding the Great Depression . . . we did it. We’’e very sorry. . . . We won’t do it again”?
In addition, Leigh doesn’t address why the Great Depression persisted so long. He could have mentioned Robert Higgs’s arguments about “regime uncertainty,” paralyzing investors or at least discussed a few of the policies that stifled the recovery, especially the National Industrial Recovery Act. He certainly has room to do so. In a one-page box on Sadie Alexander, the first African American woman to receive a doctorate in economics, Leigh mentions her criticisms of the NIRA, which “boosted wages in certain sectors” so that “employers in those industries fired black workers and hired whites in their place” (96). But he doesn’t mention that the above equilibrium wages of the National Recovery Administration caused overall employment to collapse and pushed up prices causing sales to fall as shown by economic historians like Jason Taylor. The fuller story simply clashes too much with his overall thrust that government solves problems like these. (The chapter also repeats the conventional wisdom that Weimar Germany was crippled by enormous reparations under the Treaty of Versailles. This argument is contested by Max Hantke and Mark Spoerer in “The Imposed Gift of Versailles: The Fiscal Effects of Restricting the Size of Germany’s Armed Forces, 1924–29.” They find that the net effect of the Treaty’s stipulations on the German central budgets was either much lower than previously thought or even positive, as reductions in military spending offset all or more than all of the reparations bill.)
A similar problem arises in the discussion of the housing bubble and financial crisis of 2008. While Leigh concludes that “greedy bankers, incompetent credit-rating agencies, gullible home owners and lax policymakers each bear some share of the blame” (162), only the greed, incompetence and gullibility of the private sector is detailed, while the regulatory “laxity” is mentioned in passing. Nothing is said about the reasons bankers suddenly lowered their lending standards—how they were largely forced into it by regulators and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). Phil Gramm and Donald Boudreaux summarize it this way: “Guidelines turned into mandates as each bank was assigned a letter grade on its making of CRA loans. Banks could not even open ATMs or branches, much less acquire another bank, without a passing grade—and getting a passing grade was no longer about meeting local credit needs. Increasingly, passing grades were gotten by making subprime home loans. As then-Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan testified . . . ‘the early stages of the subprime [mortgage] market . . . essentially emerged out of the CRA” (Gramm and Boudreaux, 124).
I must stress that there are countless interesting things to be learned or relearned from The Shortest History: Thomas Thwaites—the guy who built a toaster from scratch, using only his own labor and raw materials he personally sourced—sold the toaster (which famously melted down after five seconds) to a museum for £20,000; half of all Roman emperors were murdered, others died in battle or committed suicide, so only one-third died of natural causes; Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations was published one day after James Watt’s first profitable dual-cylinder steam engine entered the market; Joan Robinson wrote a harsh eight-page critique of her own book, The Economics of Imperfect Competition, which she included as a preface to its second edition; Warren Buffet told his shareholders that “If a statue is ever erected to honor the person who has done the most for American investors the hands-down choice should be Jack Bogle,” founder of Vanguard and pioneer of the index fund (167); the median AI researcher predicts that the singularity—when artificial intelligence exceeds human intelligence—will occur around 2059. (Leigh sees AI run amok as the greatest existential threat facing humanity.)
However, I must also stress that there are also a lot of potholes. We are told that yams, like bananas, spoil in days. Cooks and readers of Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart know this is off. The Wikipedia article on the subject says that among “the major roots and tubers, properly stored yam is considered to be the least perishable” (emphasis added). We are told that the ruling class in ancient Egypt and Rome “didn’t have much interest in raising the output of the enslaved class” (22). The claim virtually contradicts itself, as slave owners would gain any increase in slaves’ output. Slave owners in the antebellum South constantly worked to increase productivity by introducing and developing more productive strains of cotton, for example, as Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode have demonstrated. We are told that “traders brought maize to China in the 1300s” (30). As maize is a New World crop and the Columbian Exchange didn’t begin until 1492, this would be impossible. We are told “during the 1500s and 1600s, nearly one million people were killed for the crime of witchcraft” (43). Perhaps this is true on a worldwide scale, but as the passage refers to Europe, this is too high by at least a factor of ten. (Try Googling “how many were killed for witchcraft in Europe in the 1500s and 1600s.”) We are told that “in the 1700s, Europeans trafficked around 10 percent of Africa’s population across the Atlantic” (36). The population of Africa in the 1700 was about 138 million (see Manning). The population for the entire century was much greater. The number of slaves taken across the Atlantic in the entire century was about 6.5 to 7 million. The math doesn’t add up. We are told that “by guaranteeing people’s deposits, a central bank can prevent bank runs” (77). I suppose that’s true (to a degree), but central banks don’t typically insure deposits. We are told that the United States invaded Japan in 1853. That would be news to Commodore Perry and a lot of other people. A diplomatic visit with a threat of force does not constitute an invasion. We are told that the problem of political business cycles—whereby the incumbent party stimulates economic growth before an election—is “so stark that you can literally pick the election years out of the economic charts” (133). No citation is listed, but Jac Heckelman concludes oppositely that the “theory of political business cycles has not generated much empirical support from myriad studies that concentrate on contemporary elections” (emphasis added). We are told that “most central banks have adopted inflation targets, typically about 2 percent—a level that is thought to keep prices stable” (135). Stable means unchanging. Two percent is not zero.
We are also told, on the penultimate page of The Shortest History, that we should recognize our “good fortune to live at a time when most of humanity has access to schools, vaccines and the internet” (193). I heartily agree that we should count our blessings and have gratitude to those who have gone before us, building our successful economic system and handing us improved technologies.
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