The Problem of Political Authority
Book Review
Reviewed by
This book review appeared in the Summer 2014 issue of The Independent Review.
As the title The Problem of Political Authority suggests, a central issue in politicalphilosophy is the nature and justification of the authority of the state. States claim tohave authority, and this authority is simultaneously the basis for the individual’s dutyto obey the state and, should we be remiss in this duty, the state’s right to coerce. Butwhere does this authority come from? Long ago, one might have grounded theauthority of the state—or more precisely, the monarch—in raw power or the divinewill. Few today would defend the notion that we all by nature owe allegiance to adivinely appointed sovereign, whose power is an expression of God’s law. Modernalternatives that many people do take seriously include the idea that a democratic stategets its authority from the whole of the people and the idea that we can hypotheticallybe presumed to consent to authority as an expression of the “social contract.” What ifthese arguments don’t work? One possibility is that states actually don’t have theauthority they claim. In that case, the only justification for state coercion would bethat the social order itself is impossible otherwise.
Michael Huemer argues in his new book that indeed the modern arguments forpolitical authority fail and, furthermore, that society will work just fine without statecoercion. Hence, there is no duty on persons to obey the law and no right of thestate to coerce. Huemer thus joins the ranks of twenty-first-century philosophicaldefenders of an anarchist position that is rooted in a conception of the efficacyof voluntary and competitive institutions (see, for example, Gerard Casey, Libertarian Anarchy [London: Continuum Books, 2012]; Gary Chartier, Anarchy and LegalOrder [Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2013]; and Aeon J. Skoble,Deleting the State [Chicago: Open Court, 2008]). He argues that if we begin fromcommonly held and relatively uncontroversial moral claims, we will arrive at hisuncommon and controversial conclusion. He announces early on that his argumentis not based on a comprehensive moral or political theory such as utilitarianism orKantian deontology or Rawlsian social contract theory. According to Huemer, “Onewho hopes to make progress [in political philosophy] cannot begin from a contentiousmoral theory, still less from a contentious political ideology” (p. 15). Thisputs him in the interesting, and in my view correct, position that although mostpeople’s widely shared moral beliefs are correct (stealing and killing are bad; keepyour promises), most people’s widely shared political beliefs are mistaken (laws haveauthority because they are laws; some states are legitimate).
Huemer devotes the first part of the book to the question of whether governmentis justified—or, more precisely, whether government can have special rights thatordinary persons lack or whether persons have special duties to government that theydo not have to others. The second part of the book is concerned with the consequencesof recognizing that the answer to the first question is “no”—whether societycan actually function without government. To argue against the justification forauthority, Huemer shows how several common strategies fail: social contract theory,democratic theory, consequentialism, and fairness. Each in turn is shown to appeal tosome aspect of our moral intuitions, but then to overlook some equally importantfacet of those intuitions. For example, he argues that we cannot derive a theory ofpolitical obligation from majority-rule democracy. Democratic sensibilities will producea need to respect other people’s judgments, but not a right of majorities toimpose their judgments on unwilling persons by force. The inference from the formerto the latter, Huemer argues, is a sleight of hand: deliberating, for example, can’t byitself be a rationale for negating prima facie rights. Treating others as equals can’t byitself be a rationale for majorities coercing minorities. Indeed, one might argue thatdemocratic respect for the equality of all persons necessarily excludes majoritariancoercion of minorities. Similarly, Huemer shows that consequentialist or fairnessbasedarguments for coercion either prove too much or skip a step. One of the mostprevalent rationales for political obligation is social contract theory, and Huemershows that it too fails. He argues that the central idea of social contract theory is agood one—our interactions should be voluntary—but that “subjection to governmentis obviously not voluntary” (p. 35). The laws are imposed whether one hasconsented or not, and there are no reasonable means for opting out. Some defendersof the social contract approach try to work around this objection by recasting it as ahypothetical contract: although you didn’t actually consent, a rational person would consent, and so again the state’s right to coerce is legitimate. This recasting, Huemerargues, does not work either. He shows that there is no good reason to think that allwould agree to any particular set of commands, even under hypothetical deliberation conditions such as those postulated by the influential philosopher John Rawls. Buteven if there were, Huemer says, it still wouldn’t warrant the conclusion about thejustification of coercion: “the mere unreasonableness of someone’s rejecting anarrangement does not typically render it morally permissible to coerce that personinto accepting the arrangement” (p. 57). Here we see a representative example ofHuemer’s approach—common sense and widely held moral beliefs about the wrongnessof this rationale for coercion are taken to be overridden because it is thestate doing the coercing, yet this is supposed to be a rationale for the justificationof the state. Hence, such arguments for the state’s authority are question begging,in addition to having the other flaws Huemer notes.
In the second part of the book, Huemer responds to a different set of concerns.Even if we take it as granted that the state lacks authority and is not morally justified,if the results of not having a state were catastrophic, then we would need one anyway.If social living were literally impossible without the state, then the anarchist argumentwould be undercut. So Huemer’s next task is to show that society can functionperfectly well without the state. Again, he appeals to commonly held moral beliefsthat do not depend on sophisticated moral theory—for example, popular notions thatviolence, stealing, and lying are morally wrong. He then outlines how basic securitywould be obtained in a free society—readers of this journal will be familiar with theidea of private, competing agencies that offer protective services and of disputes beingarbitrated by competitive dispute-resolution firms (see, for example, EdwardStringham, ed., Anarchy and the Law [Oakland, Calif.: The Independent Institute,2007]). Such firms depend for their viability on actual success at preventing andresolving conflicts rather than on political patronage and the coercion that entails.He also addresses concerns about the degree to which market institutions can serveand protect the poor, and he shows that “privatization” of dispute-resolution andprotective services not only has lower costs and higher levels of service but also avoidspredictable pitfalls of government-run systems.
There’s a school of thought that argues that even if all of the above is correct,we would still need a state to prevent foreign attack because only a state can wage war.Huemer also takes up this concern, arguing that an anarchist society has perfectlyplausible means for collectively defending itself against invaders, but that being apeaceful and decentralized society makes war less likely to begin with. He claims, notimplausibly, that keeping a large standing army with global reach actually makes itmore likely that the society will engage in unwarranted aggression, which is the sortof thing that provokes reprisals.
Huemer concludes on a note of optimism: a claim that his project is not utopianand that we can actually hope to achieve the free society. He argues that abolition ofgovernment is actually more realistic than reforming it, on the grounds that the latterrequires people to know a lot about complicated matters, whereas the former requiresonly skepticism of authority. He says the only thing standing in the way is publicopinion and inertia. Unfortunately, these obstacles are huge, and I fear that they are harder to overcome than Huemer thinks. Nevertheless, his thesis is correct: states donot have authority and lack the right to coerce, and society can get along perfectlywell, if not better, without them. His arguments are sound and elegantly presented.Perhaps if the book is widely read and discussed, his final prediction might havea chance of being correct also.
Comments
Related Book Reviews
Independent Review Issues
Articles by Issue










