Politics Without Politicians
Book Review
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This book review is a web exclusive for the Spring 2026 issue of The Independent Review.
During the ratification battle over the United States Constitution, the Federalists and Anti-Federalists were divided on many issues. One major axis of disagreement concerned the kinds of people who should occupy the new Congress. The Federalists believed that only individuals with exalted capabilities should serve—those whom Thomas Jefferson called in his correspondence with John Adams the “natural aristoi.” In Federalist No. 4, John Jay (Liberty Fund, 2001, p. 15) predicted that the new government would “collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the union they may be found.” This was not merely a hope on Jay’s part, but a principle that guided the design of the Constitution. James Madison (The Federalist [Liberty Fund, 2001], p. 295) would later write in Federalist No. 57 that “the aim of every political constitution is, or ought to be, first, to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society.”
The Anti-Federalists disagreed. They wanted ordinary people—farmers, mechanics, and merchants—to serve in government. For example, the pseudonymous Brutus (The Anti-Federalist Writings of the Melancton Smith Circle [Liberty Fund, 2009], p. 188) wrote that “the very term, representative, implies, that the person or body chosen for this purpose, should resemble those who appoint them—a representation of the people of America, if it be a true one, must be like the people.”
Who won the debate? When it comes to how our political systems actually work—not just in the United States but in democracies across the world—the Federalists won. There are few farmers, mechanics, and merchants in Congress. Politicians are rich and mostly come from white-collar professions (Nicholas Carnes, White-Collar Government [University of Chicago Press, 2013]). They are highly educated (Mark Bovens and Anchrit Wille, Diploma Democracy [Oxford University Press, 2017]). They are disproportionately trained at elite universities, although this is changing somewhat within the Republican Party specifically (Craig Volden, Jonathan Wai, and Alan E. Wiseman, “On the Decline of Elite-Educated Republicans in Congress,” Perspectives on Politics [Online First]).
But not everyone has given up on the Anti-Federalist cause. One prominent holdout is Hélène Landemore in her recent book Politics Without Politicians: The Case for Citizen Rule. The book does what it says on the tin: it offers a vision of how political institutions might be structured so as to eliminate the natural aristoi that worried the Anti-Federalists. It can be divided into three parts. First, Landemore offers a critique of electoral democracy. Second, she surveys recent experiments with mini-publics, some of which she herself helped facilitate. Third, she sketches what a system of politics without politicians might look like in practice. I will discuss these parts out of order—first the critique of electoral democracy, then the institutional sketch, and finally the discussion of mini-publics.
To begin, what is so bad about electoral democracy? As already hinted, the central concern is that those elected to office are unlike ordinary citizens. Historically, this was regarded as a virtue, not a vice (see Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government [Cambridge University Press, 1997]). But it is a vice to Landemore. Why, exactly, is it so problematic that elected politicians are descriptively unrepresentative? Landemore offers two arguments. First, there is “profound dissatisfaction” with electoral democracy among those who live under it, suggesting that something has gone seriously wrong (p. 30). Second, unrepresentative politicians are insufficiently responsive to voters’ preferences. Landemore is particularly concerned that politicians are more responsive to the preferences of the wealthy than those of the non-wealthy. Plausibly, this is because politicians are themselves wealthy.
Neither criticism is compelling. Consider first the claim that widespread dissatisfaction with electoral democracy reveals a genuine defect. Public opinion, however, is notoriously fickle (see John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion [Cambridge University Press, 2011]). It fluctuates frequently and for arbitrary reasons. For example, both Republican and Democratic voters flip their assessments of the health of the economy almost instantaneously when their preferred presidential candidate wins or loses an election (see Joseph Copeland, “Most Americans continue to rate the U.S. economy negatively as partisan gap widens,” Pew Research Center [October 3, 2025]). That people believe conditions have deteriorated does not make it so; voters may simply be mistaken. The same applies to electoral democracy. That citizens express dissatisfaction in opinion surveys does not by itself show that there are good reasons to be dissatisfied.
Instead, it may be good to judge electoral democracies according to more objective measures than opinion polls. And when we do, they ain’t half bad. I offer a summary of the relevant empirical literature in my most recent book (Brian Kogelmann, Political Meritocracy in the 21st Century [Cambridge University Press, 2025]). To offer a brief summary: Democracies tend to select educated leaders, which has a direct and positive impact on economic growth. Democracies are rich; they increase GDP by 20 percent on average when compared to nondemocracies in the long run. They protect civil liberties. Democracies go to war infrequently. They do not engage in ethnic cleansing. No famine has ever occurred in a democracy. And so on.
Landemore’s second objection to the elite character of electoral democracy is that it is insufficiently responsive to voter preferences. But here she simply assumes—rather than argues—that responsiveness is normatively desirable. It may not be. Indeed, some have argued that responsiveness alone is problematic as a normative standard for judging democratic institutions (see Andrew Sabl, “The Two Cultures of Democratic Theory,” Perspectives on Politics 13 [2015]: 345–65). A more plausible way to evaluate competing political regimes is with a procedure-independent normative standard. On this approach, the relevant question is not how responsive electoral democracy is, but how well it fares with respect to outcomes such as economic growth, the provision of public goods and services, the avoidance of catastrophic failures (such as war, ethnic cleansing, and famine), and so on. And, as suggested by the paragraph above, on many plausible procedure-independent standards, electoral democracy performs quite well.
Entirely absent from Landemore’s critique of the elite character of electoral democracy is an honest accounting of the other side of the ledger: the ways in which elites improve governance. She claims there is “zero empirical evidence to date” that demonstrates a relationship between elite characteristics and “the ability to govern well” (p. 104). This is not true. There is, for example, ample empirical evidence showing that educated politicians have a positive impact on governance. I summarize this empirical literature in a recent article (Brian Kogelmann, “Sortition and Cognitive Ability,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics [Online First]: §5). The highlights: educated leaders cause greater economic growth. They enable basic goods and services—such as electricity, access to food, education, and healthcare—to be provided more effectively. They supply public goods and services more efficiently. These all strike me as good reasons to insist on government by natural aristoi. Electoral democracy often (but not always) delivers just that, because elections tend to select intelligent leaders (Kogelmann, Political Meritocracy in the 21st Century). Perhaps the Federalists were on to something.
Suppose that Landemore succeeds in showing that electoral democracy is flawed beyond repair and that we ought to bring more ordinary citizens into the halls of political power. How do we go about doing so? A proposal growing in popularity among political philosophers is sortition, which is the idea that we should replace elected officials with ordinary citizens selected at random. The most detailed articulation of this idea is Alexander Guerrero’s Lottocracy: Democracy Without Elections (Oxford University Press, 2024), though Guerrero is by no means alone in advancing the case for government by lot. Some theorists advocate a bicameral system, in which one chamber is elected and the other is selected at random (see Arash Abizadeh, “Representation, Bicameralism, Political Equality, and Sortition,” Perspectives on Politics 19 [2021]: 791–806). Guerrero, by contrast, argues that all legislators be chosen by lot and further suggests the creation of multiple single-issue legislatures, each tasked with deliberating and deciding on a specific policy domain. Landemore advocates a different model. She envisions a single legislature composed entirely of randomly selected citizens. A novel twist in her version of sortition is that this randomly selected chamber should be supplemented by referenda, allowing the broader citizenry to have a direct say in policy.
Sortition forces us to confront an uncomfortable question: are ordinary citizens competent enough to rule? Landemore answers affirmatively. What justifies her optimism is the performance of mini-publics. She writes:
Over the last thirty years, mini-publics have proven adaptable across cultures and contexts, even in deeply divided societies. These randomly selected bodies are used to generate ideas, policy recommendations, and, in some cases, legislative proposals. They consistently demonstrate that, under the right conditions, ordinary citizens are capable of informed deliberation, reasoned judgment, and even competent lawmaking. In fact, evidence shows they perform as well as, or better than, professional politicians in many respects (p. 14).
What are mini-publics? Roughly, they are small bodies of citizens selected at random to deliberate about a specific policy question or set of questions. Examples include the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly of 2004, which was tasked to come up with a new electoral system for the province, and the 2016–2018 Irish Citizens’ Assembly, which was asked to consider a number of policy issues, including abortion and climate change. This brings us to the second part of the book. Indeed, much of Politics Without Politicians is devoted to surveying recent experiments with mini-publics. At times, the book reads almost like a memoir, with Landemore recounting her own experiences observing—and in some cases helping to facilitate—these bodies.
The core inference Landemore makes is straightforward: because mini-publics have performed so well, we have good reason to believe that ordinary citizens would be sufficiently competent to govern were we to follow advocates of sortition and eliminate professional politicians. This inference is mistaken, however. The reason why is that mini-publics are themselves quiet havens of natural aristoi. An open secret of mini-publics is that, despite being randomly selected, they are not especially representative. In particular, the highly educated are overrepresented in nearly all such bodies.
For example, in three mini-publics—in British Columbia, the Netherlands, and Ontario—the share of participants with college degrees far exceeded that of the general population: 44 percent versus 19 percent, 57 percent versus 26 percent, and 44 percent versus 20 percent, respectively (Patrick Fournier, Henk van der Kolk, R. Kenneth Carty, André Blais, and Jonathan Rose, When Citizens Decide [Oxford University Press, 2011], p. 55). This happens—despite the use of lotteries—because the highly educated are far more likely to accept invitations to participate, while the less educated are more likely to opt out. Mini-publics, as a result, systematically skew toward citizens with higher levels of education and political engagement.
This sets up a dilemma. Either a system of sortition would also (just like mini-publics) disproportionately select the highly educated, or it would not. If it does, then the performance of mini-publics gives us reason to expect sortition to function tolerably well, but at the cost of reproducing the very elite bias that motivates Landemore’s embrace of sortition in the first place. If, by contrast, sortition does not also select for the highly educated, then it does not reproduce elite bias, but at the cost of making us far more uncertain of its performance, for mini-publics would no longer provide relevant evidence.
Politics Without Politicians thus offers a vision of democracy that promises to eliminate elite bias while relying on evidence that presupposes it. Mini-publics may perform well precisely because they select for exactly the kind of natural aristoi that worried the Anti-Federalists and that Landemore seeks to banish from government. One thus finishes the book uncertain whether Landemore has made a case for sortition or inadvertently reinforced the case for electoral democracy—a system that, for all its flaws (and there are many!), has a reasonably good track record of selecting competent leaders and producing tolerable outcomes. Perhaps the Federalists were right, after all.
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