The Pursuit of Happiness & Proclaiming Liberty
Joint Book Review
Reviewed by
This book review is a web exclusive for the Fall 2026 issue of The Independent Review.
Americans speak of “the Founding” as a single event, but it was at least three, each founding moment producing a document with a different idea of what the country wanted to be. Understanding those ideas, and the enduring tensions among them, tells us something important about the conflicts in American politics.
The Declaration of Independence (1776) is a document of natural rights and revolutionary justification. It says almost nothing about institutions; its job was to explain why a people may dissolve their political bonds, grounding that right in self-evident truths about equality and unalienable rights. Libertarians honor the Declaration because it is philosophically prior to any government at all—it locates sovereignty in the individual, not the state, and treats government as an instrument that exists only to secure rights already possessed. It is aspirational and abstract, and brokers no compromises with the needs of practical administration. The Declaration lays out the goals, and constraints, of a state that does not yet exist.
The Articles of Confederation (1777/1781) is the forgotten founding, and for many Anti-Federalists—then and now—that neglect tells the honest observer why the Articles need to be restored. The first “constitution” created a genuine confederacy: a “league of friendship” among sovereign states, with a Congress that possessed minimal independent power to tax, and which specified no executive, no national judiciary, and no ability to compel state compliance. Its defenders, historically and today, see this not as a design flaw but as fidelity to the actual logic of 1776: if the states seceded from imperial Britain to govern themselves, why would they immediately subordinate themselves to a new distant sovereign? Modern admirers of the Articles—often skeptical of Washington, D.C. concentration of power—read the (second) Constitution’s replacement of this system as a coup, not a fix, engineered as it was by militant nationalists like Alexander Hamilton. The Articles’ partisans honor decentralization, state sovereignty, and suspicion of concentrated power as the truer expression of the American project.
The Constitution (1787/1789) is the founding of institutions—the only one of the three that actually attempts to solve the problem of designing a durable federal government. The Constitution embodies both mechanism—enumerated powers, separated branches, checks and balances, federalism as a structural compromise—and constraint, in the form of the Bill of Rights. Mainstream conservatives honor it because it is established and has stood the test of tumultuous times. The Constitution was formally ratified through a clear process and is amendable on its own terms. At the time of its passage, the document embodied the intuition that stated good intentions are not enough, and that, as Madison said, only ambition and power can be expected to constrain ambition and power.
All three of these impulses and yearnings are real, but each addresses a different question. The Declaration asks why a people may govern themselves. The Articles show what happens when that self-governance is taken to a decentralized extreme, and warn what is lost when it is abandoned. The Constitution asks how self-governance, once claimed, can actually be exercised without either tyranny or chaos.
Two recent books, one by Jeffrey Rosen (president of the National Constitution Center) and one by Timothy Sandefur (vice president for legal affairs at the Goldwater Institute), take up the question of how these three impulses came to be, by looking at the origins and foundations of the founding.
Rosen opens with a mea culpa: he had never actually traced the reading lists that shaped the American Founders’ moral imaginations. When one does look at the sources—specifically when Jefferson borrowed Cicero’s phrase for the Declaration—an anachronism is revealed. “Happiness,” for the founding generation, was not pleasure, comfort, or the satisfaction of hedonic desire. It was the classical and Stoic ideal of virtue achieved through self-mastery, of liberty from bodily appetites. Happiness was the daily, lifelong, and necessarily incomplete project of governing one’s own passions in order to be fit to govern a republic.
Rosen structures the book around Franklin’s famous “spiritual accounting system”—the chart of thirteen virtues (order, temperance, industry, moderation, tranquility, and so on) that Franklin tracked daily and, characteristically, eventually gave up trying to perfect. Each chapter takes one of these virtues as an organizing thread and follows it through the life of a different Founder, showing how each man encountered the same handful of texts, but metabolized them differently. Jefferson’s tranquility lay in an obsessive program of self-discipline following his father’s death; Adams’s pursuit of virtue curdled, in his son John Quincy, into a corrosive perfectionism and self-recrimination. Washington cultivated stoic reserve as a deliberate public performance of self-command, and saw “fame,” in the sense of deserved renown, as the primary goal.
The throughline is Rosen’s central thesis, stated and restated throughout: personal self-government was understood by the Founders as the necessary precondition for political self-government. A republic of citizens who cannot as individuals govern their own passions, on this view, cannot sustain a government of laws rather than of men—a claim with an obvious and intended resonance for readers surveying contemporary American political culture.
Rosen is direct about the Founders’ catastrophic failure to extend their own moral logic to the enslaved people whose labor sustained their leisure for philosophical cultivation, particularly among the Virginians. He also extends the story past 1800, tracing the afterlife of this virtue tradition through Frederick Douglass, Louis Brandeis, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg—nudging the account from a static portrait of eighteenth-century minds into an argument about a durable American intellectual inheritance, one available for appropriation by people the Founders excluded.
By reading what the Founders themselves read, rather than projecting a philosophy onto them from secondary literature, Rosen makes a real contribution, a genetic rather than speculative intellectual history. But the theme may be too strictly imposed, because Rosen seems more interested in demonstrating that the “being good, not feeling good” thesis is true of the Founders than in interrogating whether it is a coherent or defensible account of happiness on its own terms. The book skates past the harder question of what happens when the classical equation of virtue with happiness runs up against cases—and there are plenty in the Founders’ own lives—where rigorous self-mastery produced not tranquility but anxiety and self-punishment, as with John Quincy Adams. Rosen notes this tension but doesn’t dwell in it; the book’s argumentative momentum consistently favors affirmation of the thesis over sustained engagement with its limits. Readers looking for a more critical philosophical reckoning with Stoicism’s discontents will find the book more descriptive than analytical at exactly the point where analysis would be most rewarding.
Sandefur has a different approach to much of the same subject. He has built a substantial body of work arguing that the Declaration is not merely a rhetorical flourish preceding the “real” constitutional order of 1787, but a binding statement of first principles that continues to serve as a benchmark—though often in the breach—against which American law and practice should be measured. Proclaiming Liberty extends that project, at a moment when, as Sandefur notes, the Founders face a wave of scholarly and popular skepticism he clearly means to rebut.
Sandefur’s argument rests on a contrast: John Adams the combative, legally precise New Englander steeped in constitutional grievance vs Thomas Jefferson the philosophical, literary Virginian confident in the self-evidence of natural rights. Their temperaments, in Sandefur’s telling, are often depicted as details, but Sandefur sees them as generative: Adams’s lawyerly insistence on rights secured by legal process is pitted against Jefferson’s soaring universalism. It is precisely that conflict that gives the Declaration its distinctive power.
The book traces this fusion back through the English Civil War, John Locke, Algernon Sidney, and Baron Montesquieu, then forward through the imperial crises of the Stamp and Townshend Acts, to the drafting itself. This is the best part of the book in my view, because Sandefur walks us through the Declaration clause by clause. Its most consequential claim, though, concerns the document’s afterlife: Sandefur argues the Declaration functioned as constitutional “basic law” for later Americans—most notably the abolitionists and John Quincy Adams’s “Freedom National” tradition—who treated it and the Constitution as “one consistent whole” rather than as ornamental preamble followed by binding text. The book closes by pressing the Declaration’s relevance into the present, treating it as a standing measure against which American practice can still be judged. (It is no accident that this “measure” is also a theme in earlier Sandefur books, Frederick Douglass: Self-Made Man [2018] and The Conscience of the Constitution [2014], both published by Cato Institute).
Sandefur documents the importance of the Declaration as a legally and politically active, rather than historical and inert, influence that has repeatedly supplied Americans with vocabulary, a standard of critique, and a sense of unfinished obligation. The novel claim, at least in my reading, is the pairing of Adams and Jefferson, as personalities as well as thinkers, as generative forces rather than merely rivals. This gives the argument narrative traction it lacks in purely doctrinal treatments.
But this virtue is also a flaw. Sandefur’s interpretive frame is set in advance, and the book is explicitly targeted at critics who view the Founders and the Declaration with suspicion. The book reads as an attorney’s brief, structured as vindication of a viewpoint. I happen to find this quite persuasive, but that is because I was persuaded before I cracked the book open. That approach leaves less room for the Declaration’s genuine ambiguities and the darker themes of the founding generation’s compromises, particularly on slavery, as elaborated in the Articles and the Constitution.
Still, for readers already inclined toward Sandefur’s version of constitutionalism, Proclaiming Liberty is not just important, but engaging, making a strong case that the Declaration did not stop working in 1776. The organic unity of three founding documents, often overlooked, is taken seriously here. Together, by illuminating the constitutive texts, and the process of generation, of the Declaration, these two books pair well for a goodbye to the 250th anniversary of that document’s publication.
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