
Capitalism, Cronyism, and Democracy

— ◆ —
GEOFFREY M. HODGSON

Michael Munger and Mario Villarreal-Diaz promote an interesting and provocative thesis: Does capitalism have an inbuilt tendency toward cronyism? If so, as they point out, capitalism may be its own gravedigger after all, as Karl Marx, Joseph Schumpeter, and Karl Polanyi had previously pronounced, albeit using very different arguments.

Munger and Villarreal-Diaz argue that the very success of capitalism creates the temptation and potential for large businesses to lobby the state to protect their gains and their position from sustained market competition. As they note, Marx made a similar point. Leftists such as Guy Standing (2017) have lambasted such “corruption” within modern capitalism using a similar logic.

A second dimension to Munger and Villarreal-Diaz’s argument concerns the role of democracy. They ask: “Does capitalism in a democracy always devolve into corporatist cronyism?” Noting the similar argument developed by Mancur Olson (1982), they write: “If prosperity enables democracy and the access to coercive powers of democracy allows businesses to concentrate their power and obtain state protection from competition, the result is cronyism. . . . In a democracy, the problem is particularly acute. . . . We are simply pointing out that allowing real democracy may doom real capitalism, just as many opponents of capitalism have argued.”

I turn to Olson first. His argument has come under much critical scrutiny, although today his work is often unduly neglected. Olson (1982) argued that democracy

Geoffrey M. Hodgson is professor in management in the Institute of International Management at Loughborough University London.

The Independent Review, v. 23, n. 3, Winter 2019, ISSN 1086–1653, Copyright © 2019, pp. 345–355.

can empower special-interest groups that increase institutional sclerosis. Jac Heckelman (2007) reviewed fifty-three attempts to test the effect of institutional sclerosis on economic growth. Some attempts were case studies; others involved quantitative comparisons. Fifty-seven percent of the studies supported Olson's institutional sclerosis hypothesis; 23 percent reported mixed support; and the remaining 20 percent were unresponsive. On balance, the theory concerning growth-retarding effects of institutional sclerosis had substantial but not universal support.

Institutional sclerosis is not the same as cronyism, although the mechanisms involved may be similar. The common thread in Olson's and Munger and Villarreal-Diaz's arguments is the idea that democracy enables the development and empowerment of interest groups that gain influence over politicians and the state machine.

It may be argued, however, that influence by powerful actors over the political process is possible in authoritarian as well as democratic regimes. Olsonian institutional sclerosis may happen, but it may not be confined to democracies. Does democracy help or hinder institutional sclerosis? Here the evidence is less clear.

For example, in a regression analysis of sixteen Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries with data from 1870 to 1987 (Hodgson 1996), I confirmed some Olsonian hypotheses, in particular the effect of major political disruptions in recasting institutions. But the analysis also found that democracy was positively rather than negatively associated with economic growth. Although the literature on the effects of democracy on economic growth gives mixed results, some studies report a positive correlation (Gerring et al. 2005; Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005; Acemoglu et al. 2014).


Cronyism and Democracy: Some Evidence

The only attempt to measure cronyism across leading economies of which I am aware is a "crony capitalism" index published by the *Economist* (2014). It covers twenty-three countries, including China, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. As an index, it has come under some criticism, but apparently it is the best we have.

Figure 1 relates the Polity IV democracy index for 2013 (Center for Systemic Peace 2016) to the *Economist's* (2014) cronyism ranking. Note the weak positive correlation between the democracy index and the numerical value of the cronyism rank. Higher-ranked crony capitalisms have a lower numerical value, so this diagram shows a weak *negative* relationship between democracy and cronyism. The highest-ranked crony capitalisms shown in the figure are Russia, Malaysia, Ukraine, and Singapore, all of which have a democracy index of 6 or less. If there is a meaningful correlation at all, cronyism seems inversely related to democracy and economic development.¹

Corruption and cronyism are not the same, but they are related, and they are likely to be positively correlated. Organizational corruption means breaking laws or other


1. The *Economist* (2014) had Hong Kong as the highest-ranking crony-capitalist country. But because there is no information for Hong Kong in the Polity IV data for democracy, it does not appear in figure 1.



established rules in public or private institutions (Miller 2005; Hodgson and Jiang 2007). Figure 2 uses data from Transparency International (2016) on perceived levels of corruption in 158 countries. These data are related to the Polity IV data on levels of democracy for 2016. There is a slightly significant and mildly positive correlation between the corruption-perceptions index and democracy.

But note that Transparency International constructs its corruption-perceptions index so that the more corrupt countries have a lower score. Hence figure 2 shows a *negative* correlation between democracy and corruption. The five countries that are perceived as the most corrupt—Afghanistan, North Korea, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria—have democracy levels of 1, 0, 5, 0, and 0, respectively.

In sum, the evidence to hand does not support the contention that democratic regimes enable corruption or cronyism more than authoritarian states. There are several possible reasons why this may be so. Although perhaps facilitating corruption and cronyism in some ways, democracy allows more protest against them. Actual or possible public protest could influence politicians, who depend on popular votes. Democracy can also help to foster countervailing power, which can open up social orders, keep them more fluid, and keep ruling cliques in check (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009).



Democracy is not without its problems, but its effects on cronyism do not work in one direction only.

To reveal the complexities involved, we need to take a historical look at the development and interaction of markets, the state, and political cronyism.

In the Beginning There Was Cronyism

Before the rise of general systems of state law, cronyism was the normal way of getting things done. Studies of primate behavior suggest that our simian ancestors formed groups and coalitions to influence leaders or take over power (De Waal 1982). Primate groups stick together by doing each other favors. You pick off my fleas, I'll pick off yours. Preference in doing favors is typically given to closely related kin. Hence, cronyism is an everyday occurrence among primate bands. Members of the human species have always relied on family members, close relatives, or trusted allies to do deals and help them make their way in the world. Even today, much business throughout the developed and underdeveloped world is facilitated by using the ties within families, clans, or ethnic groups (Landa 1994).

“In the beginning there were markets” are the much-quoted words from a much-cited book by later-to-become Nobel laureate Oliver Williamson (1975, 20). A problem with this statement is that it takes for granted the social and institutional rules that are required to establish meaningful property and to establish, verify, and enforce contractual exchange. Williamson wrongly suggested that markets are the universal ether of

human interaction, but he did not take into sufficient consideration the institutional character and prerequisites of markets themselves.

There is a large literature on the actual or possible emergence of contract-enforcement mechanisms through private ordering rather than via the state. For example, Avner Greif (1989) points to the case of medieval Jewish traders in the Mediterranean. To maintain the reputation of this ethnic group, its leaders ensured that contracts with outsiders and insiders were enforced fairly. Others point to the medieval private courts of the “law merchants” (Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990). In this case, the courts would establish a reputation for fair enforcement. But these courts declined in number and were eventually absorbed or replaced by state legal institutions and enforcement. A major reason for their decline seems to be that they could not cope with the increasing scale and complexity of contracting (Hodgson 2015, 77 n. 162).

Modern, large-scale, and global markets require additional institutional supports. Friedrich Hayek (1960, 1973) regarded the establishment of general rules of conduct that apply to everyone as key. From a contrasting theoretical perspective, Francis Fukuyama (2011) makes a similar point and emphasizes the emergence of relatively autonomous state legal systems that could constrain the arbitrary powers of monarchs. At the beginning of the modern era, these developments were crucial to begin to suppress the endemic cronyism that had marked much of the activity of our prehuman and human ancestors for millions of years.

Like cronyism and corruption, these original sins had to be restrained as we entered the modern world of liberal capitalism. These sins did not emerge recently, aided by modern freedoms and the flaws of the state. They were there before, and a task of the modern institutional order is to keep them in check.

How Was Corruption Reduced?

We may ask: What causes corruption? But following a conversation with Gunnar Myrdal in the 1970s, Robert Neild turned the question on its head (Hodgson, Gagliardi, and Gindis 2018). Neild pointed out that corruption has been “normal throughout history.” And rulers who come to power by corrupt means are unlikely to try to eliminate corruption entirely. Neild’s research problem became “When and how was corruption successfully reduced in some countries?” This problem was eventually to lead to a major historical-evolutionary study showing why public corruption was largely cleaned up in northern Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this study, *Public Corruption: The Dark Side of Social Evolution* (2002), Neild rejects the idea that the extent of corruption was necessarily correlated with the size of government and the march of democracy: “For example, the reduction of corruption and the great improvement of the quality of government in Britain in the latter part of the nineteenth century went hand in hand with an extension of the scope of government; they were both part of a general wave of reform” (6).

Neild points out that as government becomes more complex, more rules and decisions are involved. The degree of corruption is the proportion of decisions made

corruptly—that is, by breaking the rules. When relatively uncorrupt governments developed in northern Europe, “new rules were introduced which forbade practices that were previously permitted, and the enforcement of rules was improved” (6). By contrast, some countries have tried more recently to stem corruption by reducing the public sector. Neild explains: “[A] policy of trying in a heavily governed country to reduce the scope of government, and hence the number of rules that have to be enforced, may be accompanied by denigration of public service and cuts in its pay and conditions of such severity that, in combination with an idealization of private gain, it [the policy] may produce an increase rather than a decrease in the rate of corruption. Russia today is an example” (6).

Neild then discusses a number of factors that may influence the level of corruption, from religion to geography. He points out that the “establishment of a career public service, selected by competition and given security and high status, was the common means of reforming the civil and military services in Europe” (2002, 13). A relatively free press in a democratic system is also important to expose corruption and to campaign for reform.

Neild treats nation-states as the objects of selection in a competitive, evolutionary process. Levels of corruption are among the outcomes of this competitive selection. He focuses on the period from around the late seventeenth century (when public corruption was rife) until end of the nineteenth century (when it was much diminished) in the main states of northern Europe. Crucially, during this period military competition involved mass mobilizations of large numbers of trained troops and the support of state bureaucracies. Under these conditions, Neild argues, “military competition between nations has favoured the expansion of the less corrupt *vis-à-vis* the more corrupt: those nations that have developed efficient, relatively uncorrupt governments have been able to mobilize their resources for war and military domination more effectively than the more corrupt and less efficient” (2002, 14).

Clearly, military competition is not the only explanatory factor, but Neild argues that it has been a major one. The needs of war set up an imperative to gather taxes more effectively and to mobilize human and material resources. In addition to the effects of the Enlightenment on science and politics, “domestic and international forces combined to foster less corrupt government” (Neild 2002, 19).

Neild then outlines a number of case studies, including Prussia (which eventually dominated united Germany), France, the United States, and (at much greater length) Great Britain. He shows how competitive evolutionary forces helped to diminish corruption in these countries—albeit to different degrees. Neild puts the main burden of explanation on selection pressures at the national level. He then considers how rules changed within nations in response to the selection pressure.

The conclusions Neild arrives at are pessimistic, however. Conventional military competition has diminished among developed countries since World War II. Military conflict between developed nations has instead involved high-technology weapons of mass destruction rather than a mobilization of large numbers of troops requiring

a relatively efficient state machine. As a consequence, military competition cannot play the role it formally did in reducing corruption. Solutions to the problem of stemming corruption in both the developed world and the less-developed world must be sought elsewhere.

Crucial here is understanding that cronyism and corruption are the default positions rather than modern intrusions into a market society. They have been prevalent for much of our history, and they are still commonplace today. Given this prevalence, Neild focuses on the exceptional cases where cronyism and corruption have been rolled back.

On Capitalism and Its Impurities

I now turn to the concept of capitalism. Munger and Villarreal-Diaz acknowledge the value of Weberian ideal types in forging such concepts. They also adopt a definition of capitalism by Michael Labeit:

Capitalism is a social system based upon the recognition of individual rights, including private property rights where all goods, both intermediate goods and final goods, are owned privately. . . . An economy remains capitalist so long as the government, or any other agency for that matter, refrains from intervening coercively in the peaceful private lives of citizens. The implications of this fact are substantial: under pure capitalism there are no taxes, no price ceilings, no price floors, no product controls, no subsidies to either the rich or the poor, no public streets, no public schools, no public parks, no central banks, no wars of aggression, no immigration restrictions, etc. (2009)

For a number of reasons, I do not think that this definition is satisfactory. First, in addition to establishing an ideal type, it rules out any deviations from this “pure” type: “An economy remains capitalist so long as the government . . . refrains from intervening coercively in the peaceful private lives of citizens.” With Weber, we all know that real-world cases never correspond to ideal types in their pure form. But Labeit’s definition requires us to conclude that because the pure form of capitalism manifestly does not exist, capitalism does not exist. It is a definition of something that does not exist and cannot exist.

Labeit’s definition is not a workable ideal type because it is unfeasible. But Weber did not see ideal types as impossible extremes. For him, the ultimate fruitfulness of an ideal type must depend on its success in locating and revealing significant causal linkages in the phenomenon under investigation. Each set of ideal types must be deployed and examined with this criterion in mind and then revised accordingly. Weber thus envisaged “a perpetual process of reconstruction of those concepts in terms of which we seek to lay hold of reality” (1949, 105). In that sense, the ideal type is “real” and

“objective.” For an ideal type to be adequate, it has to represent an “objective possibility.”

I argue elsewhere (Hodgson 2015, 2018) that capitalism without some state interference is impossible. In a large-scale, complex economy, the state is necessary to help protect property, to regulate and help enforce contracts, to sustain a viable financial system, and to perform other vital tasks that cannot be performed spontaneously or by market activity alone. Markets are essential, but they are not enough.

In addition to the state, there are other unavoidable impurities in modern capitalism. Consider the rearing of children. Capitalism would no longer be capitalism if all children were owned, farmed, and produced for profit like slaves. Of course, real-world capitalism has historically used slave labor as well as waged labor. But this is yet another case of an impurity. If all labor were performed by slaves, it would not be capitalism. Although capitalism promotes markets and profit-seeking activity, it cannot in principle allow the family to be run fully along capitalist lines and still remain capitalist. There are other reasons why markets cannot govern everything. Joseph Schumpeter (1942) argued that capitalism would collapse if commercial relations became ubiquitous and undermined institutional ties of loyalty and respect.

The mistaken idea of *pure* capitalism is also found in Marxism. Karl Marx declared in the preface to the first edition of *Capital* in 1867 that he was following physicists by studying the capitalist mode of production in its “most typical form . . . least affected by disturbing influences” and hence closest to its “pure state” ([1867] 1976, 90).

Marx’s theoretical strategy of isolating a “pure” capitalism is flawed and misleading. He recognized the *empirical* existence of impurities but not their functional role for the system as a whole. Hence, he concentrated on a single, pure form. He wrongly believed that the dynamic of the system could be understood simply by focusing in this pure type. To the contrary, the study of the *impurities* is necessary to understand the evolution of the system. Because *impurities* of some kind are always necessary, the system can never be self-contained. There is no point in constructing ideal types that in principle can never function.

We need a better definition of capitalism than Labeit’s. I argue elsewhere (Hodgson 2015) that we need more than the familiar ingredients of private property and markets. If we stick to these features alone, then *capitalism* has been around for many thousands of years. But *capitalism* is a poor word to describe this immense period of human history. As the word *capitalism* suggests, the system has a great deal to do with *capital*, which we may interpret in the ordinary business and accounting sense as money or the money value of assets. As Schumpeter (1954, 322–23) and others have insisted, the term *capital* should ideally be applied to financial assets alone. Schumpeter further argued that a key distinguishing feature of capitalism is a developed financial system: “Owing to the importance of the financial complement of capitalist production and trade, the development of the law and the practice of negotiable paper and of ‘created’ deposits afford perhaps the best indication we have for dating the rise of capitalism” (1954, 78 n.).

Accordingly, capitalism entails more than private property and markets. It involves a developed financial system as well.² In any case, the formulation of the ideal type of capitalism has to recognize that capitalism is always a combination of different types of structure and mechanism—it never comes in a pure form.

Conclusions

The problem of crony capitalism is a vital topic for research. The question raised by Munger and Villarreal-Diaz, whether capitalism has an immanent tendency to cronyism, is an important one. In doing research for this article, I came across a non-academic essay by the Marxist writer Jack Farmer on the same topic. Farmer writes: “Cronyism, like greed, is . . . a behaviour typically rewarded by the normal workings of the free market” (2012). His argument is that there is nothing particularly special about “crony capitalism”: rather, all forms of capitalism encourage cronyism. The analytical similarity of Farmer’s point to Munger and Villarreal-Diaz’s argument is obvious, although they of course do not endorse the Marxist policy of socialist revolution.

My arguments and conclusions differ from all of those described here. Unlike Munger and Villarreal-Diaz and unlike Marx in *Capital*, I do not start from an analytical baseline of “pure capitalism.” Although Munger and Villarreal-Diaz, on the one hand, and Marx, on the other, differ on the nature of capitalism itself, they all start from the analytical viewpoint of commodity exchange—a “pure” market economy. But other writers, notably Williamson (1975), differ from Marx in treating markets as the original or universal ether of all human interaction. It is unclear whether Munger and Villarreal-Diaz would agree with Marx or Williamson on this point.

In any case, I argue instead that cronyism has had much greater longevity than markets: it extends back to our simian ancestors. Trade in some form has been in existence for tens of thousands of years, but cronyism goes back millions of years. As a consequence, cronyism and corruption are not recent impositions on a market economy caused by large corporations, democracy, or whatever. They are instead long-standing aspects of the human condition that may be restrained in the modern era only with the rise of modern, relatively autonomous systems of state law.

Although the task may have become difficult, and other remedies must be found, history demonstrates that it is possible to roll back cronyism and corruption with capitalism. We need further case studies to develop policies to that end.

References


- Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James A. Robinson. 2014. *Democracy Does Cause Growth*. National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper no. 20004. Cambridge, Mass.: NBER.

2. There is also a case to follow Marx and accept wage labor as an important feature of capitalism (Hodgson 2015). But that need not concern us here.

- Center for Systemic Peace. 2016. Our Polity Project. At <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html>.
- De Waal, Frans B. M. 1982. *Chimpanzee Politics: Power and Sex among Apes*. New York: Harper and Rowe; London: Jonathan Cape.
- Economist*. 2014. Our Crony-Capitalism Index: Planet Plutocrat. March 15. At <https://www.economist.com/international/2014/03/15/planet-plutocrat>.
- Farmer, Jack. 2012. The Myth of Crony Capitalism. *Socialist Review*, no. 366 (February). At <http://socialistreview.org.uk/366/myth-crony-capitalism>.
- Fukuyama, Francis. 2011. *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. London: Profile Books; New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- Gerring, John, Philip J. Bond, William T. Barndt, and Carola Moreno. 2005. Democracy and Growth: A Historical Perspective. *World Politics* 57, no. 3 (April): 323–64.
- Greif, Avner. 1989. Reputations and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders. *Journal of Economic History* 49, no. 4 (December): 857–82.
- Hayek, Friedrich A. 1960 *The Constitution of Liberty*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 1973. *Law, Legislation, and Liberty*. Vol. 1: *Rules and Order*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Heckelman, Jac C. 2007. Explaining the Rain: *The Rise and Decline of Nations* after 25 Years. *Southern Economic Journal* 74, no. 1: 18–33.
- Hodgson, Geoffrey M. 1996. An Evolutionary Theory of Long-Term Economic Growth. *International Studies Quarterly* 40: 393–412.
- . 2015. *Conceptualizing Capitalism: Institutions, Evolution, Future*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 2018. *Wrong Turnings: How the Left Got Lost*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Hodgson, Geoffrey M., Francesca Gagliardi, and David Gindis. 2018. From Cambridge Keynesian to Institutional Economist: The Unnoticed Contributions of Robert Neild. *Journal of Institutional Economics* 14, no. 4 (August): 767–86.
- Hodgson, Geoffrey M., and Shuxia Jiang. 2007. The Economics of Corruption and the Corruption of Economics: An Institutional Perspective. *Journal of Economic Issues* 41, no. 4 (December): 1043–61.
- Labeit, Michael. 2009. Explaining the Difference between Capitalism and Corporatism to Michael Moore. *Economic Policy Journal*. At <http://www.economicpolicyjournal.com/2009/11/explaining-difference-between.html>.
- Landa, Janet T. 1994. *Trust, Ethnicity, and Identity: Beyond the New Institutional Economics of Ethnic Trading Networks, Contract Law, and Gift Exchange*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Marx, Karl. [1867] 1976. *Capital*. Vol. 1. Translated by Ben Fowkes. Harmondsworth, U.K.: Pelican.
- Milgrom, Paul R., Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. 1990. The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs. *Economics and Politics* 2, no. 1 (March): 1–23.

- Miller, Seumas. 2005. Corruption. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Fall ed., edited by Edward N. Zalta. At <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/corruption/>.
- Neild, Robert R. 2002. *Public Corruption: The Dark Side of Social Evolution*. London: Anthem.
- North, Douglass C., John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Olson, Mancur, Jr. 1982. *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Rodrik, Dani, and Romain Wacziarg. 2005. Do Democratic Transitions Produce Bad Economic Outcomes? *American Economic Review* 95, no. 2: 50–55.
- Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- . 1954. *History of Economic Analysis*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Standing, Guy. 2017. *The Corruption of Capitalism: Why Rentiers Thrive and Why Work Does Not Pay*. London: Biteback.
- Transparency International. 2016. Corruption Perceptions Index. At https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016.
- Weber, Max. 1949. *Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- Williamson, Oliver E. 1975. *Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Anti-trust Implications. A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization*. New York: Free Press.

WHERE WILL THE WORLD ECONOMY BE IN FIFTY YEARS?



FUTURE ECONOMIC PERIL OR PROSPERITY?

It is impossible to tell what the future will look like a single year from now, much less fifty. In **Future**, however, twenty writers bravely venture to shine a spotlight on the next fifty years. In this engaging book, the authors create an economic roadmap with both warning signs and guideposts, signaling the direction of the best possible future through innovations in technology, the marketplace, and workplace.



ORDER TOLL FREE: 800-927-8733
ORDER ONLINE: INDEPENDENT.ORG/FUTURE
Independent Institute | 100 Swan Way, Oakland, CA 94621-1428

"The fascinating book **Future** succeeds admirably in provoking and informing about the directions our choices may take us. Those who fail to think about the future are destined to repeat the mistakes of the past!"

—Garry K. Kasparov, Chairman, Human Rights Foundation; 13th World Chess Champion; and author, *Winter Is Coming*

SUBSCRIBE NOW AND RECEIVE A FREE BOOK!



“*The Independent Review* does not accept pronouncements of government officials nor the conventional wisdom at face value.”

—**JOHN R. MACARTHUR**, Publisher, *Harper’s*


“*The Independent Review* is excellent.”

—**GARY BECKER**, Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences

Subscribe to [The Independent Review](#) and receive a free book of your choice such as *Liberty in Peril: Democracy and Power in American History*, by Randall G. Holcombe.

Thought-provoking and educational, [The Independent Review](#) is blazing the way toward informed debate. This quarterly journal offers leading-edge insights on today’s most critical issues in economics, healthcare, education, the environment, energy, defense, law, history, political science, philosophy, and sociology.

Student? Educator? Journalist? Business or civic leader? Engaged citizen? This journal is for YOU!



Order today for more **FREE** book options

SUBSCRIBE

The Independent Review is now available digitally on mobile devices and tablets via the Apple/Android App Stores and Magzter. Subscriptions and single issues start at \$2.99. [Learn More.](#)

