Gordon Tullock’s Scholarly Legacy

*Extracting It from Buchanan’s Shadow*

**RICHARD E. WAGNER**

Th**inking was Gordon Tullock’s main interest in life. He let his thinking roam widely and creatively over his many fields of interest; moreover, Tullock is widely recognized for the robust and creative quality of this thought. He left a valuable legacy. All the same, I think the value of that legacy is underappreciated. Too much of Tullock is perceived as residing within the shadow of James Buchanan’s constitutional thinking, with Tullock supplying the *homo economicus* to complement Buchanan’s broader constitutional concerns. To the contrary, I would describe Tullock and Buchanan as resembling divergent parabolas who point analytically in opposing directions, despite their common point of origin in the high value they place on individual liberty. Both were social theorists, with their divergent research programs constituting a yin and yang of liberal political economy. Tullock, however, unlike Buchanan, never created an overview of his research program, leaving him to be perceived in significant measure as simply supplying the *homo economicus* needed to complement Buchanan’s constitutional political economy. If Buchanan’s oeuvre is regarded as an intellectual cathedral, I would aver that Tullock’s oeuvre is generally...

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**Richard E. Wagner** is Holbart Harris Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at George Mason University and Distinguished Senior Fellow in the Hayek Program on Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at George Mason University.

regarded as a flying buttress in Buchanan’s cathedral. But I believe that Tullock’s oeuvre likewise constitutes a cathedral.

Even though Tullock came to publish increasingly without Buchanan after 1970 or so, the bulk of his work seemed to entail trituration of the *homo economicus* theme after the fashion of George Stigler and Gary S. Becker (1977). Without doubt, Tullock theorized in terms of people seeking to make the best of the situations they faced. His incessant use of *homo economicus*, however, failed to capture what he was truly about. Tullock was an empirically oriented theorist after the fashion of Frank Knight, as exemplified by Ross Emmett’s (2006) contrast between Knight and Stigler–Becker. Examination of Tullock’s oeuvre shows that he was not a theorist of rational choice. To the contrary, he was a social theorist whose work focused on the eternal human predicament that social life entails. Sure, all societies are inhabited by people who try to do the best they can as they understand their situations. This recognition, however, does not make a person a rational-choice theorist. Tullock’s thinking recognized that societies are rife with emergent phenomena that arise through interaction. His work centered on human interactions within society, not on rational choice per se. Tullock was more than the “natural economist” that Buchanan (1987) described him as being. Tullock was a social theorist who never articulated his social theory, even though that theory is present throughout his oeuvre. Furthermore, his social theory diverges in significant ways from Buchanan’s.

In a paper I wrote for a festschrift in Tullock’s honor (Rowley 1987), I noted that Tullock’s publications relate to matters treated by departments of political science, public administration, biology, philosophy, sociology, history, and military science. His publications also contribute to matters of interest to faculties in schools of law and criminology, as well as to faculties associated with interdisciplinary programs in international relations and Asiatic studies. All of this is in addition to his contributions to fields more narrowly economic. Someone writing a survey of Tullock’s works would surely think he was surveying the work of the faculty of a small university. (Wagner 1987a, 33–34, emphasis added)

The high value of Tullock’s large body of work is attested to by his being named a Distinguished Fellow of the American Economic Association in 1997, in addition to being honored by other professional associations. It is also attested to by the large volume of citations to many pieces of his body of work. Tullock’s original paper on rent seeking (Tullock 1967) has been cited more than four thousand times, and his follow-up paper on efficient rent seeking (Tullock 1980) has been cited more than three thousand times. One can, moreover, find many people who assert that Tullock should have been awarded a Nobel Prize for his scholarship. For instance, after noting that James Buchanan and Ronald Coase, both of whom were with Tullock on the faculty of
the University of Virginia in the early 1960s, had been awarded Nobel prizes, Art Carden and Phillip Magness note that “there is widespread agreement that another colleague, Gordon Tullock, should have won one” (2017, 63). Tullock is certainly well recognized for his scholarship. This I don’t deny, not for an instant. What I assert, though, and seek to render plausible here is that Tullock’s cosmic significance within the social sciences is underappreciated all the same. Why I might think this way when most people don’t is what I seek to explain here.

I start my exposition with Tullock’s introduction into academic economics as a sidekick of James Buchanan, a position that entailed both benefits and costs. One benefit was the instant recognition that Tullock gained from being catapulted into Buchanan’s scholarly orbit. One cost was the difficulty Tullock had in escaping that orbit, which he never fully accomplished, perhaps testifying to the enduring quality of first impressions. Lost from the common view of Tullock is his social theory and its divergence from Buchanan’s. That theory was left mostly implicit in Tullock’s many writings, thereby clouding some deep differences between Tullock and Buchanan in their scholarly orientation.

I should perhaps explain that I write this essay based on deep experience with Tullock and Buchanan going back to September 1963, when I entered the University of Virginia as a graduate student, and continuing until their deaths, Buchanan’s on January 9, 2013, and Tullock’s on November 3, 2014. I am the only person alive who was a student of both Tullock and Buchanan at the University of Virginia and who served with them as a faculty member at both Virginia Tech and George Mason, in addition to coauthoring with them. A great deal of what I offer about Tullock’s social theory, moreover, although always connected with his written work, has been amplified by numerous conversations I had with him over those years. I should also note that I have written essays about Buchanan (Wagner 1987b, 2013, 2014, 2017), about Tullock (Wagner 1987a, 2008, 2015a), and about them jointly (Wagner 1988, 2004, 2012, 2015b). Although this essay is based on the written record, it is invariably colored by a variety of long-standing experiences that speak to both similarities and differences between the two great scholars.¹

Buchanan and Tullock: Invariant Twins?

A decade stood between Tullock’s graduating from the University of Chicago in 1947 with a degree in law and his entering academic life at the University of Virginia in 1958 on a one-year fellowship.² During that fellowship year, Buchanan and Tullock laid the

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¹. I should also note three festschriften published on Tullock’s work: Rowley 1987; “A Symposium on Tullock’s Contributions to Spontaneous Order Studies” 2008; and “Gordon Tullock and Constitutional Political Economy” 2016.

². My reference to invariant twins comes via E. T. Bell’s essay on the mathematicians Arthur Cayley and James Joseph Sylvester, where Bell describes their work as being so close as to warrant his describing them as “invariant twins” (1937, 376–405). I invoke this comparison also in Wagner 2008.
groundwork for *The Calculus of Consent*. The actual drafting of the manuscript took place during the 1959–60 academic year while Tullock was a member of the International Studies Department at the University of South Carolina, where he served until 1962, when he returned to the University of Virginia as an associate professor.

In 1962, when *The Calculus of Consent* was published, Buchanan was a solidly established economic theorist, with more than a decade of publications in many major economics journals. Indeed, Buchanan 1960a represents what Buchanan described as “a progress report, a balance sheet struck after a decade’s academic accounting period” (1960a, 4). It’s not that this volume represented the totality of his activity over that decade, for it didn’t, but it did contain several themes that, with one exception, had already been published in highly regarded economics journals and had captured good scholarly notice. That exception (Buchanan 1960b), moreover, came to attract good scholarly attention in the coming years for making readers of English aware of a rich Italian literature on public finance that had been accessible only to readers of Italian. Furthermore, in 1958 Buchanan’s book *Public Principles of Public Debt* was published. This book stood in sharp contrast to the Keynesian ideas about public debt that had captured the academy over the preceding two decades and reflected the non-Keynesian character of much Italian thinking on public debt. Most significantly, *Public Principles* was reviewed in many of the major economics journals, and those reviews were written by many of this period’s most prominent theorists on public finance and macroeconomics. Although most of those reviews challenged Buchanan’s non-Keynesian orientation toward public debt, they were also clearly respectful of Buchanan, indicating the high regard in which he was held by his peers.

In contrast, Tullock was little known within academic economics apart from his connection with Buchanan. Tullock had tried two career paths after receiving his law degree in 1947. First, he tried legal practice, joining a law firm in Chicago. He tried two cases, winning one and losing one, and determined that the practice of law was not for him. He then joined the Department of State, where he stayed for nine years, focusing on Asian affairs. His sojourn with the State Department included two years of studying Chinese at Yale and a third year at Cornell as well as serving in China when the Communists took control. Nine years after joining State, Tullock realized that making a mark in diplomacy would not be his path in life. After a brief hiatus during which he took odd jobs, he received his one-year fellowship to work with Buchanan in Charlottesville.

It would not be wholly accurate to describe Tullock as being a novice in the ways of scholarship when he moved to Charlottesville, but it would be close. Next to Buchanan, Tullock was a pigmy standing beside a giant. He did pursue publication while working with the State Department, publishing three academic papers before moving to the University of Virginia. The first was published with Colin Campbell (Campbell and Tullock 1954), a close friend from his student days, in the *Journal of Political Economy*. He published a second paper with Campbell (Campbell and Tullock 1957) in the *American Economic Review*, while also publishing a paper (Tullock 1957) in the
Economic History Review. Tullock had also written a draft manuscript based on his experiences with the State Department, which he had shown to Buchanan prior to being offered a postdoctoral fellowship and which eventually became The Politics of Bureaucracy (Tullock 1965b). Without doubt, Buchanan was impressed with Tullock’s work and talent, and for excellent reason. Nevertheless, Tullock was clearly the junior partner in his working relationship with Buchanan, who had ten years of publications in many of the major economics journals behind him.

Following the publication of The Calculus of Consent in 1962, Buchanan and Tullock collaborated on several publications over the next decade or so. During this period, the impression of their being invariant twins would surely have been plausible. In Charlottesville, Buchanan and Tullock had adjacent offices facing one another at the end of a corridor, with Betty Tillman’s desk standing between the offices. During the years following publication of The Calculus of Consent, they wrote several papers together. In 1963 and 1964, they convened meetings of some twenty scholars under the rubric “Committee on Non-market Decision Making” to explore ideas at the boundaries of economics and politics. Those meetings led to Tullock’s founding a journal he titled Papers on Non-market Decision Making in 1966. In 1968, moreover, the committee morphed into the Public Choice Society, and Tullock retitled his journal Public Choice.

Further evidence speaking to invariance was Buchanan’s leaving the University of Virginia for the University of California at Los Angeles in 1968 in response to the University of Virginia’s third refusal to promote Tullock to the position of professor, despite strong positive support from the Department of Economics. After the third rejection, Tullock left Virginia for Rice in 1967, moving as a professor with a joint appointment in economics and political science. Still further evidence pertaining to invariance appeared when Buchanan joined Tullock and Charles Goetz at Virginia Tech in 1969 after spending but one year at UCLA. Tullock and Goetz established the Center for Studies in Public Choice in 1968, but the center’s name was changed to Center for the Study of Public Choice after Buchanan joined the faculty in 1969. In Tullock and Buchanan’s initial years at Virginia Tech, the invariance seemed to be alive, as illustrated by the project on anarchy to which both contributed in the early 1970s.

That project resulted in publication of two small volumes that Tullock edited and published through the imprint University Publications: Explorations in the Theory of Anarchy (1972) and Further Explorations in the Theory Anarchy. Many years later, Edward Stringham (2005) presented a set of essays that respond to the original anarchy essays by taking a more favorable view toward the orderly potential of anarchy. Both of Tullock’s volumes followed the publication of Academia in Anarchy by Buchanan and Nicos Devletoglou in 1970. Although the anarchy project was a joint effort between

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3. Tillman was Buchanan’s secretary. Her family was from the Charlottesville area, but she moved to Blacksburg when Buchanan moved to Virginia Tech in 1969, and she moved with Buchanan to Fairfax when Buchanan shifted to George Mason in 1984.
Buchanan and Tullock, it followed from Buchanan’s earlier effort with Devletoglou. Buchanan and Tullock were still invariant twins at this time, with Buchanan remaining senior to Tullock as the mid-1970s approached. To be sure, however, Buchanan and Tullock wrote separate appendixes for *The Calculus of Consent*, and those appendixes illustrate some differences in interest between them: Buchanan’s appendix concerns some history of political philosophy; Tullock’s appendix treats relatively technical analyses regarding theories of voting and collective action.

**Tullock and Buchanan: Divergent Parabolas?**

Around the time of their work on the anarchy project, Buchanan and Tullock undertook independent statements of their perspectives on anarchy, liberty, and social order. This work culminated in two manuscripts containing each one’s vision of the contribution of public-choice reasoning to the problem of securing ordered liberty within human affairs. Each submitted his manuscript to the University of Chicago Press. The fates of those manuscripts differed, as did the contents. Buchanan’s manuscript was accepted and published as *The Limits of Liberty* (1975). Tullock’s was rejected, to which Tullock responded by publishing it as *The Social Dilemma* (Tullock 1974b) under the University Publications imprint, which he financed during his days in Blacksburg. Each book was developed as a by-product of the anarchy project, and each was concerned with the viability of individual liberty in the presence of the political in society.

Of most significance here, comparing *The Limits of Liberty* and *The Social Dilemma* shows the authors to be more like divergent parabolas and nothing like invariant twins. Buchanan and Tullock shared a common origin that placed strong value on individual liberty and treated political action as a form of economizing action. Beyond this common origin, however, Buchanan and Tullock diverged like the parabolas $x^2$ and $-x^2$. These books show both theorists to be social theorists who grounded their theorizing in economizing individual action. Beyond this common point of departure, however, they diverged, and that divergence reflected their different research programs.

At base, Buchanan’s social theory rested on a presumption that there exists a point of constitutional concord that can serve as a focal point for constitutional agreement. To be sure, Buchanan theorized differently than most theorists who operate in this vein. Unlike most welfare theorists, Buchanan was not willing to posit some point of maximum social gain but rather regarded that point as something to be discovered through constitutional bargaining among the affected parties. He presumed that there exists some point of mutual benefit from escaping what he imagined as preconstitutional anarchy and that the social problem is twofold: first, to locate that point and enshrine it in a suitable constitutional framework and, second, to maintain that framework against erosion through postconstitutional politics. Buchanan thus theorized in terms of states of political-economic equilibrium, but he treated that equilibrium as something to be determined through constitutional bargaining as against being specified by some welfare theorist.
Buchanan adapted the prisoner’s dilemma to his explanatory task, which is to explain how self-interested persons can agree to live by some common set of rules to escape the dilemma that they otherwise would face. In making this escape, people create political authority to enforce the rules to which they have agreed. The rule-enforcing authority is independent of those who agree to the rules and so becomes a species of Leviathan. Hence, Buchanan arrived at *The Limits of Liberty*’s subtitle: *Between Anarchy and Leviathan*. He conceived of reality in terms of two options. One is life under anarchy, which is thought to represent independent action by each person. The other is life under some agreed-upon set of rules that will be enforced by an independent agent, which can become a Leviathan, following Thomas Hobbes’s reference to a sea creature in Job and Isaiah in the Bible. This formulation brings into the analytical foreground the constitutional framework that is adopted to limit the range of Leviathan’s action. Although Buchanan used little mathematics in his formulations, mostly simple diagrams, his exposition is abstract and formal all the same. His analytical style could well be called “mathematics without equations” in its axiomatic-like character of deriving implications from presuppositions.

In this respect, I have elsewhere described Buchanan as theorizing from east of Eden (Wagner 2008). This description carries with it several associations. For one thing, east of Eden theorizing entails some point where everything starts, so to speak, as a form of de novo theorizing. The phenomena under examination did not exist prior to the theoretical act. There were no human phenomena in the Garden of Eden prior to Eve’s imploring Adam to eat from the tree of knowledge. Ejection of Adam and Eve from Eden leaves them haunted by recollection of Eden and longing to return. The best that can be attained is some constitutional arrangement that might limit Leviathan’s predations. This scheme of analysis is a form of comparative statics. The original data pertained to life inside the Garden. Ejection from Eden is an exogenous shock that entails different data, creating some new set of conditions for living together. There is no unique way a set of people might live together in geographical confinement. Practically limitless are the possibilities. The few might enslave the many. The few might dominate the many as lords of a manor. The many might seek to promote civil peace by surrendering their powers of self-protection to a Leviathan, which is the scheme Buchanan adopted in *Limits of Liberty*.

For Buchanan, politics could be beneficial within a limited range and was something to be subdued or perhaps just tamed through constitutional design. In this view, he pretty much reflected the mainline, as contrasted with the mainstream after Peter Boettke (2012), of classical liberal theorizing by seeking to reduce politics to the point of elimination through some combination of economics, law, and morality, leaving little if anything remaining for the truly political in society, in contrast to Carl Schmitt’s ([1932] 1996) claim on behalf of the autonomy of the political within societies. The reduction of politics to near nothingness reflects the idealized liberal vision of constitutional governance. What people typically regard as politics would still be visible, but politics would be tamed almost to extinction. In good measure, this taming
would be accomplished by economics, as envisioned by the theory of public goods, wherein politics promotes citizens’ desires in the same fashion as producers promote consumers’ desires. Contract theories of the state reflect this abolition of the political from society. Law and morality would work to similar effect in abolishing the political. To be sure, one could, as did Buchanan, think that liberal constitutionalism will never be fully successful in abolishing the political, rendering the maintenance of liberal constitutional orders a continuing challenge within societies.

Tullock theorized differently from Buchanan, and in several respects he did not theorize from some de novo point of departure. He always theorized from some actual and not imagined point of departure; in other words, he theorized in media res. Contrary to Buchanan, Tullock did not theorize in terms of social equilibrium—that is, presuming that some state of social concord could be found on which universal assent exists—though sometimes he used a language that spoke of equilibrium. For him, concord within society is an act of imagination that bears no counterpart in historical experience. Discord is always present. Societies are arenas of continuing civil warfare of variable intensity, ranging from modest simmering to fierce boiling. According to The Social Dilemma, Tullock regarded wars, revolutions, and coups d’état as latent phenomena that can pretty much manifest anywhere and anytime. It is easy to understand that people who are comfortable and satisfied with their state of existence would like to keep things as they are. But there will also exist people who are not comfortable and satisfied and who often will seek in one way or another to upset the existing order in some fashion. Tullock was a sober realist and a meliorist who looked at life as entailing a continuing parade of predicaments with which to deal and most certainly not as some dilemma to escape or avoid.

Buchanan articulated, often, core ideas that animated his research program. So far as I know, Tullock never did this, though it might be possible to cobble together such a core program from pieces of his work in conjunction with numerous conversations with him going back to September 1963. In Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921), Frank Knight provides a convenient framework for distinguishing Buchanan’s and Tullock’s two distinct research programs. Aside from two introductory chapters, Knight’s book is split into two parts. The first of those parts contains four chapters on the theory of perfect competition. The second part contains six chapters on imperfect competition. Knight’s distinction between perfect and imperfect competition has nothing to do with how economists use those terms today. The term perfect competition for Knight meant pretty much what economists mean by it today: a state of affairs in which it would be impossible for any change to make one person better off without making at least one other person worse off. Perfect competition denotes a set of theoretical conditions under which all possible gains from trade within a society are exploited.

The theory of perfect competition represents a piece of demonstrative reasoning, in contrast to plausible reasoning, that George Polya (1954) cogently illuminates. Perfect competition is a form of ideal construction made in full recognition that reality does not conform to the ideal. For Knight, however, unlike most contemporary
economists, the gap between ideal and real does not indicate some need for collective action to close the gap. To the contrary, it is the gap that actuates entrepreneurial action to find ways of closing that gap, recognizing that closing the gap is a source of profit. Buchanan and Tullock, as well as everyone at Virginia in the late 1950s and early 1960s, were intimately aware of Knight’s scheme of thought. Buchanan and Tullock differed in how they assimilated Knight’s scheme to their projects, but that scheme is present in either case. Knight’s ideal of perfect competition became for Buchanan a point of constitutional agreement when he transformed Knight’s focus on markets into a focus on politics. The gap between constitutional and postconstitutional action entails coalitions seeking gains from trade at the expense of those excluded from those coalitions. Although Buchanan’s theorizing started with Knight’s vision of perfect competition, Buchanan kept Knight’s vision of imperfect competition close at hand. In contrast, Tullock was strongly oriented toward process theorizing, though occasionally he would sneak a peek at equilibrium, as illustrated by his theorizing about rent seeking. Yet he viewed reality as open-ended and as offering no point of universal agreement, meaning that wars, revolutions, and coups d’état are an inescapable part of the human predicament, as he explained in *The Social Dilemma*.

Elsewhere (Wagner 2008) I describe Tullock as theorizing from west of Babel, in contrast to Buchanan’s east of Eden point of departure. West of Babel does not start from some abstract point of concord as a product of the imagination. To the contrary, it starts from discord, with people having to find their way amid that discord. The subtitle of *The Social Dilemma* is *The Economics of War and Revolution*. Several points can be made about this subtitle and how it illustrates divergences between Tullock and Buchanan. By starting his analytical efforts from the middle of situations, Tullock’s writings invariably reflect substantive points of dispute and contestation among people. The world west of Babel is cacophonous and is not aided by some harmonious vision of what had been left behind. There is no vision of some state of perfection that might be recaptured through constitutional construction. By understanding how principles of economizing action play out in provoking war and revolution, lessons might be learned that would facilitate adoption of some melioristic effort, but that is about all that anyone can expect from economic analysis. I don’t ever recall hearing Tullock object to one of Hayek’s better-known statements about the need to create a new utopian vision to recapture vitality for liberalism, and I doubt if he would have objected to the sentiment Hayek expressed. All the same, I doubt he would have thought that a pithy statement of such a sentiment would be sufficient to transform reality.

**Extracting Tullock’s Social Theory**

By starting his analytical effort from the middle of situations, Tullock’s writings invariably reflect substantive points of dispute and contestation among people. There is no vision of some state of perfection that might be recaptured through constitutional construction. Theorizing from west of Babel entails thinking in terms of continually
evolving systems of societal relationships wherein those relationships entail a great deal of cooperation but also a great deal of conflict, reflecting the human predicament that more people want to be first violin in some societal orchestra than there are first-violin positions available. There is, moreover, no conductor who stands apart from the society to make a choice. Tullock did not object to game-theoretic formulations to illustrate points, but he was also wary of the prisoner’s dilemma formulations Buchanan often used and for reasons similar to Daniel Ellsberg’s (1956) treatment of the reluctant duelist. The standard prisoner’s dilemma involves three persons, not two. There are two prisoners, but they are placed in the dilemma by a district attorney, who is also a player in what is a three-person game. If there were truly just two players, there would be no reason for them to play a prisoner’s dilemma game, for they would instead be reluctant duelists.

Tullock surely would not have objected to the disappearance of politics if life happened to take this course, but he would have been highly doubtful that politics would disappear. In this skepticism, he resembled Carl Schmitt ([1932] 1996). Disappearance of the political would denote the appearance of some Peaceable Kingdom where lions lie down with lambs. Tullock didn’t see this view as reasonable and thought the human predicament entailed eternal conflict as far as anyone could tell, with the presence of the political in society being an ineradicable feature of human societies. In this outlook, Tullock was surely a kindred spirit to Schmitt, whose theory of the political turned on the friend–enemy distinction. Schmitt applied his theory of the political mostly to international relations, as did Tullock in *The Social Dilemma*. In other works, however, Tullock applied the orientation encapsulated in *The Social Dilemma* to life inside nations. For instance, taxing and spending throughout the Western world turn on never-ending conflicts among people over how they are to live together (as shown in Webber and Wildavsky 1986). Armistices might subdue one quarrel for a time, but a new one will erupt. Indeed, majoritarian processes ensure the continual eruption of such quarrels. From time to time, some era of good feelings might arise, with political programs reflecting a high degree of consensus within a society. As William Riker (1962) argues, however, those good feelings will dissolve in budgetary and other quarrels.

I don’t recall ever seeing Tullock cite Carl Schmitt, nor does Schmitt appear in the index of the ten-volume collection of Tullock’s *Selected Works*. All the same, there is a clear affinity between Schmitt’s vision of liberalism and Tullock’s. Renato Cristi (1998) has described Schmitt’s vision as authoritarian liberalism, and Eckhard Bolsinger (2002) describes it as political realism. These treatments of Schmitt bring to mind James Burnham’s (1943) treatment of the Machiavellian strain of political thought, to which Tullock contributed significant amplification. It is also worthwhile to recall James F. Stephen’s ([1873] 1993) objection to John Stuart Mill’s (1863) formulation of liberalism. Schmitt explained the collapse of the Weimar Republic as due to the inability of the republic’s political leadership to fend off predation from interest groups; this diagnosis is captured nicely in the subtitle of Cristi’s book *Carl Schmitt and*
Authoritarian Liberalism: Strong State, Free Economy (1998). Schmitt claimed that a genuine market economy required a strong state to maintain its liberal arrangements. Weimar, however, was a weak state that was unable to resist incursion by predation from those who would undermine the republic.

Tullock’s work on rent seeking builds on some initial public-choice insights about a few people’s ability to capture concentrated gains often in order to dominate the many people who suffer small losses, even though some plausible measure of aggregates would show the losses to exceed the gains. Public-choice theorists have long recognized the advantage that a relatively small set of people with concentrated interests have within democratic polities. This situation can be illustrated with some simple binomial arithmetic. Suppose a polity contains 1,000 members. Suppose there is an issue about which 50 people care intensely but 950 care only modestly, one way or the other. Suppose this pattern of preference means that the 950 can be plausibly modeled as deciding how to vote by flipping a coin. In contrast, the 50 with intense preferences will vote the same way. Within this binomial framework, the group of 50 will get their way 80 percent of the time, and a group of 75 will be able to do so 99 percent of the time, as Ronald Rogowski explains (1974, 86–89).

If the political process entails a sequence of issues, each with a similar structure of preferences, a liberal constitutional order can be eroded through a parade of protectionist measures. To say that a strong state is necessary to resist this constitutional predation by interest groups begs the question of just what this might entail. A simple illustration of this point might be helpful to illustrate some of the difficulties of maintaining a liberal framework for social interaction. Suppose part of a nation’s public finances includes a modest tariff, similar to the financing of the American republic prior to the introduction of income taxation. It could plausibly be argued that a modest tariff does not undermine the principles of liberal governance, which rests on the principles of private property and freedom of contract. A low tariff could plausibly be argued to be a reasonable means to finance some governmental activities of general value, with the recognition that I am speaking of plausibility and not demonstrability.

A low tariff does not significantly alter channels of commerce through market interaction. Sure, imported goods will become more expensive, leading to some substitution of domestic production for importation. The boundary between a low tariff and a high tariff is not sharp. Nonetheless, the boundary separates tariffs that provoke no effort at evasion because the cost of evasion would exceed the gain, from tariffs that will promote evasion. A low tariff will not induce evasion through smuggling because the gain from evasion is not worth the cost. There is good reason, however, to think that democratic processes will generate tariffs that are high enough to induce evasion through smuggling. To illustrate this point as Tullock (1959) did, suppose a tariff increases the price of products that two-thirds of the population buys, with the gain from the tariff accruing to a small group of resource owners. The higher the tariff, the stronger will be the inducement to smuggling—and to the creation of new channels of commerce to support smuggling. It will also induce a growth in state offices to detect
and prosecute smuggling, eroding the domain within society that is organized within
the framework of private property and freedom of contract. As tariffs grow from low to
high, the private ordering of economic activity gives way to public ordering, thereby
replacing private property and freedom of contract as principles governing economic
interaction. The state’s weakness to resist raising tariffs inserts public ordering into the
scheme of private law, enabling expansion in the scope of the political in society.
Constitutional parchment is unlikely to resist this expansion, Tullock recognized, with
resistance being plausible only if independent sources of guns were facing one another.

**Amplifying Tullock’s Social Theory**

In my rational reconstruction of Buchanan’s scholarly oeuvre (Wagner 2017), I
characterize Buchanan’s body of work as resembling a mature oak tree that grew out of
an insight and aspiration that Buchanan (1949) set forth in his first scholarly paper,
where he contrasted the individualist approach to public finance that he wanted to
develop with the organismic approach that dominated public finance at that time—and
still does, for that matter. Buchanan’s oeuvre has a clear architectonic quality that
derives from his initial interest to reconstruct the theory of public finance within
a genuinely democratic setting for what would be regarded substantively and not just
formally as a self-governing republic. The effort to do this is an immense task that leads
a theorist in many directions, as Buchanan’s bibliography attests, with the twenty-
volume collection of his works published by Liberty Fund being but the major part of an
even larger body of work. The architectonic quality of Buchanan’s oeuvre is, I believe,
apparent, even though I recognize that other people could give alternative descriptions
of that architecture.

The work of any social theorist will have an architectonic quality wherein nu-
merous lines of examination are connected through some general theoretical frame-
work that integrates the parts within the whole. For Buchanan, it is easy to see
connections between parts and whole. For Tullock, this task is more challenging.
Tullock showed us parts, many of them, but he didn’t offer any glimpses into his
animating core from which the parts sprang. To be sure, a scholar need not have an
animating core from which myriad parts spring. Many scholars don’t. They would be
foxes, according to Isaiah Berlin’s (1953) distinction between hedgehogs and foxes as
types of thinkers. Tullock surely appears to be a fox in many readers’ eyes because he
explored a vast array of topics without offering insight into his animating vision. This
appearance is surely exacerbated by his reluctance to engage in methodological dis-
course. So far as I can tell, the closest he came to methodological discourse is chapter 3,
But even this chapter discusses methodological matters only in the final three par-
agraphs, noting that the relation between facts and theories is complex and that scientists
in practice have little difficulty distinguishing between science and nonscience. In other
words, Tullock didn’t present a comprehensive vision of some whole into which his
various parts fit. He seems to be a fox. I am reminded of Berlin’s treatment of Tolstoy as being a fox by nature but as thinking he should be a hedgehog. I am inclined to claim that Tullock was a hedgehog by nature but thought he should be an energetic fox and so refrained from articulating the qualities of his thought, which would have rendered him a hedgehog.

The perception of Tullock as more a planter of trees than a creator of a forest perhaps springs from the path he followed in moving from law to diplomacy to economics over a ten-year interval. Several commentators, including Tullock himself, have remarked that he took only one economics class, from Henry Simons, while he was in law school. This is only partially true. Tullock did start a class with Simons in the fall 1943 quarter but did not finish it because he was drafted into the army, subsequently entering France a week after D-Day in June 1944. When Tullock returned to law school after he was mustered out of the army, Simons was dead. Although Simons presented the elements of price theory in the style of Frank Knight, Tullock’s thinking surely received its grounding in the case method of law schools of the time, where the order of movement was from points of controversy to the extraction of what seemed to be the general principles that connected various judgments. In his formative years, Tullock thought more like a lawyer than like an economic theorist. This characteristic is apparent in *The Politics of Bureaucracy* (Tullock 1965b), which he wrote while with the State Department and which Buchanan read before Tullock took up his one-year position with the Thomas Jefferson Center at Virginia. To be sure, Tullock brought with him to Virginia a draft manuscript on a theory of constitutions, which eventually became chapter 6 of *The Calculus of Consent*. His mental framework of starting from instances of something and moving toward general principles, so far as they could be articulated, stayed with him throughout his career. In contrast, Buchanan’s mental framework reflected the equilibrium framework of the time, even though he approached that framework in the manner of Frank Knight (1921) and not in the manner of the ordinary theory of economic equilibrium. Buchanan’s mental framework was grounded in concord and teleology; Tullock’s was grounded in conflict and evolution.

The image of Tullock as being Buchanan’s sidekick was surely reinforced by Buchanan’s (1987) description of Tullock as a “natural economist.” According to this essay, Tullock was intuitively gifted and applied that gift to a variety of topics, including bureaucracy, voting, crime, war, revolution, charity, redistribution, and rent seeking. To take recourse again to that image of trees and forests, we might say that Tullock planted many, many trees in his writings, but those trees did not a create a coherent forest. Buchanan, too, planted many, many trees, but no one could say that his planting failed to reflect a coherent forest.

As a conceptual experiment, suppose one were to ask one hundred informed economists and other social scientists what comes to mind when they hear Buchanan’s name mentioned. Those economists would doubtlessly respond in several ways, with those responses ranging from individual lines of thought to broader schemes of thought that encompass those lines. Responders would affirm a vision that included awareness of
trees as well as the forest those trees constitute. If these economists were asked about Tullock, however, they would describe many trees, probably covering more species of thought than resided in Buchanan’s forest, but I think they would be hard-pressed to give shape to the forest constituted by those trees.

Gaetano Mosca (1939) claimed that people defer more readily to abstract, universal principles than to identifiable individuals per se. Mosca advanced his claim within the context of his theory that democracy entails minorities articulating ideological images to compete among themselves to gain support within a society. It isn’t so much charismatic persons per se who are successful as it is persons who are able to articulate abstract principles that resonate more strongly within a society than do the articulations made by competitors. I think something similar is in play in the ranking of thinkers. A fox might articulate more specific ideas than a hedgehog, but a hedgehog will typically occupy a position more in the foreground of a reader’s attention space than a fox will, perhaps due to the ability of some coherent universal to displace numerous details in a setting where the claims on a reader’s attention space is crowded. Scholars can always be noted for individual contributions they have created, but especial prominence seems to be captured by those whose contributions entail universalistic qualities of some type.

In my estimation, The Social Dilemma contains the core of a social theory that could have served as Tullock’s equivalent to The Limits of Liberty but did not. Where Limits of Liberty has been cited nearly thirty-five hundred times, Social Dilemma has been cited barely four hundred times. Social Dilemma includes Tullock’s general vision of the problem of social order, similar to Buchanan’s presentation in Limits of Liberty. Indeed, Tullock dealt with substantive instances to amplify his theme, whereas Buchanan stuck with abstract analysis. The Social Dilemma contains a theme from which Tullock’s examination of war and revolution arises and takes its bearing, but Tullock did nothing to render that theme explicit. Hence, The Social Dilemma appears to be Tullock’s application of public-choice thinking to war and revolution and to do so within the conventional context of the prisoner’s dilemma. It appears to be public choice applied to matters of international political economy rather than to domestic political economy.

I don’t think it had to be this way, but perhaps it did, given Tullock’s start in law and not in economic theory, and, in any case, that was the way it was. In Tullock’s analytical vision present within The Social Dilemma as well as in his work on such topics as rent seeking, income redistribution, bureaucracy, crime, and charity, the same unifying vision of individuals formulating and pursuing plans of action operates throughout the social world. That operation, however, does not converge on some point of origin about which universal agreement can plausibly be secured. We live west of Babel and not east of Eden in the social theory with which Tullock worked, even if he never articulated it fully and sharply. Tullock’s oeuvre points toward Babel as providing

the starting point for social theory. All the creatures ejected from Babel were economizers, only they differed in the objects toward which they acted and in how they understood their situations. In this setting, instances of local peace could always result, but those instances would be tenuous and always subject to entropy.

For Tullock, politics is destiny. There is no escape from that destiny. The distinction between friend and enemy cannot be vanquished, neither in politics among nations nor in politics within nations. In a nearly ignored paper titled “Constitutional Mythology” (1965a), Tullock explained that a court that truly has the ability to decide what is and is not consistent with the Constitution must stand outside the Constitution and so cannot be ruled by the Constitution. In other words, constitutional parchment cannot enforce itself. Only people can enforce constitutions, and in Tullock’s scheme of thought there is no universal point of agreement outside of adorning some theorist’s whiteboard. In the ebb and flow of social life, there are only friends and foes and struggle, as James Burnham captures nicely in the opening two chapters of The Machiavellians (1943), where he contrasts Dante and Machiavelli. Tullock’s social theory bears a family resemblance to the work of the theorists Burnham examines: Vilfredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Roberto Michels, and Georges Sorel. Tullock operated with a vision of social theory that created distance between him and Buchanan. That distance can be inferred to some extent in comparing various works Tullock and Buchanan wrote, but I think it is underestimated due to Tullock’s failure to articulate the social theory that undergirded his work.

Arthur Lovejoy (1936) distinguished between other-worldly and this-worldly thinkers, with both types illuminated within Plato’s body of work. In this work, Lovejoy was particularly interested in the unconscious mental habits and patterns of thought that inform a scholar’s thinking. For other-worldly thinkers, the world of experience is but a pale reflection of some better world that can be imagined. For this-worldly thinkers, by contrast, the experienced world is all there is, though it is also a world that is continually undergoing change through interaction among people and their ideas. Tullock’s unconscious mental habits revealed him to be a this-worldly thinker, in contrast to Buchanan, who was clearly an other-worldly thinker.

Related to Lovejoy’s distinction between this-worldly and other-worldly styles of thinking is the distinction between reason and rational action pertaining to form or to substance. For most economists, rationality pertains to the form of action. All action is rational because there is no other option. Tullock wouldn’t have denied this but would instead have noted that action in the world is always substantive and never formal. This recognition plays out throughout Tullock’s oeuvre. Rationality can be reasonably treated as the form that purposeful action takes, but that form is distinct from the substance at which purposive action is directed. The postulate of rational action simply holds that people seek to be effective and not ineffective in what they choose to do. This

5. When I visited Google Scholar on October 26, 2017, “Constitutional Mythology” had collected only eleven citations, three of them by me.
postulate is surely unexceptional, for no one seeks deliberately to fail at something one chooses to do. Both Albert Schweitzer and Adolf Hitler had Germanic origins, and both migrated from their point of origin to pursue their dreams, Schweitzer moving from Germany to Africa and Hitler moving from Austria to Germany. Both conformed to the form of rational action despite monumental differences in the substance of their actions.

At base, public choice reflects recognition that the formal quality of rational action will exhibit substantive differences across different environments for action. Social environments dominated by private ordering will differ from environments where public ordering exerts significant influence over social interaction. In the theory of markets, economists treat production as occurring along a cost function. Those functions, moreover, are a boundary that separates outcomes that can’t be achieved from outcomes that can be achieved. It is impossible to produce below cost, but production above cost is possible. Once this elemental point is recognized, one might wonder why economists locate cost on the boundary between the possible and the impossible. The answer lies in formal reasoning about the properties of private ordering. Within organizational arrangements where managers hold positions of residual claimancy, a manager who can locate lower-cost methods of producing a product will reap the increased residual between the revenues that accrue from the sale of output and the contracted expenses of production. With public ordering, however, residual claimancy vanishes or at least manifests in different ways due to the peculiar features of politics as a form of business practice (Wagner 2016). Cost will exist in public organizations as well as in private ones, but the substantive meaning of cost differs between organizations even if the form is invariant to organization.

Richard Posner ([1973] 2011) claimed that common-law rulings conform to economic efficiency. In various works, Tullock (1971, 1980, 1996) objected to that claim. In doing so, he did not label the claim on behalf of efficiency wrong but noted only that the work necessary to render the claim plausible had not been done with respect to the environments within which legal processes unfold. Consider just one instance where Tullock disputed Posner’s claim on behalf of the economic efficiency of common-law rulings. I have in mind Posner’s gloss in the common-law doctrine that railroads have a duty to watch out for pedestrians only at railroad crossings but always have a duty to watch out for cattle straying anywhere along their tracks. Posner’s reconciliation of this observation invoked the comparative cost of avoiding accidents. Posner claimed, surely with intuitive plausibility on his side, that it would be less costly for pedestrians to watch for trains at crossings than it would be for trains continuously to be watching for pedestrians. In contrast, it would be costlier for ranchers to install and maintain fences around their cattle than it would be for railroads to instruct their train drivers to look out for straying cattle. Posner’s claim is grounded in intuitively plausible metaphysics.

Tullock didn’t dispute Posner’s claim but noted instead that Posner’s claim is metaphysical and not empirical, as are numerous claims about efficiency in economics. Efficiency in economics is really a property of the model of competitive equilibrium and
is undefined outside that model. Efficiency is not something that is directly apprehensible. Rather, it is an implication of a model of the Pareto efficiency of competitive equilibrium. Is the cost to the pedestrian of avoiding crossing anywhere but at railroad crossings truly lower than the cost to train drivers of watching for pedestrians? Should the shortest paths of all pedestrians whose travels take them across train tracks lead to their crossing at road crossings, Posner’s intuitive plausibility surely becomes highly likely. But there will surely be pedestrians, perhaps many of them, for whom the shortest distance requires their crossing outside of grade crossings. If so, it is difficult if not impossible to say in any substantive way which is the lower-cost rule, which was Tullock’s empirically grounded response. Even more, watching for cattle and watching for pedestrians are joint activities. A train driver who is watching for cattle can watch for pedestrians at no marginal cost.

A well-known problem in statistical decision theory involves a lady who claims that she can tell whether a cup of tea was made by putting the tea or the milk into the cup first (Neyman 1950). A judge must decide whether to accept or reject the lady’s claim and designs an experiment to test it. Within Tullock’s context, this setting is equivalent to asking whether the lady is an efficient oracle for determining how a cup of tea is made. Yet there is no way even to make this kind of determination because there is no independent source of evidence and judgment. Many procedures for reaching a judgment are possible, and these procedures will typically differ both in their costliness and in their ability to avoid errors. Aside from accuracy and cost, various standards of judgment are possible, with higher standards of judgment typically involving more costly procedures. For instance, accuracy will increase as the lady is given more cups of tea to taste, but cost will also rise with the number of cups tasted. In these situations, there is no God’s-eye platform from which “truth” can be pronounced. Rather what exists are various decision procedures with varying ability to provide useful evidence and differing both in their costliness and in their error-avoidance properties.

Tullock’s approach to the cost and accuracy of judicial proceedings fits within this decision theory motif. For instance, where Posner compared the common law to a competitive market system, Tullock compared it to a socialist bureaucracy. There is something to be said in support of each analogy, but there are also things to be said against each of them. The common-law system features competition among attorneys for custom and between attorneys at trials. Tullock argued that this system resembles an arms race with both cheap and expensive points of equilibrium, with the process tending toward the expensive equilibrium. On this basis, Tullock favored the civil-law procedure where judges and not lawyers are the dominant players. But judges are bureaucrats who are paid through tax revenues and not by clients who are seeking their services. Furthermore, law and politics are deeply entangled because all legal systems are replete with public ordering wherein the private law principles of property and contract are hemmed in through various politically articulated requirements. Even arbitration, which entails far more private ordering than either common or civil law, requires public officials’ willingness to enforce the judgments that are reached in those proceedings.
In Lieu of a Conclusion

Gordon Tullock’s legacy, like that of any scholar, will be determined through the choices that future scholars make in according significance to past scholars. Tullock supplied many ideas for future scholars to think about, though I think he is destined to be regarded as an energetic fox and not as a hedgehog, whose social theory pointed in the opposite direction from Buchanan’s, even though both sought to support liberalism within the contemporary world. For Tullock, politics is destiny. The political is not restricted to one sphere of life. It can manifest anywhere. For Tullock, liberty is less a matter of getting a mass of people to agree to some constitutional arrangement than of hitting upon societal arrangements where there is robust opposition among people and their interests. Organized boxing is a misleading model for the problem of constitutional governance. Boxing has a referee to enforce rules set forth by the Marquess of Queensberry—and with the boxers effectively agreeing upon the referee before they step into the ring. For social life, however, there is no Marquess of Queensberry. When at the close of the American Constitutional Convention in 1787, Benjamin Franklin responded “a republic if you can keep it” to a woman who asked what kind of government had been created, Franklin was acknowledging the unavoidably evolutionary character of social life, where struggle is unavoidably part of the deal.

From several conversations I had with Tullock after 1986, I know that he was deeply hurt by not being awarded a Nobel Prize, for he thought his contribution to promoting public choice throughout the world was roughly on par with Buchanan’s. Tullock could also plausibly have been awarded a Nobel Prize for his work on rent seeking, but that didn’t happen either. Tullock was both sensible and whimsical, and those two qualities often do not fit well together. In Tullock, they often clashed, his whimsical character sometimes manifesting in an apparent harshness that redounded to his detriment. Late in the 1980s, I recall a conversation in which Tullock related receiving a phone call from a journalist in Sweden. Tullock was living in Blacksburg at the time, and the journalist asked why he was living in that remote part of Virginia, a question that surely shows that the journalist held Tullock in high esteem. Yet Tullock responded by asserting that there were more good economists in his part of Virginia than there were in all of Sweden. To be whimsical and quick witted can sometimes be a detriment. I have known a number of people over the years who have expressed irritation about Tullock, due, I think, to his inability to tame his whimsy. Yet from the day I met him in September 1963 to the very end, I could see that this whimsy sprang from one of the kindest and gentlest men I have ever known.

References


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