

# 11 The Promise and Sensibility of Integrative Dualism

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This chapter has three aims. First, I argue for what may be called the primacy of the mental. Much contemporary philosophy of mind proceeds on the grounds that we have a problem-free concept of what is nonmental, or mind-independent, or taking up the so-called third-person point of view. I argue that the very notion of a third-person point of view rests on the intelligibility of an antecedent subjective, first-person point of view. To appreciate the nature and cogency of mind-body “dualism” historically and today, one needs to recognize the importance of methodology and of securing a common-sense, initial starting point of inquiry that takes the first-person, subjective experience seriously. Second, I advance a case for what may be called *integrative dualism*. Too often, critics of dualism fail to recognize that one may embrace the metaphysical distinction of person and body, or the mental and physical, and yet claim that in a fully functioning, healthy embodiment, the embodied person functions as a unified subject. The second part of this chapter, then, seeks to redress the charge that dualism employs an implausible bifurcation between the observable, material body and the invisible, incorporeal mind. Third, I argue that the objection to mind-body interaction in a dualist framework is over rated. Contemporary critics of dualism such as Paul Churchland assume that we have a problem-free account of physical causation, but we are (or we should be) baffled about how to square “thoroughly” and “unambiguously” physical causation with mental causation. I argue for the reverse: we should not be baffled or suspect of mental causation, lest we undermine the very intelligibility and practice of the physical sciences.

I have defended elsewhere a modal argument for mind-body dualism.<sup>1</sup> This chapter will not directly contribute to that argument, which I find persuasive, but it will address three challenges facing dualism in terms of method, integration, and causal interaction. If successful, this chapter will indirectly contribute to the modal argument insofar as its concluding portrait of personal embodiment seems both coherent and promising.

*The primacy of the mental:* Some physicalists assume that we are first and foremost in possession of a sound understanding of what it is to be physical. This is sometimes articulated in terms of the problem of causal interaction in dualism. Consider three claims. Here is Jaegwon Kim:

It simply does not seem credible that an immaterial substance with no material characteristics and totally outside physical space, could causally influence and be influenced by, the motions of material bodies that are strictly governed by physical law. Just try to imagine how something that isn't anywhere in physical space could alter in the slightest degree the trajectory of even a single material particle in motion. (Kim 1996: 4)

Here is a similar claim by Eliot Sober:

If the mind is immaterial, then it does not take up space. But if it lacks spatial location, how can it be causally connected to the body? When two events are causally connected, we normally expect there to be a physical signal that passes from one to the other. How can a physical signal emerge from or lead to the mind if the mind is no place at all? (Sober 2000: 24)

And here is Daniel Dennett:

There is only one sort of stuff, namely *matter*—the physical stuff of physics, chemistry and physiology—and the mind is somehow nothing but a physical phenomenon. In short, the mind is the brain . . . we can (in principle!) account for every mental phenomenon using the same physical principles, laws, and raw materials that suffice to explain radioactivity, continental drift, photosynthesis, reproduction, nutrition, and growth. (Dennett 1991: 33)

There are a number of matters to challenge in these claims. First, there is the presupposition that we have a sound, problem-free understanding of what it is to be material. Evidently, for Kim and Sober, something is material if it is spatial. This is not a unique or minority report. Peter van Inwagen writes, "A thing is a material object if it occupies space and endures through time and can move about in space" (van Inwagen 1990: 17). But this seems highly problematic. Many philosophers have believed that the mind or soul is spatial and yet not physical (the Cambridge Platonists), and philosophers like G.E. Moore and H.H. Price have contended that visual sensations (not limited to but including dream images and after-images) and sense or sense-data are spatial but not physical (see Taliaferro 1994: ch. 2). If any of these positions are plausible, we have reason to doubt the thesis that space is unified (every spatial object is some spatial distance from every other spatial object). Related to this is the fact that we only know of spatial objects and their relationships through our experience. Our appreciation and understanding of space requires the adequacy and reliability of our perceptual experience, our understanding, and consciousness. Indeed, when philosophers articulate what it is to be spatial (e.g. space is intersubjective; two persons can have experiences of the same object), they seem to grant that subjectivity is a key,

conceptual, even prior category. Without an understanding of subjectivity, how can I understand intersubjectivity? We only have views about physical signals on the grounds of experience and understanding.

Some of the terms used by Kim and Sober also seem open to question. Why is the mental (on a dualist view) described as “totally outside physical space”? On any standard dualist account, the physical and mental are interwoven: we smell material objects, see them, hear them, taste them, and so on, where this seeing, hearing, tasting, and smelling involves more than the physical. Do physical signals smell, are they colored, or do they feel hot or cold? If so, it is not clear that “physical signals” are purely and exclusively physical sorts of things: perhaps they are objects that appear to us in certain ways, and this appearing is not thoroughly physical. Also, without a good grasp of what counts as physical, how do we know that “material bodies are strictly governed by physical law”? When I smell a rose, perhaps this is a matter of *psycho-physical causation*, and this is not a narrowly physicalistic affair. Also, van Inwagen’s view of material objects seems to rule out immobile material objects that are not enduring temporally—a phenomenon that does not seem impossible.

Dennett’s account of what he terms “the contemporary orthodoxy” of the current climate leads to the question of the primacy of the physical or mental in terms of our thinking itself. In “Who’s On First”, Dennett (2007b) claims that the only proper way of understanding what is going on subjectively in persons is by making inferences based on what we externally observe others reporting from what Dennett calls the third-person point of view. This outlook presupposes that I can be more certain of what others say than I can be about my own thinking, hearing, reasoning, feeling, interpreting, and so on. Here is an extensive passage in which Dennett advances his position as obvious and uncontroversial, but I suggest it is anything but obvious and uncontroversial:

This third-person method, dubbed heterophenomenology (phenomenology of another not oneself) is, I have claimed, the sound way to take the first-person point of view as seriously as it can be taken . . . Most of the method is so obvious and uncontroversial that some scientists are baffled that I would even call it a method: basically, you have to take the vocal sounds emanating from the subjects’ mouths (and your own mouth) and *interpret* them! Well of course. What else could you do? Those sounds aren’t just belches and moans; they’re speech acts, reporting, questioning, correcting, requesting, and so forth. Using such standard speech acts, other events such as button-presses can be set up to be interpreted as speech acts as well, with highly specific meanings and fine temporal resolution. What this interpersonal communication enables you, the investigator, to do is to compose a catalogue of what the subject believes to be true about his or her conscious experience. (Dennett 2007b: 81–82)

In reply, I suggest that it is baffling to think you could be more sure of what vocal sounds emanate from a subject than you can be sure of your subjective experience of hearing, seeing, thinking, and interpreting. Taken to an extreme, Dennett would be committed to thinking that the best, scientific way of my having self-awareness would be by listening to what others infer, based on their investigation, from the vocal noises emanating from my mouth. Or, as Dennett implies, I might listen to myself say “I feel tired” and then, upon investigation, interpret this noise as a speech act I probably undertook because I subjectively feel tired. Again, how might I be so sure I heard myself say *anything* unless I trust my first-person experience of listening, thinking, feeling, and interpreting? As an aside, Dennett’s initial way of describing speech as “vocal sounds emanating from the subject’s mouth” seems bizarrely detached from any commonsense, ordinary way of describing or interpreting what it is to speak or to be in conversation. Speaking is an activity, not a matter of noises that simply emanates or that we find wheeling up within us. Fortunately Dennett recognizes that speech is different from belches and moans, but it is telling that he has to point this out to his readers. Why would one need to make this point explicitly unless his initial portrait of speech and self-awareness comes dangerously close to confusing speaking with belching? Using Dennett’s terminology, a conversation between two persons could be (preposterously) described as two organisms whose mouths are a conduit of various noises at different times which an observer and the two persons themselves may interpret as something called a discussion about philosophy of mind.

I propose that a more reasonable place to begin thinking about human nature and the world than that which was proposed by Kim, Sober, and Dennett is with what we know is incontrovertible, namely that we have subjective experiences and we are thinking and acting persons. We write books and go to conferences; we eat, sleep, run, make love, and so on. These I believe to be obvious. Dennett seems to have boundless confidence in “the physical stuff of physics, chemistry, and physiology” and treats “the mind” and “mental phenomenon” as second class citizens, but physics, chemistry and physiology are not possible without mental phenomena: experience, observation, and concepts. Arguably, the *concepts* of radioactivity, continental drift, and so on, are better known and need to be grasped in order to investigate the less well-known phenomena at hand. While I am not an anti-realist, I sympathize with Hilary Putnam’s lament about mind-independent, transcendent objects:

I am not inclined to scoff at the idea of a noumenal ground behind the dualities of experience, even if all attempts to talk about it led to antinomies. Analytic philosophers have always tried to dismiss the transcendental as nonsense, but it does have an eerie way of reappearing. (. . . [A]lmost everyone regards the statement that there is *no* mind-independent reality, that there are *just* the ‘versions’ or there is just

‘discourse’, or whatever, as itself intensely paradoxical.) Because one cannot talk about the transcendent, or even deny its existence without paradox, one’s attitude to it must, perhaps, be the concern or religion, rather than that of national philosophy. (Putnam 1995: 241)

I do not follow Putnam all the way in these remarks, but it does bring out the primacy of our concepts, our versions, or discourse vis-à-vis (to use Dennett’s example) photosynthesis. While I am more concerned with the primacy of the mental than the primacy of value, I view with approval Putnam’s further point about the primacy of value over and against what in the old days we called facts (of scientific facts).

. . . and Quine’s critique of the logical positivists’ picture of what they called the language of science as neatly divided into a “factual” part and an “analytic” part, the whole argument for the classical fact/value dichotomy was in ruins, and that, as far as logical empiricism could tell, science might presuppose values as well as experiences and conventions. Indeed once we stop thinking of “value” as synonymous with “ethics,” it is quite clear that it does presuppose values—it presupposes epistemic values. (Putnam 2003)

Back to the mental: In affirming the primacy of the mental, one is not ipso facto assuming dualism, idealism, or physicalism. The way some philosophers today characterize dualism is that dualists ask us to imagine two categories: the material and the immaterial. Perhaps following Descartes and philosophers like van Inwagen, they construe the first as spatially extended and the latter as not. But historically this is not how Descartes proceeded, and it is not how so-called “dualists” in the past or present usually develop their position. Even Descartes first establishes that he exists and only then does he consider what he is. Is he his body? He comes to conclude that he is not, because he believes it is possible that he can exist without his body, but it is not a matter of beginning with two well defined categories (the material and immaterial) and then wondering whether he is in one category or the other. I think it would be less misleading historically if Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Leibniz and other so-called “dualists” were considered non-monists or “pluralists” (these figures did not themselves use the term “dualism” to identify their position). They are best seen as affirming the reality of the mental (or the self) and then doubting that the mental (or the self) is metaphysically identical with what materialists from Democritus to Hobbes to Dennett claim. They are therefore most charitably (and reasonably) seen not as affirming something like two-ism, but as affirming that the mental is more than the body and the bodily, especially as this is articulated by those in the tradition of materialism/physicalism.

One way to argue further for the non-identity of the mental and the physical (such as neurological events) would be to articulate and defend a modal

argument that seeks to bring to light the contingent relationship of the mental and physical and their possible separability (metaphysically possible, not just epistemically possible to believe). As noted earlier, this chapter is a little less ambitious, with the focus on matters surrounding (and not directly on) the modal argument, and so I conclude this first of three sections stressing, once again, the primacy and our greater grasp of the mental as distinct from having a problem-free grasp of what it is to be physical and nonmental.

The primacy and ineradicability of the mental became apparent in considering the implausibility of eliminating the mental. For a recent case, consider Alex Rosenberg:

A single still photograph doesn't convey movement the way a motion picture does. Watching a sequence of slightly different photos one photo per hour, or per minute, or even one every 6 seconds won't do it either. But looking at the right sequence of still pictures the rate enhances the illusion, though beyond a certain rate the illusion gets no better for creatures like us. But it's still an illusion. There is nothing to it but succession of still pictures. That's how movies perpetrate their illusion. The large set of still pictures is organized together in a way that produces in creatures like us the illusion that the images are moving. In creatures with different brains and eyes, ones that work faster, the trick might not work. In ones that work slower, changing the still picture at the rate of one every hour (as in time-lapse photography) could work. But there is no movement of any of the images in any of the pictures, nor does anything move from one photo onto the next. Of course, the projector is moving, and the photons are moving, and the actors were moving. But all the movement that the movies watcher detects is in the eye of the beholder. That is why the movement is illusory.

The notion that thoughts are about stuff is illusory in roughly the same way. Think of each input/output neural circuit as a single still photo. Now, put together a huge number of input/output circuits in the right way. None of them is about anything; each is just an input/output circuit firing or not. But when they act together, they "project" the illusion that there are thoughts about stuff. They do that through the behavior and conscious experience (if any) that they produce. (Rosenberg 2011: 191)

There are two problems. First, Rosenberg's position seems to be self-refuting. If he is right, his own thesis has no meaning. There is the problem, then, that if thoughts are not about things, neither are Rosenberg's. There is the further problem Anthony Kenny points out in his *Times Literary Supplement* review of Rosenberg's book:

In *The Atheist's Guide to Reality*, Alex Rosenberg asserts repeatedly that physics is the whole truth about reality: the physical facts fix all the

facts. But that there are no facts other than physical facts is not itself a physical fact. If it is a fact at all, then there is at least one fact that is not a physical fact. If it is not a fact, but a falsehood, then there are facts other than physical facts. The self-trap snaps shut. (Kenny 2012)

Second, in watching a film, the experience of seeing a person running is not an illusion. The images do move—as images—depicting or representing or perhaps even disclosing (in a case of non-animation or digital reproduction) a person running. I should also add that for familiar Cartesian reasons, I think Rosenberg's thesis is self-referentially absurd.

In wrapping up this first section, what of the pervasive objection to dualism that it confuses epistemology and metaphysics? Perhaps there is not really a primacy of the mental but only a primacy of our concept of the mental over our concept of what is physical. Why cannot there be a conceptual dualism between the mental and physical (what we conceive of as pain is distinct from what we conceive of as brain processes) and yet no actual (metaphysical or ontological) distinction? I suggest that behind this proposal rests a fundamental misunderstanding: when it comes to the mental, the *appearing* is ontologically significant. Arguably, it is a fact that there are appearances, whether or not they are threatened by a scientific worldview that ultimately denies the reality of appearances. As Raymond Tallis writes:

We seem, therefore, to have a *disappearance of appearance* as we move from subjective experience towards the scientific, quantitative and ultimately mathematical account of the world as matter. This loss of appearance is strikingly illustrated by those great equations that encompass the sum total of appearances, such as, " $e = mc^2$ ". But it is also present at a more homely level when we try to envisage material objects as they are in themselves. Think of a rock. I can look at the rock from the front or from the back, from above or below, from near or far, in bright light or dim. In each of an (innumerable) range of possible circumstances, it will have a slightly or radically different appearance. *In itself*, it has not definite appearance; it simply offers the possibility of an appearance to a potential observer (although those possibilities are constrained—the rock cannot look like a sonnet). So we can see that, as we get closer to the material world "in-itself," as a piece of matter, so we lose appearances: colour, nearness or farness, perspective. (The history of science, which is that of progress towards greater generalization is a gradual shedding of perspective—a journey towards Nagel's "view from nowhere.") (Tallis 2011: 142)

I turn now to what may be called *integrative dualism* to correct a common misunderstanding of dualism.

*Integrative dualism*: Some critics (Antony Flew, Gilbert Ryle, Anthony Kenny, Peter Hacker, Daniel Dennett, and Trenton Merricks) today depict

dualists as supposing that there is a radical bifurcation between the person (soul, mind) and body (see Goetz and Taliaferro 2011). Dualists are said to believe the mind is a ghost in the machine, or a tiny person in the head (a homunculus), or they think that, if dualism is true, then you never see other persons, only their bodies or their containers. In one of the more interesting arguments in philosophy of mind, Trenton Merricks argues that if dualism is true, his wife is a soul. You can't kiss a soul (an immaterial, nonphysical being). He kisses his wife. Hence dualism is false (see Taliaferro and Goetz 2008).

Now, some dualists write in a way that lends some support to a picture of bifurcation. Consider Richard Swinburne's characterization of what it is to have a body, from the standpoint of his dualist perspective.

We humans have bodies. A body is a physical object through which we can make a difference to the world and learn about the world; and ordinary humans are tied down to acting and acquiring information through their bodies. I can only make a difference to the world by doing something with some part of my body—by using my arm to move something, or my mouth to tell you something. And I can only learn about the world by stimuli landing on my sense organs (light rays landing on my eyes or sound waves landing on my ears, for example). (Swinburne 2008: 6–7)<sup>2</sup>

I do not doubt that the above is true, but without significant qualification it creates the impression that “I” am not so much embodied, located in and as my embodied self, but that “I” seem remote from my body or virtually detached except by virtue of my ability to control it and learn things about the world through it. Swinburne's picture of embodiment is better than Dennett's initial account: at least, in Swinburne's view, I am said to tell you things by moving my mouth whereas Dennett does not begin with a subject speaking but with vocal sounds emanating from the subject's mouth. Under difficult, perhaps damaged circumstances, a person might feel merely tied to their body or feel that their body is like some communicative, learning device. But dualists can offer a completely integrated understanding of embodiment in which the embodied person functions as a unity.

When we are functioning in a healthy way the embodied person is a functional unity: to see me talking is not seeing an immaterial soul manipulating a chunk of matter. To hit my body is to hit me, and so on. When I kiss someone, I do so as an embodied, feeling being. To use a line inspired by G. E. M. Anscombe, just as legs do not walk, people walk (a pedant might add, people walk by moving their legs), so lips do not kiss, people kiss (and again a pedant might add that they do so with their lips). At the risk of bringing analytic philosophy into the bedroom, assuming integrative dualism, for a kiss to be a kiss there must be a combination of intentional movement, embodiment, and expression. You do not really kiss someone if you stumble toward them

and press your lips on their cheek or even if you press your lips on your beloved's lips and she or he seems to respond, unless there is an integration of the person and body, a functional unity. Even if, metaphysically a person and mental states are nonspatial, we inhabit and act as spatial, embodied persons who are capable of kissing and embracing or injuring and killing each other. But tragic, damaged conditions can arrive in which the caricatures set up by Ryle and others seem accurate. Brain damage accompanied by profound psychological disorders could make me seem like a ghost in a machine. If I lost all motor control over my body except through tapping out Morse code with one hand, I might be like a little homunculi inside my head and not fully embodied. Partial disorders may limit embodiment—visual agnosia may limit my agency—and moral decay can get in the way of kissing. I may believe I am kissing my beloved, but he or she is the moral equivalent of a zombie, merely going through the motions in order to gain wealth. What the critics of dualism confuse is the portrait of a damaged person with the portrait of a healthy integrated, embodied person. I would also suggest, returning to the material in the first section of this chapter, that if I found myself in the position that Dennett commends—I have to rely on myself and others to interpret the vocal noises coming out of my mouth in order to know what I am feeling—I would have an impaired embodiment. It would be the philosophical equivalent of losing proprioception, the inner ability to know of one's bodily location without having to resort to visual observation.

In an effort to combat the prevalent view (especially among theologians) that mind-body dualism foists on us a denigrated treatment of the body, I have sought to recover the notion that embodiment involves the coordination and function of several, interrelated nonmoral goods. By a nonmoral good, I mean a good that is not a matter of the virtues or duties. In "The Virtues of Embodiment" (Taliaferro 2001) I argue that being able to have sensations is not only part of a characterization of being embodied, but it is a good power. Similarly, the power to act is not merely a power, but a good power. To fully support this position here would be difficult, given the space available, but I commend this value-oriented account of embodiment as more in common with our ordinary conception of being an embodied person. If it was reported to you that after I finished writing this chapter, I lost all powers to act or feel, and you were unsure whether this was good or bad, most of us would conclude you did not really believe the report or some other extenuating conditions were in play. Our ordinary concept of embodiment is the concept of a good integration of the body and the conscious, sensing, cognitive, and agentive powers of persons.

*On causal interaction:* once we adopt the primacy of the mental, the framework for stating the challenge of causal interaction between the mental and physical shifts from its current format. Paul Churchland's articulation of the problem of interaction for dualism is representative. In what follows, Churchland puts the problem of interaction in terms of a neuroscientist trying to find how to fit the mental into her study of the brain.

Put yourself in the shoes of a neuroscientist who is concerned to trace the origins of behavior back up the motor nerves to the active cells in the motor cortex of the cerebrum, and to trace in turn their activity into inputs from other parts of the brain, and from the various sensory nerves. She finds a thoroughly physical system of awesome structure and delicacy, and much intricate activity, all of it unambiguously chemical or electrical in nature, and she finds no hint at all of any nonphysical inputs of the kind that substance dualism proposes. What is she to think? From the standpoint of her researches, human behavior is exhaustively a function of the activity of the physical brain. And this opinion is further supported by her confidence that the brain has the behavior-controlling features it does exactly because those features have been ruthlessly selected for during the brain's long evolutionary history. In sum, the seat of human behavior appears entirely physical in its constitution, in its origins, and in its internal activities. (Churchland 1984)

I suggest that matters should be reversed.

The neuroscientist should first and foremost believe that she is a person who has concerns; she is tracing parts of the brain; she is feeling awe about the structure and delicacy of what she is studying; she is thinking about human behavior and evolution; she is seeking to explain human behavior. These suppositions cannot be suspect without undermining her practice of neuroscience (which requires thinking, observing, explaining, and so on). It is obviously a reasonable question to ask about the role of the brain and one's overall anatomy when we are thinking in general or doing neuroscience in particular, but any account of the brain-mental activity in causal terms must not begin with greater certainty about how the brain functions than the certainty that one is engaged in thinking about and practicing neuroscience. The task, in other words, should not lie with trying to fit the mental into the physical, but how to understand the physical in relationship to the mental. Arguably, the neuroscientist does not just have hints that she is thinking, feeling awe, and is engaged in neuroscience; she should be certain of this, and if she does not observe the thinking, feeling awe, and the active practice of neuroscience in the observable, "unambiguously chemical or electrical" brain events or any other "thoroughly physical" phenomena, that is good reason for her to believe that thinking, feeling awe, and so on are not identical with such physical events and phenomena.

Once one appreciates the primacy of both the mental in general and the certainty we have (and need to have to practice science or philosophy) the abilities to think, feel, draw inferences, and so on, a position like Colin Blakemore's seems (in my view) to carry an enormous burden of proof.

The human brain is a machine which alone accounts for all our actions, our most private thoughts, our beliefs . . . All our actions are products

of our brain. It makes no sense (in scientific terms) to try to distinguish sharply between acts that result from conscious attention and those that result from our reflexes or are caused by disease or damage to the brain. (Blakemore 1988: 257)

Blakemore's claim that it makes no sense to distinguish conscious attention and brain process is curious, when you take into account that his writing the these passages must surely be explained in terms of his own conscious attention. Perhaps Blakemore thinks that brain processes *are* conscious states? But how can this even be articulated without either eliminating conscious states or preserving a non-identity in which conscious states (the hurtful feelings of pain) still exist and yet are correlated with brain states or in casual interactions but not metaphysically identical with brain states? Surely, eliminating conscious attention as playing a causal role in why Blakemore is speaking, thinking, moving, and so on, is too high a price to pay no matter what, for if we do eliminate conscious attention it seems we would not have anything like what we normally assume when people speak, think, and move. It would mean that Blakemore does not ever say that his position is correct because he thinks his position is correct, if thinking turns out not to play a primary causal role such that he would not say his position is correct unless he thought it was. As it has been argued by Kenneth Einar Himma in "What Is a Problem for All Is a Problem for None: Substance Dualism, Physicalism, and the Mind-Body Problem":

Eliminating the ontological distance between mental states and brain states by reducing the former to the latter solves the conceptual puzzle of how the mental and physical can interact because there is no conceptual mystery about how one physical state can cause another. But it solves this puzzle only by ruling out, as a conceptual or nomological matter (depending on the character of the reduction), any causal role for the hurtfulness of pain. (Himma 2005)

The reason why (I believe) Blakemore faces such an enormous burden of proof is because mental causation (casual relations involving experience) is so pervasive and unmistakable—from withdrawing one's hand from flames to giving a paper at a conference, both involving conscious, intentional activity by a subject.

Back to Sober's claim about causal integration having to involve physical signals: we have the challenge (as noted earlier) of identifying the boundaries of the physical, but if we stipulate that all and only material objects are spatial, and all and only nonspatial objects (things, events, states) are mental, why think that causation only occurs through spatial contact or between spatial objects? This simply seems question begging; there are multiple theories of causation that are not question begging such as counterfactual theories and nomological theories. Either could well accommodate the

nonphysical/physical interaction as itself (at the most basic level), as direct, and as not requiring an intermediary causal mechanism.

What of the pairing problem posed by Kim and Sosa? Both Kim and Sosa have argued that a dualist is unable to explain why in a case of qualitatively identical sons, a blow to one body may cause one soul pain, but not another. They argue that in physical causal interaction, this problem does not arise.

Consider three replies. First, as Audi has argued, the pairing problem can arise in physical-to-physical causal relations. He asks us to imagine a universe of two qualitatively indistinguishable spheres with a power *P* that has the same probability of producing a *L*-particle equidistant to each other. Imagine that *L*-particle appears and yet the spatial relations do not tell us which sphere causally brought about *L* nor whether the occurrence of *L* is over determined. As Paul Audi maintains: “Space, then, does less to confer structure on physical events than defenders of the pairing argument are inclined to think . . . It is not impossible for two things to have exactly the same pure spatial relations to all other particulars, let alone all those with which they causally interact” (Audi 2011) If Audi is correct, and I believe he is, then the pairing problem arises with physical-to-physical interaction, and so if the problem is fatal to dualism, it seems equally fatal for accounts of exclusively physical causal interaction.

Second, if the mental (or some subset of what is mental) is spatial, then there is no advantage to being spatial when it comes to being physical. The spatiality of the mental (as held by the Cambridge Platonists and G. E. Moore) is not in the same space as “unambiguously” physical phenomena, but it is still “unambiguously” spatial.

Third, there may be nomological laws to the effect that particular souls are embodied by way of primitive, and not further explainable, powers. The causal relation is on no worse grounds than the supposed identity relation posited by physicalism: Why is it that certain brain states are identical to phenomenal states? My own view—sometimes called singularism—is that there can be primitive or basic, not further analyzable, causal relations. In physical-to-physical interaction there must be (I propose) such relations, and to deny this would incur a vicious infinite regress. The identity relation seems nothing like the familiar identity relations some physicalists employ. We see that water is  $H_2O$ ! In that case we have an evident compositional relation, but this is not evident in the case of the physical and mental.

I close with a question about dualism and scientific explanations: Does dualism (or, as I prefer, integrative dualism) involve any impediment to the brain sciences or to a scientific inquiry into human nature? Dennett charges that “to be a dualist is, by definition, to be a mystery-monger, a despiser of science”. Might that be true?

A full reply to this charge may take a book, and fortunately other authors address this matter (Robinson 2008). But I cannot resist adding my own counterclaim. I doubt there is any force to Dennett’s charge. I do not see why the brain sciences cannot continue with its study of psycho-physical

interaction. The failure to identify metaphysically consciousness with brain states does not for a nanosecond impede the study of correlation. Moreover one may be a dualist and treat consciousness and brain states, the person and body, as functional units without supposing that there is only one kind of thing metaphysically that is in play. Mind-body (or, as I prefer to call it, integrative) dualism is a thesis in metaphysics, as is the identity theory, functionalism, anomalous monism, and so on. Like many positions and questions in metaphysics (are there abstract objects?), integrative dualism is not a scientific hypothesis that competes with any scientific claims. A neurologist who seeks to explain prosopagnosia (a subject is unable to recognize familiar objects) and presupposes physicalism (the underlying cause of right brain damage) will be no different scientifically from a neurologist who adopts integrative dualism and presupposes that the subject's experiential states and cognitive powers are causally intertwined with neurological (and other) events without identifying the two.

In all, while I have not re-worked or re-presented my principle reason for accepting dualism (the modal argument), I have addressed three areas where dualism has been denigrated philosophically, challenging the primacy of the physical and the third-person point of view, the idea that dualism involves an implausible bifurcation, and the charge that dualist causal interaction should be ruled out.<sup>3</sup>

## NOTES

1. I have defended the modal argument in Taliaferro (1994) and more recently in Taliaferro and Evans (2010).
2. Despite my pointing out that Swinburne does not offer what I think is a properly integral understanding of the person-body relationship, I thoroughly endorse much of his defense of dualism in *The Evolution of the Soul* and elsewhere.
3. I am very grateful to Allison Rodriguez for comments on earlier drafts of this chapter and editorial assistance.