Washington’s Cuba Delusion

Although the president ran on a “no war” platform, the Trump administration has kept the Department of War quite busy between the removal of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro in January of this year and the continued military action against Iran.

Although these operations have drawn sharp criticism, many have praised these interventions. The operation to remove Maduro drew support from many Venezuelan expatriates, with others describing the operations as “surgical,” “clean,” and precise. Indeed, both White House officials and others have suggested that these interventions are a net positive and may lead to the establishment of liberal institutions and freedom for people oppressed by autocracy. Given these sentiments are shared by U.S. officials and others, it may come as no surprise discussion has turned to another illiberal regime—Cuba. 

Indeed, the president didn’t mince words when he said he believed he would “have the honor of taking Cuba,” and “Cuba’s next,” while speaking about other military operations. A recent poll of Cubans and Cuban-Americans found overwhelming support for military action and remarkably low support for additional diplomatic efforts. 

There’s just one problem—while the U.S. government can overthrow or remove foreign political powers, officials are fundamentally incapable of systematically exporting democratic institutions abroad. 

The data on U.S. attempts at exporting democracy are as unambiguous as they are depressing. Surveying 100 years of nation building efforts, researchers found only four cases where democratic institutions remained a decade after U.S. intervention. Two of these were Japan and Germany following World War Two, where scholarship suggests that these “success” cases are largely not the result of U.S. efforts, but reflective of the resiliency of pre-war institutions. 

This raises an obvious question—why can’t the U.S. effectively export democracy? There are two primary reasons.

First, there are genuine knowledge constraints on the part of U.S. officials. In many cases, these epistemological issues boil down to breathtaking ignorance of basic facts or history. Consider, for example, the inclusion of family dogs in Iraqi school books. Officials failed to realize that most Iraqi children, as Muslims, would not have dogs in their homes and may consider it spiritually unclean to do so. Even General Stanley McChrystal, the general who oversaw military operations in Afghanistan for five years stated even he had a “frighteningly simplistic” understanding of Afghanistan. 

Even if we assume basic competence on the part of policymakers, a rich literature on nation building and exporting democracy highlights that knowledge cannot be known by a single person or entity. Even if it could, the changing and individualized nature of knowledge would make any gathered information obsolete at its time of use. 

The second reason for consistent failure relates to the incentives and the political pathologies inherent in democracies. Incentive misalignment, conflicting goals of domestic and foreign government actors, pressures from special interest groups, and poor accountability mechanisms provide additional hurdles to successful nation building. Critically, these issues can’t simply be fixed by ensuring the “right people” are in power. 

Some suggest that Cuba would be different, suggesting that the country’s proximity, history with the United States, and some support for intervention among the Cuban citizenry reduces or eliminates the problems observed in other attempts at nation building. Others note the presence of an active community of Cuban exiles in the United States and that Secretary of State Marco Rubio, as a Cuban-American and the child of Cuban immigrants can overcome knowledge and cultural constraints.

Such suggestions not only illustrate a profound misunderstanding of the depth and nature of knowledge constraints but also overlook other obvious problems. Marco Rubio, for example, may have more knowledge on Cuba’s history than other officials, but this does not make him an expert on Cuba, nor does it do anything of consequence about the incentive problems inherent to nation building. Similarly, while Cuban expatriates may be enthusiastic about regime change and eager to support liberalization efforts, intentions do not equal outcomes. Many in Cuba view Cuban refugees or Cuban-Americans as “too Americanized” and may view not interpret historical events in the same way, meaning the well-intentioned ideas of Cuban exiles may be not only be poorly received, but met with hostility. 

I have no doubt the communist regime in Cuba will collapse. Economics teaches us such economic systems are not viable in the long run. Without a doubt, the people of Cuba have suffered terribly and deserve their freedom and liberties. The question is one of how to best help the people of Cuba. Military intervention is a poor choice. Instead, policymakers may consider other alternatives—allowing Cubans who want to leave to come to the United States and lifting trade sanctions.

While this may sound counter-intuitive, we know that trade facilitates peace. When goods cross borders, ideas cross too. It will be ideas of liberty and internal demands for freedom that will lead to a freer Cuba, not Uncle Sam exporting democracy at gunpoint.