Section 122 Can’t Carry Trump’s Tariffs
It requires a balance-of-payments deficit—a problem that has become obsolete.
February 24, 2026
News Article
It requires a balance-of-payments deficit—a problem that has become obsolete.
The Supreme Court dealt a serious blow to President Trump’s economic agenda by ruling that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act doesn’t allow him to rewrite the U.S. tariff schedule. Mr. Trump immediately invoked a different law to impose a 10% tariff on all countries, followed by threats to raise it to 15%.
The White House’s tariff Plan B looks copied from President Biden’s playbook when the court overruled his student-loan forgiveness scheme in 2023 and Mr. Biden began statute shopping for anything to back it. That strategy hit a roadblock in federal court, as a succession of rulings invalidated his attempt to revive the policy under different laws.
The same may happen to Mr. Trump. His plan relies on a seldom-invoked clause of the Trade Act of 1974, Section 122. It allows the president to impose a general tariff of up to 15% for 150 days to address “fundamental international payments problems” that “require special import measures to restrict imports.”
Under Mr. Trump’s current interpretation, this law allows tariffs in the presence of a common trade deficit, which occurs when a country imports more goods and services than it exports. The U.S. has run trade deficits for most years since the mid-1970s. But Mr. Trump’s reading of Section 122 is erroneous. The relevant statute allows only tariffs that “deal with large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits,” “prevent an imminent and significant deprecation of the dollar,” or facilitate an international agreement to correct a “balance-of-payments disequilibrium.” To justify his new tariffs, Mr. Trump is relying on the first option and now asserts the U.S. has a large balance-of-payments deficit.
But that’s different from a trade deficit. Turning to the arcane economic terminology of international accounting, the balance of payments is a complete ledger of all economic transactions between the U.S. and the rest of the world. The trade balance, also known as the current account, comprises only a part of this ledger.
Other components appear in the capital and financial accounts, which cover monetary transfers and investment transactions with the rest of the world. While the U.S. current account is in deficit, the capital account runs a large surplus, effectively balancing it out. Under this full accounting, the current U.S. balance-of-payments deficit is close to zero.
This isn’t a fluke—the problem Congress had in mind when it crafted Section 122 in the early 1970s vanished shortly thereafter. America had just left the Bretton Woods system’s international fixed exchange rate regime in 1973. Under Bretton Woods, other countries pegged their currency to the dollar. To maintain the targeted peg, governments had to buy, sell or borrow reserves of foreign currencies—often in coordination with each other. A balance-of-payments crisis could happen when sustained demand for a particular currency depleted the U.S. government’s official reserve holdings, thereby threatening the stability of the peg. America ran a balance-of-payments deficit throughout the 1950s and ’60s, even though the trade balance was a surplus in most years before 1976.
Records from 1973 show that Congress had this exact scenario in mind when it drafted Section 122. The committee report for the bill noted that a “large decline in the U.S. net international monetary reserve position would be evidence of a serious balance-of-payments deficit.” Congress intended this tariff clause as an emergency tool to counteract a payments “disequilibrium” caused by strains on currency reserve holdings.
Instead of adopting some new fixed-exchange international agreement to replace Bretton Woods, as Congress likely expected, America eventually settled on the floating exchange system we have today. And so we left behind any possibility of a problem that would trigger Section 122. As Milton Friedman explained in 1967, “a system of floating exchange rates completely eliminates the balance-of-payments problem.” It allows the relative values of currencies to adjust against each other automatically on the open market. Coordinated buying, selling and lending of currency reserves between central banks became an obsolete tool, and with it the risk of a balance-of-payments deficit disappeared.
Six months ago, Solicitor General John D. Sauer argued in court filings defending the administration’s now-defunct tariffs that Section 122 tariffs aren’t a viable substitute for IEEPA, because “trade deficits . . . are conceptually distinct from balance-of-payments deficits.” The White House has changed its mind and is trying to redefine balance of payments as a common trade deficit. The legislative history of Section 122 conclusively establishes that this is false.
Since under the current floating exchange rate system there is no “United States balance of payments deficit” to speak of, there’s nothing to legally justify Mr. Trump’s new 15% tariff regime.

























