Would Adam Smith Support the Jones Act?

In an article in The Economist, it was claimed that Adam Smith would likely have supported the Jones Act because he supported the Navigation Acts. This claim is wrong on two counts. First, the idea that Smith supported the Navigation Acts is either overstated or entirely false. The Navigation Acts did not have a single aim or apply to a single sphere of commerce. Rather, they were seen both as promoting defence and opulence, and the clauses can largely be divided into those that apply to trade with Europe and those that apply to their colonies. There are four combinations of spheres of regulation and reason for regulating that could have been used to support the Navigation Acts: (Colonies, Opulence), (Colonies, Defense), (Europe, Opulence), and (Europe, Defense).

Smith clearly rejected support for the Navigation Acts for three of the four reason-sphere combinations. He advocated the relaxation or repeal of the Navigation Acts as regulations on the colonies, rejecting them as sources of defense and opulence. He also clearly stated that the Navigation Acts, as they related to European trade, were harmful to British opulence, leaving only European regulations for defensive purposes as the only possible justification for the Acts.

The European regulations were also meant to regulate trade specifically with the Dutch, not European trade generally. Smith acknowledged that the Navigation Acts were targeted at the Dutch, but also believed that they had not hindered Dutch trade, had not helped England in her wars against the Dutch, or reduced Dutch naval power. The Navigation Acts targeted the Dutch because the Dutch were the principal country engaged in the carrying trade, a country moving goods between two foreign countries, which was seen at the time as a uniquely beneficial manner of trade. That means Smith undermined a reason for supporting the Navigation Acts when he argued against the idea that there was anything special about the carrying trade.

Smith’s acknowledgment and emphasis of the point that the Navigation Acts were targeted against the Dutch also undermined support for the Navigation Acts further undermined support for them. The Dutch were strong rivals and dangerous enemies when the Navigation Acts were passed. But since then, Dutch and English interests were harmonized with the Glorious Revolution, which positioned France, not the Netherlands, as England’s chief rival. Even if Smith thought the European regulations in the Navigation Acts were effective, which appears unlikely, he certainly saw that the regulations against the Dutch were outdated in the wake of the Glorious Revolution. 

Second, regardless of Smith’s view of the Navigation Acts, Smith would be appalled by the Jones Act today because the empirically demonstrable impacts of policies shaped his policy views. You could not simply say a restriction on free trade was justified for national defense to get Adam Smith on your side; you had to show that it worked. 

For example, Smith was very critical of the herring bus bounty, which was said to improve Britain’s defense by increasing Britain’s sailors and shipping. He did not say that defense was a bad justification, but said that the bounty was too large, that it encouraged fraud, that it was not well adapted to the Scottish mode of fishing, and that it increased the price of a staple food. 

If Adam Smith looked at the impact of the Jones Act today, he would see that Jones Act vessels cost dramatically more to build than comparable foreign ships, they drive up prices, particularly in non-contiguous states and territories, and that the American ship-building industry is virtually non-existent. It would be easy for Adam Smith to see that the Jones Act has not established America as a ship-building nation, has not promoted its defense, and has done more harm than good.