A Tariff Time-Bomb
A critical part of the One Big Beautiful Bill’s budget equation may evaporate with a judicial pen stroke in the very near future.
July 16, 2025
The White House, July 4, 2025
News Article
A critical part of the One Big Beautiful Bill’s budget equation may evaporate with a judicial pen stroke in the very near future.
President Donald Trump secured the first major legislative victory of his term with the adoption of the “One Big Beautiful Bill” Act, a multi-trillion-dollar spending package intended to codify his budgetary priorities. The measure contained a small victory for American taxpayers by forestalling the expiration of a 2018 income-tax cut this year. At the same time, fiscal hawks had much to criticise about the exorbitant new spending provisions, which are projected to accrue at least US$3 trillion in additional budget deficits over the next decade. The bill also contain a US$5 trillion increase in the national debt limit, removing a legislative constraint on government borrowing and setting the US national debt on track for an expansion to over US$41 trillion.
The One Big Beautiful Bill’s supporters portray the measure’s income tax cuts as a boon for economic growth, while its detractors worry about the profligate spending that is set to commence, including over US$160 billion in border and immigration enforcement funding along with the usual flurry of legislative pork. However, the One Big Beautiful Bill faces another obstacle on the horizon in the form of a ticking time bomb of tariffs. When preparing its budget calculations for the measure, Trump’s economic team relied on a new revenue source to offset its spending extravaganzas. The Council of Economic Advisors expects at least US$2.8 trillion in new tax receipts over the next decade from the tariffs the administration has been imposing on international trade with the rest of the world since the infamous “Liberation Day” press conference back in April.
The White House has been quick to tout tariff revenue as the centrepiece of its plan to pay for its spending priorities. Just last week, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced in a cabinet meeting that he expects tariffs to generate US$300 billion in new tax revenue in 2025 alone. White House talking points have suggested that future tariffs will exceed even their already optimistic revenue projections in the years that follow, reversing Bessent’s widely- mocked claim from a month ago that “tariffs are not taxes:’ As it stands now, new tariff revenue comprises the single largest source of deficit offsets in the White House’s ten-year budget projections, far exceeding any discretionary spending reductions.
Staking so much of the One Big Beautiful Bill’s budget equation on tariffs is a risky proposition. There’s a good chance that the Trump administration’s tariff revenue stream will evaporate with a judicial pen stroke in the very near future.
Trump imposed most of his tariffs through an unconventional route of
“emergency” executive orders under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977. Although the White House claims sweeping tariff powers under this provision, the administration’s new revenue strategy faces mounting legal problems. IEEPA does not actually authorise the president to redesign the US tariff schedule on his own, since that power falls within the enumerated constitutional duties of Congress. The word “tariff’ does not even appear in the statute’s text, nor do any common synonyms such as “import duties.” Trump simply invoked IEEPA to bestow him with the sweeping tariff powers that he desires, and he is the first president to ever claim them under this law. If the Supreme Court reviews Trump’s tariffs, there’s a good chance they will be struck down as unconstitutional abuses of executive power. And if that happens, the government will find itself facing a US$2.8 trillion hole in the One Big Beautiful Bill’s assumptions about future revenue.
This tariff time-bomb could go off while the White House is still celebrating its One Big Beautiful Bill victory. Earlier this spring, the United States Court of International Trade (USCIT) heard a lawsuit challenging the president’s authority to impose tariffs. In V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, a three-judge panel struck down the IEEPA tariff orders on a wide range of legal and constitutional grounds. That ruling is now under a procedural stay pending appeal, but the case is set to be heard on an expedited schedule in the US Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit on 31 July 2025.
The challenge stems from Article I, Section 8 of the US Constitution, which stipulates that “The Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” for federal revenue purposes. Multiple legal precedents affirm that Congress cannot simply delegate this power to the executive branch, absent the provision of an “intelligible principle” to guide its action. Nor can the executive branch simply arrogate these powers by administrative edict. A sweeping rewrite of the United States tariff system has “major economic and political significance” that requires clear congressional authorization under the “Major Questions Doctrine” of constitutional law. Since IEEPA does not even mention tariffs, it is doubtful that Trump’s actions pass constitutional muster under either of these legal doctrines.
When the USCIT struck down Trump’s tariffs, the president predictably rageposted about the judiciary: on Truth Social, portraying the ruling as a renegade move by activist judges on the Left. But two unmentioned facts of the decision undermine the president’s claims. First, the USCIT is not a typical federal district court, attempting to impose its will by injunction. It’s a special court established by Congress to hear cases pertaining to tariffs and international trade, and its authorising legislation gives it nationwide jurisdiction.
Second, the judges who ruled against Trump came from across the political spectrum. Two of the three judges on the panel were appointed by Republican presidents, including one of Trump’s own appointees-a former protege of Robert Lighthizer, Trump’s arch-protectionist trade representative from his first term in office. Indeed, Trump’s own justice-department lawyers had spent the months prior to the ruling filing a flurry of motions to shift other lawsuits against his tariffs into the USCIT because they believed it would offer a friendlier jurisdiction for the president’s arguments. Instead, their hand-picked court struck down Trump’s entire tariff agenda.
With the 31 July appellate review looming, Trump’s lawyers are scrambling to mount a legal defence of tariffs under IEEPA. Their strongest retort invokes a historical example, when President Richard Nixon imposed temporary tariffs under the now-defunct Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, which IEEPA replaced. Although a federal court upheld Nixon’s tariff order at the time, it specifically emphasised that they were temporary measures. Warning against future abuses of this authority, the court’s 1975 ruling described a scenario that almost exactly fits what Trump is attempting to do today: “The declaration of a national emergency is not a talisman enabling the President to rewrite the tariff schedules;’ By implication, even the friendliest interpretation of prior case law would still strike down Trump’s IEEPA tariffs.
The case against Trump in V.O.S. Selections is strong. It has elicited eighteen amicus curae briefs from across the political spectrum and features some of the country’s best legal scholars. (Only two amicus briefs argue in favour of Trump’s tariffs, and both come from political-advocacy groups close to Trump advisor Stephen Miller). That said, even the best constitutional challenges have an element of uncertainty when the case is still pending. Courts can choose to duck an issue on procedural grounds, or sometimes they simply make a bad ruling. Nonetheless, Trump has painted himself into an economic corner on the One Big Beautiful Bill over its tariff dependency, and he has few good options ahead no matter how the appellate court rules.
The worst scenario for the president would be for the appellate court, and presumably the Supreme Court after it, to uphold the USCIT ruling and strike down Trump’s IEEPA tariffs. Under this scenario, an unexpected budget gap of at least US$2.8 trillion would accrue over the next decade. The court might also order the Treasury Department to refund tariff collections from this year, seeing as the original order behind them was illegal and unconstitutional.
If the IEEPA tariffs are voided by the courts, the One Big Beautiful Bill’s underlying fiscal assumptions effectively collapse. Trump would then face an accelerated budget deficit crisis with no good options to bring it under control. He could attempt to raise taxes, reneging on a campaign promise not to do so and pursuing a course that would almost certainly harm his party in the 2026 midterms. Alternatively, he could attempt to finance his spending by taking on more debt-a precarious move given that the Federal Reserve’s own toolbox to counter inflationary pressures from government spending is already stretched to its limits after the Biden era.
The appellate courts may defy expectations, though, which could mean that the Trump IEEPA tariffs somehow survive the current challenge. The administration would no doubt treat such an outcome as a victory, but such a scenario would only delay the tariff time bomb. By linking his spending agenda to tariff revenue, Trump has also limited his future options in both spending and tariff-setting.
Trump’s tariff agenda has been plagued by conflicting and contradictory messaging since he unveiled it in the spring. But one of the policy’s selling points was the promise of negotiating leverage with other countries. Trump continues to use the threat of tariffs as a tool to pull other countries into reciprocal trade “deals” with the United States, most of which amount to informal agreements with him personally. The results of this approach have been underwhelming so far, yielding just three agreements during the ninety-day pause on the “Liberation Day” tariffs from April. Yet Trump continues to hold out trade negotiations as a lure for his foreign-policy objectives.
So does Steve Miran, the fanatical protectionist chair of Trump’s Council of Economic Advisors. In Miran’s peculiar worldview, tariffs serve as a powerful foreign-policy tool to induce other governments into relocating companies to the United States, altering their exchange-rate policies and foreign-currency holdings, and even increasing their military spending to targets that match US goals. These and other leverage strategies depend on a basic assumption about tariffs, namely that they can be adjusted in a friendly direction as part of the negotiations for striking a deal with Trump.
That’s where the next round of trouble begins. Negotiated rate changes also alter the revenue yield from tariffs, and presumably in a downward direction if Trump entertains a serious offer to remove reciprocal barriers with a major trading partner. All trade deals henceforth could accordingly imperil the revenue obligations of the One Big Beautiful Bill over the next decade-obligations that Trump touted while signing the bill, and that Miran calculated as the architect of the White House’s tariff-dependent deficit-offset projections. For those projections to work, Trump’s IEEPA tariffs must remain in place (or be expanded) for at least the next ten years, lest the revenue promises fall short. Trump and Miran, it would appear, have unwittingly tied their own hands and will now be unable to use tariffs as a negotiating tool for the foreseeable future.
If IEEPA somehow survives the courts, or if the case is still pending when the next midterm elections arrive in 2026, the tariff time-bomb could also reignite if the Democrats take back Congress. Any “emergency” action by the president under IEEPA is technically subject to congressional oversight in the form of a vote of each chamber to terminate the emergency. Trump has thus far avoided these votes not through numerical majority, but with the assistance of Republican Speaker Mike Johnson.
Shortly after the original “Liberation Day” orders, Johnson forced through a House rule change that prevented other members from requesting a vote on the termination of emergencies. He did so because of the high likelihood that some Republicans would defect on such a vote and join Democrats to halt Trump’s use of IEEPA. If Congress changes hands at any point in the next ten years, we can expect to see a flurry of challenges to Trump’s tariffs, any one of which would undermine its revenue projections.
These prospective scenarios differ greatly, depending on how the courts handle the tariff lawsuit and how the Republicans fare in the Congressional midterms, but neither outcome leaves Trump with a good long-term option. If the courts strike down IEEPA tariffs or the Democrats overturn them, Trump will have to plug a multi-trillion dollar hole in the One Big Beautiful Bill’s budget outlays. If the courts deflect on the issue or the IEEPA tariffs survive judicial review, Trump loses his main negotiating card with foreign countries on future trade deals because playing it would jeopardize the One Big Beautiful Bill’s tariff-dependent tax revenue. In either case, budgetary realities will soon intrude upon the protectionist fantasies of the current administration.

























