Abstract: This paper discusses two recent innovations in federal antitrust enforcement of mergers - 'unilateral effects' and 'innovation markets.' These instruments of merger analysis, despite increasing usage by federal regulators, are inconsistent with modern economic theory, and lead to erroneous and overly restrictive enjoinments of potential mergers. Antitrust regulators should avoid using these and similar instruments in future merger evaluations.Read Acrobat File
A paper based on this work has now been published as:
Lopez, E.J. 2001. New Anti-Merger Theories: A Critique. Cato Journal 20 (3): 359-378.
The URL for this paper is: http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj20n3/cj20n3-3.pdf
|Edward J. López is BB&T Distinguished Professor of Capitalism at Western Carolina University. Professor López's main area of research is in public choice and law and economics, with emphases on empirical models of creative expression, technological innovation, voting, political ideology, and political institutions.|