Abstract: This paper discusses two recent innovations in federal antitrust enforcement of mergers - 'unilateral effects' and 'innovation markets.' These instruments of merger analysis, despite increasing usage by federal regulators, are inconsistent with modern economic theory, and lead to erroneous and overly restrictive enjoinments of potential mergers. Antitrust regulators should avoid using these and similar instruments in future merger evaluations.
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A paper based on this work has now been published as: Lopez, E.J. 2001. New Anti-Merger Theories: A Critique. Cato Journal 20 (3): 359-378. The URL for this paper is: http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj20n3/cj20n3-3.pdf |
 Edward J. LópezSend email Edward J. López is Research Fellow at The Independent Institute, BB&T Distinguished Professor of Capitalism at Western Carolina University, and former President of the Association of Private Enterprise Education. He earned a B.S. in economics from Texas A&M University, and an M.A. and Ph.D in economics at George Mason University in 1997. Before joining the faculty of San Jose State University in the fall of 2005, he held appointments at the University of North Texas and George Mason University, and he served as staff economist on the Joint Economic Committee of Congress. Full Biography and Recent Publications |
