The Independent Review
(Quarterly Journal)
Policy Reports
The Lighthouse
(Email Newsletter)
Commentary Articles
News Releases
Audio and Visual Programs
The Independent
(Quarterly Newsletter)
Research Articles
Working Papers
Course Adoption Program


Facebook Facebook Facebook Facebook

Your participation will advance liberty. Join us as an Independent Institute member.

Contact Us
The Independent Institute
100 Swan Way
Oakland, CA 94621-1428

510-632-1366 Phone
510-568-6040 Fax
Send us email

Interested in working with us?  Click here for more information.

Working Paper

When Is Two Better than One?
How Federalism Mitigates and Intensifies Imperfect Political Competition



Abstract: The current paper models power-maximizing politicians' behavior subject to imperfect political competition and perfect citizen mobility. It then analyzes the welfare implications of federal and non-federal structures. The model abstracts from both heterogeneous preferences (the most common argument in favor of federalism) and externalities (the most common argument against), showing that even in this simplified setting federalism has important welfare implications. There is one class of equilibria in which more federalism has the purely beneficial effect of offsetting imperfections in the political process. However, there is also a second class of equilibria in which citizen mobility makes political imperfections more severe by creating "safe districts" for both political parties.

Home | About Us | Blogs | Issues | Newsroom | Multimedia | Events | Publications | Centers | Students | Store | Donate

Product Catalog | RSS | Jobs | Course Adoption | Links | Privacy Policy | Site Map
Facebook Facebook Facebook Facebook
Copyright 2015 The Independent Institute