Social Welfare, State Intervention, and Value Judgments
By Pierre Lemieux
This article appeared in the Summer 2006 issue of The Independent Review

In the 1950s, the theorists of the new welfare economics showed that the state cannot enhance economic efficiency (or, what is the same, increase society’s income) without making a value judgment that favors some and harms others. But most of these economists would not accept their discovery’s corollary that to minimize value judgments the state should refrain from meddling with social welfare policy.

 PDF Read the Full Article (PDF, 18 pages)

Other Independent Review articles by Pierre Lemieux
    Winter 2016   From Lemonade Stands to 2065
    Summer 2015   The State and Public Choice
    Winter 2004   Smoke-Filled Rooms: A Postmortem on the Tobacco Deal
[View All (7)]

Subscribe Today

Buy Single Issues

Independent Review Issues

Articles by Subject

Independent Review Articles on Related Subjects