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With almost prophetic accuracy, Naguib Azoury, a Maronite Ottoman bureaucrat turned Arab patriot, wrote in 1905: “Two important phenomena, of the same nature but opposed . . . are emerging at this moment in Asiatic Turkey. They are the awakening of the Arab nation and the latent effort of the Jews to reconstitute on a very large scale the ancient kingdom of Israel. Both these movements are destined to fight each other continually until one of them wins” ([1905] 2004, 53). So far, it seems that Azoury has been correct. As noted by the late Israeli prime minister (PM) Yitzhak Rabin in the 1993 ceremony in Washington, D.C., that launched the Israeli-Palestinian talks, Israelis and Palestinians have been traumatized by a “hundred years war” (qtd. in Reuveny 1999, 659). However, Azoury apparently did not consider all the possibilities. Some observers and policymakers believe that Israelis and Palestinians can also end their age-old conflict by dividing Palestine among them, forming two states. Others believe that only a shared, binational state can solve the conflict. Still others see no solution in our times.¹ These

views are cogently stated, but it is difficult to evaluate them without an empirical backdrop for comparison.

How will the Israeli-Palestinian conflict end? Will the two parties create a Palestinian state, side by side with Israel? Can they form a binational state in Palestine? Will Israel be victorious, forcing the Palestinians to give up their national aspirations, or will the Palestinians win the struggle? I analyze these questions here against a backdrop that has rarely been used before: historical colonialism and decolonization. Although colonialism is today the subject matter of history books, I argue that it has not disappeared completely. The Israeli control since 1967 of the West Bank and (until recently) the Gaza Strip, hereafter referred to as “the Territories,” is essentially colonialism. The state of Israel, then, is the last colonialist.

The benefit of using a colonial framework is that it places the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a historical comparative setting. This conflict has too often been viewed as unique in nature. Although caution is needed when using history as a model, we will see that there are enough similarities with the colonial scenario to cause an observer to make the connection. When Israel’s presence in the Territories is placed within a colonial context, it is often done using an antagonistic tone, so that any attempt to be reflective is immediately paralyzed. My approach is empirical, not polemical.

Because colonialism is a loaded term, a colonial interpretation of this conflict—in which Israel is the colonial ruler, or metropole, the Territories are the colony, and the Palestinians are the native or colonial people—must first be substantiated. If this representation is correct, at some point in time Israel expanded beyond what were considered its borders, established a colonial arrangement in lands it occupied, and the inhabitants of these lands, the Palestinians, came to reject this arrangement. It is thus best to conduct the inquiry chronologically. Recalling Rabin’s remark in 1993, I must begin my inquiry at the point when Zionists first encountered Palestinians in the late nineteenth century. I do not seek to document this history, as many have done, but rather to establish its colonial characteristics. After substantiating my framework, I employ it in contemplating the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Partition and Creeping Colonialism

The first Zionists, or Jews seeking to establish and support a Jewish state in Palestine, arrived in Palestine in the 1880s.2 A that time, a few Jews lived in cities in Palestine, the Negev Desert, and the area between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea, along with a much larger Arab population, the Palestinians. Because Palestinians lived on much of the habitable land, the Zionists faced a dilemma: How would they obtain

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land for settlement? Of three options to obtain land—purchase, expropriation, and conquest—they decided that only purchase was acceptable. It was also the only feasible option because the Zionists did not have an army to back their endeavor and thus could not have seized lands even if they had wanted to do so (e.g., see Ussishkin [1903] 1964). In 1897, they organized politically and declared their intent to build a Jewish state in Palestine. Conflict became imminent.

In 1916, Great Britain and France agreed to divide control of the Middle East after World War I, allocating Palestine and Trans-Jordan to the British. In 1917, the British declared their support for a Jewish home in Palestine, and shortly thereafter the Zionists began to lobby the British for a state in Palestine and parts of Trans-Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. However, the Palestinians and other Arabs argued that the British had promised Palestine to the emir of Mecca in return for his support of the British in the war, and in 1922 the British granted Trans-Jordan to them. Most of the Zionists accepted that decision, seeking a compromise with the Palestinians, but a minority group of Zionists called the Revisionists continued to demand a state on both banks of the Jordan River. Tensions mounted as the growing Zionist migration to Palestine enraged the Palestinians and led to many clashes, and the Zionists argued bitterly over how to deal with the Palestinians. In 1936, the Palestinians rebelled against the British and demanded independence. The 1937 British government–appointed Peel Commission called for a division of Palestine between the Zionists/Jews and the Palestinians. The mainstream Land of Israel Workers Party (MAPAI) Zionists accepted the idea of partition, but the Palestinians and the Revisionist Zionists rejected it.

In 1939, Britain rejected the Peel plan and decided that in the next five years only seventy-five thousand Jews would be allowed to immigrate to Palestine. Jewish immigration would be forbidden thereafter, and Palestine would be granted autonomy based on the Jewish and Palestinian population shares, which favored the Palestinians two to one. The Zionists protested this determination and rebelled in 1945. Unable to contain the revolt and facing growing sectarian violence, Britain decided to leave Palestine and submitted the issue to the United Nations (UN). In 1947, the UN called for a division of Palestine between Palestinians and Jews, allocating 45 percent of the land to the Jews. Once again, MAPAI Zionists accepted the plan, but the Palestinians and the Revisionists rejected it. The conflict grew into a regional war shortly thereafter, as Egypt, Jordan, and several other Arab states sent forces to assist the Palestinians. During the war, the Zionists proclaimed independence, founding the state of Israel and gaining control over 78 percent of Palestine. Jordan occupied the West Bank (Judea and Samaria), Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip, and approximately seven hundred thousand Palestinians left Palestine and became refugees in several Arab countries.

In 1949, the state of Israel signed armistice accords with the Arab states, but not with the Palestinians, instituting a de facto partition of Palestine. More broadly, the conflict discussed so far was about partition, which most Zionists, henceforth referred
to interchangeably as “Israelis,” accepted and almost all Palestinians rejected. Many
writers argue that the conflict has in fact always been about partition of Palestine
between two opposing groups that claim the same land (e.g., Alpher 1995; Klieman
2000; Newman 2002; Shavit 2005). I argue that the nature of the conflict changed
fundamentally in 1967, when Israel occupied the Territories. At that time, Israeli
colonialism began to appear.

It is important to employ historical colonialism as a means of comparison. Most
colonies were historically established overseas from the expanding states (metropoles).
The metropoles deemed some colonies critical for their security and world status, and
they valued other colonies for their resources or labor forces. Theology and ideology
also played a role in colonial expansions: Spanish settlers believed they had a divine
mandate to bring salvation to the natives; British settlers in North America and the
Boers and Afrikaners in South Africa believed that God gave them the lands they
colonized; and Frenchmen claimed Algeria as their historical heritage.3

The colonial situation in the Territories belongs to two smaller sets of historical
cases, involving arrangements established in nearby areas and arrangements initiated
almost accidentally as a result of a war.4 With MAPAI in power after 1948, most
Israelis came to accept the de facto partition of Palestine by the late 1950s or early
1960s, and most officials believed that conquest of the West Bank was not in Israel’s
interest (Oren 2002; Segev 2005a, 2005b). In the 1950s, only the Revisionist Zionist
Herut (Freedom) Party continued to strive for all of Palestine and parts of Jordan, but
in the 1960s it, too, essentially gave up this goal. If before June 1967 the Arab nations
had offered to sign a peace treaty with Israel on the basis of the pre-1967 border,
defining what is hereafter referred to as Israel proper, Israelis would most likely have
accepted it.5

In 1967, however, Israel again went to war with its neighbors, conquering the
West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and the Sinai Peninsula. The decisive victory
shocked Israelis; overnight, Israel had become a regional power in control of vast
lands. Led by the Labor Party (an offspring of MAPAI), its government could not
decide what to do next. A center-left camp wanted to give the Territories back for
peace, but a right-wing camp—including an activist section of the Labor Party, the
Gahal Party (a bloc of parties led by Herut), and the religious Zionists in the National
Religious Party (NRP), whose members consider the formation of Israel to be God’s
will—wanted to keep the Territories. Like their historical colonial counterparts, some

3. On the causes of colonialism, see Fieldhouse 1966, 1981; Menon and O’Neal 1986; Ferro 1997;
4. Colonies established in nearby lands include Russia’s Central Asia, Imperial Germany’s Mitteleuropa,
and Nazi Germany’s follow-up in Poland. Britain’s Ireland and France’s Algeria, though overseas, were also
close to home. Arrangements occurring almost accidentally include British Quebec, Northern Ireland, and
South Africa.
5. For a similar assessment, see, for example, Isaac 1976; Tsur 1982; Beilin 1985; Seliktar 1986; Avinery
in the latter camp claimed the Territories for security, resources, or economic reasons, and others claimed the land as their heritage.

Israeli deputy PM Yigal Alon’s plan offered a compromise: annex areas deemed essential for security, such as the Jordan Valley, and surrender others for peace. Israel began to follow the plan informally but sent mixed signals. It returned lands to Egypt and accepted UN Resolution 242, which rejected occupation, but argued that the resolution did not apply to some of the land it occupied. Israeli public support for settling in the Territories grew, and the government approved after the fact some settlements that were initially built without approval. More and more Palestinians worked in Israel, holding menial jobs rejected by Israelis and going back to the Territories every day or staying illegally in cramped conditions, a situation similar to practices in South Africa during apartheid. The Palestinians, in turn, demanded independence. The creeping colonialism had matured into a more advanced stage: settler colonialism.

**Settler Colonialism**

During the past five hundred years, three primary types of colonies have been established: colonies of exploitation, colonies of settlement, and colonies of contested settlement. *Colonies of exploitation,* the large majority, overworked natives in labor-intensive sectors and did not include many settlers. In *colonies of settlement,* the settlers became the majority and gained full control. In Spanish America, for example, settlers intermarried with the local elites, killed many natives, and enslaved others, and in British North America and Australia, settlers ousted the natives and decimated them demographically, turning them into a small minority in the land they had previously inhabited. Some of these settler societies also imported slaves from Africa. In *colonies of contested settlement* in Africa and Asia, many settlers went to live in the colonized lands, but they remained a minority rejected by the natives.6

Metropoles often assisted their settlers in various ways, particularly in colonies of contested settlement. The colonial state provided them with subsidies, loans, grants, housing, low taxes, transport, and land; it also employed them and developed their infrastructures. Settlers lived in relatively nice quarters, owned businesses, and held high-paying jobs. Natives lived in wretched conditions and had few sociopolitical rights. The two societies were segregated and faced a dual system of law, one applying to settlers and the other to natives. Natives required permission from the state to engage in various daily affairs. The colonial state defended settlers, fought their wars

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against natives, and seized lands and resources from natives and transferred them to settlers. Having lost the main source of their livelihood, many natives had to work for the colonizers in menial and low-paying jobs, and at times they were forced to do so. The land seizures were often effected behind a pseudolegal facade, declaring the state as the owner of unclaimed lands, but settlers also took the law into their own hands, seizing native lands and properties.\(^7\)

Colonial regimes typically molded the native economy to serve their own needs. This is not to say that they only exploited colonies. For example, the natives could at times block land seizures by presenting proof of ownership, but doing so was difficult because native record-keeping and land-registration systems were underdeveloped or nonexistent. Some colonial rulers brought education and medical benefits to colonies and developed some of their infrastructures, but these efforts were undertaken for the most part only when they benefited the metropole or the settlers. Virtually all the native colonial societies were extremely underdeveloped at the time of their independence.

The Israeli case exhibits almost all of these features. All governments since 1967 have promoted settlement in the Territories, but those led by the Likud Party, an offspring of Herut and Gahal, have done so much more enthusiastically than those led by the Labor Party.\(^8\) In the period 1967–77, the governments under the Labor Party built settlements mostly in areas deemed important for security according to the plan of Deputy PM Alon, resulting in 33,000 settlers in East Jerusalem and 5,000 settlers in the West Bank. In 1977, the Likud Party came to power for the first time since Israel was founded in 1948 and changed this policy, building settlements throughout the Territories. When it left office in 1992, there were 105,000 settlers in the West Bank, 4,300 in the Gaza Strip, and 141,000 in East Jerusalem. By the year 2000, the numbers had grown to 197,000 settlers in the West Bank, 7,000 in the Gaza Strip, and 174,000 in East Jerusalem, and by 2006 there were 268,000 settlers in the West Bank and 190,000 in East Jerusalem. The large majority of the settlers live in 120 settlements built by the government. The government seized from the Palestinians about 40 percent of the land occupied by these settlements; 90 percent of the settlements also employ lands that settlers seized on their own. The land per capita in the settlements is much larger than in Israel proper, but the settlements use only about 20 percent of the land they control.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) The land seizures were especially intense in British North America, Australia, Rhodesia, South Africa, and Kenya; French Algeria; Italian Libya; Portuguese Angola and Mozambique; Russian Central Asia; and Dutch Indonesia.


\(^9\) For example, the area of the settler city Maaleh Edunim is 48,000 dunam (about 10,650 acres). Tel Aviv controls 51,449 dunam (11,400 acres), but its population is 385,000, whereas the population of Maale Edunim is 32,000 (Ofran and Etkes 2007). For settler data, see Reuveny 2003, UN 2005, FMEP 2005,
Many settlements in the Territories began as military bases, resembling colonial examples in French Algeria, Italian Libya, Portuguese Angola, and others. Israel has promoted settlers through policies mirroring those of other colonial states, including the use of subsidies, grants, and reduced taxes (e.g., New Year Supplement 2003; Reuveny 2004). Lured by these incentives, the number of settlers in the Territories has grown 5–6 percent per year since the mid-1980s, whereas the population in Israel proper has grown only 2–3 percent per year (Haaretz, October 11, 2006). Today, the number of Israeli settlers is roughly equal to the combined number of settlers in French Morocco and Tunisia or in Portuguese Mozambique and Angola. Among colonies of contested settlement, only French Algeria and South Africa contained more settlers than do the Territories. In all colonies of this type, settlers were greatly outnumbered by the natives. The same trend is observed in the Territories, which have about 4 million Palestinians compared to 450,000 settlers (including those in East Jerusalem) as of 2006.

In the period 1967–79, Israel seized land in the Territories in the name of military needs and gave it mostly to settlers. Palestinians petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court, protesting this policy, but the Court rejected their position. In 1979, Palestinians protested the legality of the West Bank settlement of Elon Moreh. Settlers argued that it was part of Israel proper, but the Court ruled in favor of the Palestinians, concluding that the critical issue was not security, but rather political, and ordered the settlers to evacuate Elon Moreh. After this ruling, the government changed its approach; expropriation for military needs continued, but seizure under a pseudolegal facade became the main land-acquisition method, as in historical examples of colonization. Basing its decision on a nineteenth-century Ottoman law, Israel seized remaining unclaimed lands. Like colonized peoples before them, the Palestinians could block the seizure by presenting proof of ownership, but doing so was difficult because much of their land was unregistered and the registration system was deficient (e.g., see B’Tselem 1997; Gazit 2003). Using these methods, the state acquired more than 52 percent of the land in the Territories by 2002, giving most of it to settlers. Today, the settlers inhabit about 3 percent of the West Bank, but control more than 40 percent.10

The arrangement in the Territories has exhibited standard colonial attributes, including segregation of settlers and Palestinians; settlers interacting with natives only economically; settler business based on cheap local land, labor, and subsidized water; settlers and other Israelis looking down on Palestinians; Palestinians requiring Israeli permissions for daily affairs; hostility and violence between settlers and natives; and settlers taking the law into their hands, uprooting olive trees, Haaretz (September 12, 2006, and January 9, 2007); Peace Now 2006c; and Friedman and Etkes 2007. On seized land, see Etkes and Ofran 2006; and Haaretz (October 20 and November 21, 2006).

destroying native properties, and attacking natives. Israel has instituted separate legal systems for settlers and natives based on double standards that ignore settlers’ violations of Israeli law and offenses against Palestinians and grant rights to settlers not granted to Palestinians. Israel has also allocated to settlers disproportionately large shares of water and lands. In time, the military administration set up in 1967 turned into a civilian authority, making colonial control routine. Although Israel on the surface has also sought to create a semblance of native self-rule, in practice it has interfered in native politics, promoting leaders thought to be amenable to its influence, just like the British, Dutch, and other examples of colonialization.11

In line with historical colonial examples, Israeli settlers have often built settlements, so-called outposts, without state approval. By 2007, some two thousand settlers lived in about one hundred outposts, seizing 75 percent of their lands from Palestinians. Some Israeli governments have promised to remove outposts and have even removed a few, but all the governments have essentially accepted them after the fact. In October 1999, for example, PM Ehud Barak and settler leaders agreed to evacuate eleven of forty-two outposts. Barak said this action was a breakthrough that would promote Israeli law in the Territories, but he actually removed only one outpost. Since then, settlers have built more than sixty outposts, often assisted by various arms of the state. Whereas Palestinians illegally built twice as much as settlers did in 2006, the government demolished ten times more Palestinian illegal buildings than settler illegal buildings (Haaretz, April 17, 2007).12

Recent settler actions in the West Bank city of Hebron and the former settlement of Homesh provide additional insight. Seeking to gain control over Hebron’s old city, settlers have attacked Palestinians since 2001, playing a key role in driving out 15,000 to 20,000 Palestinian residents and 1,500 to 1,700 Palestinian businesses from the city. Settlers also have often attacked verbally and physically the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) personnel sent to enforce order.13 In early 2007, settlers took over a large Palestinian house in Hebron and returned to Homesh, from which the government

11. For recent examples of legal double standards, see Peace Now 2006a, 2006b; Yesh-Din 2006; and Haaretz (August 28, September 11, September 17, 2006). For recent examples of settlers breaking Israeli law, see Haaretz (April 25, October 21, November 18, 2005; August 1, 2006; June 22, 2007) and Z. Schiff 2005. On Israeli governance of the Territories, see Gazit 1988, 1995, 2003; Haaretz (May 28, 2006); WallaNews (May 21, 2006). On looking down, see WallaNews (November 26, 2004; December 12, 2005) and Haaretz (October 11, 2005; February 19, September 12, 2006). On bad treatment, see Haaretz (November 15, 2004; August 21, 2006).

12. On outposts, see Sasson 2005; Haaretz (October 24, 2006; January 1, February 21, 2007); Peace Now 2006c; and WallaNews (October 3, 2006). On the land seized for them, see Etkes and Ofiran 2006 and Haaretz (October 20, November 21, 2006).

13. On settlers driving Palestinians out of Hebron’s old city, see Rapoport 2005 and Haaretz (January 14, April 12, April 13, 2007). For more examples of settlers attacking Palestinians in Hebron, see Sosebee 1994; Haaretz (July 16, August 10, September 11, December 11, 2000; July 30 2002; January 14, 2007); Yedioth (July 20, 2001); Jerusalem Post (March 20, 2005); WallaNews (January 10, 2007). For examples of settlers assaulting IDF in Hebron and in the southern Mount Hebron region, see Haaretz (August 24, 2000; November 24, 2004; January 16, 2006); Yedioth (April 1, April 6, 2001); and WallaNews (March 26, 2005).
had removed them during 2005. Because they had done so without approval, Defense Minister Amir Peretz from the Labor Party sought to evacuate them, but the World Council for Saving the People and the Land of Israel, a settler body, warned him not to intervene. IDF evacuated the settlers from Homesh, but they have since returned several times. In Hebron, the settlers reportedly presented forged documents to prove their ownership of the house and have refused to leave.\(^{14}\)

Like other colonial economies, the Palestinian economy has been molded to serve metropolitan—in this case, Israeli—needs. Like its colonial counterparts, Israel has not invested in the Palestinian economy, which has remained highly underdeveloped. Whereas other rulers employed natives in the colonies and shipped outputs to their metropoles, the proximity of the Territories to Israel proper has made it more profitable for Israelis to employ Palestinian natives in Israel or in the settlements, as settlers did in South Africa or South Rhodesia. Palestinians working for Israeli employers have held labor-intensive, menial jobs that most Israelis reject. Having little choice, as many as 40 percent of the native workers have worked for Israelis. As in all historical colonies, Palestinians have traded mostly with Israel, and their trade with the world has been subject to Israeli barriers. Israel has supervised the Palestinian economy in various ways—for example, by controlling both Israeli-Palestinian trade and the flows of Palestinian labor into Israel and by regulating the structure of the Palestinian agriculture, industry, and investments in the Territories. Palestinians have paid several Israeli taxes, which are supposedly to be refunded later, but in practice are often held back. All of these practices have negatively affected the Palestinian natives so that they, like all colonized people, have remained poor and highly dependent economically on the metropole.\(^{15}\)

The Israeli colonial grip on the Territories is as pronounced today as ever, bolstered primarily by an activist group among the settlers and supported by the Likud Party and parties to its right. Why have the activist settlers so adamantly insisted on continued Israeli control of the Territories? And why have they been able to convince all the Israeli governments to promote the cause of settlements? Answers to these questions lie in the ideological driver of the settlers most committed to the colonization: God.

### Colonialism in the Name of God

The Likud Party victory in the 1977 elections enabled the Revisionist Zionists and their offspring to carry out their territorial vision in Palestine, but the Likud Party did

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\(^{14}\) On Homesh, see Haaretz (March 27, June 2, 2007); United Press International (July 2, 2007); and WallaNews (March 27, 2007). On the Hebron House, see Haaretz (April 12, April 13, 2007) and Yediot (July 3, 2007).

\(^{15}\) On the evolution of the Israeli-Palestinian economic relationship since 1967, see, for example, Arnon et al. 1997; Reuveny 1999, 2003, 2004; B’Tselem 2002; Gazit 2003; Eldar and Zartal 2004; Svirsy 2004; World Bank 2004, 2005, 2006. For recent specific examples of the relationship, see Haaretz (June 1, 2004; December 28, 2005; April 9, July 13, August 21, August 30, September 9, October 4, 2006) and Roiters (August 29, 2006).
not have a majority in the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) or the human infrastructure needed to settle in a hostile land. The logical answer to these problems was to partner with the religious Zionist NRP; the Likud government would provide the military and economic muscle, and the NRP would provide the settlers. Before 1967, the religious Zionists held a pragmatic worldview in the name of which they allied with the mainstream MAPAI. Deeply moved by the Israeli triumph in the 1967 war, they called it a miracle, a sign from God that the time had come to rebuild the Kingdom of David in the Territories. This event propelled them to the forefront of the Israeli settlement project.16

Like the settlers in Algeria, but unlike almost all other colonial settlers, Israeli settlers have voted for certain Knesset members in the metropole and served as both ministers in the government and Knesset members, but the movement’s primary political power lies in its ability to rally devoted settlers in the name of biblical Israel. The religious Zionists believe the Torah forbids “giving up even an inch of our liberated land [Israel]” to anyone (qtd. in Pichnick 1968, 108–9). As their leader, Rabbi Kook, put it, “[T]here are no ‘Arab territories’ or ‘Arab lands’ here, but only the lands of Israel . . . upon which they [the Arabs] have built without our permission and in our absence” (qtd. in Schnall 1984, 19). In their minds, they are returning to their heritage. “For us,” says Hanan Porat, a religious Zionist settler leader, “the Land of Israel is a Land of destiny, a chosen land, not just an existentially defined homeland. It is the Land from which the voice of God has called to us ever since the first call to the first Hebrew” (qtd. in Hunter 1993, 35).

These intense religious feelings may seem unique, but throughout history several other colonial settler movements have also had divine and theological elements. For example, the early English settlers in North America believed God had sent them to their promised land, New Canaan; God wanted them to seize land from the native peoples (whom they called “sons of Satan”), and it was God who killed natives or forced them to aid settlers (Eisenger 1948; P. Miller 1948; Barbour 1969; Ferling 1981; Cave 1988; Johnson 1997). The Boers in South Africa believed their victories on the Great Trek northward signaled God’s blessing of a journey to the promised land (Van Jaarsveld 1959; Templin 1968; Lapping 1986). The Afrikaners believed that their rise to power in South Africa reflected a divine plan and that apartheid was ordained by God (Gwendolen 1948; Lapping 1986). The Catholic and Calvinist Dutch parties argued that Dutch rule in the East Indies came from God and that the Dutch settlers were doing God’s work (Grimal 1978). The settlers in Rhodesia argued that God blessed their state (Peaen 1979; Linden 1980). The French settlers in Algeria and Tunisia embraced the views of Cardinal Lavigerie, the archbishop of Algiers, and of French scholar Louis Bertrand, who argued that the settlers were returning to reclaim their lawful rights over the cradle of a Christian France that dated


Some settlers did go to colonies in the name of a higher calling, but many others went to better their lives economically. To be sure, some arrived poor and remained poor, but most settlers did well, exploiting the cheap labor and natural resources and benefiting from state aid. Still others went to glorify the home country or were drawn by the prospects of having adventure, building a new society, or cultivating lifestyles not appreciated at home (Arghiri 1972; Osterhammel 1997; Landes 1999; Pomfret 2003).

Israeli settlers went to the Territories for similar reasons. Many went in the name of God, arguing that what they were doing is similar to what the Zionists did in Palestine before 1948. Israelis settling along the pre-1967 border, including Orthodox Jews who stress religious education and living in exclusive spaces, moved there primarily for economic reasons, seeking a better material life. A third group relocated to promote Israeli security and established settlements before 1977 in areas slated for annexation by the Alon plan. The Territories have also attracted a fair share of adventurers. Over time, the share of economically driven settlers has grown, as it did in British North America, French Algeria, and other colonial examples. A July 2005 survey found that 7 percent of the settlers relocated for security reasons, 44 percent for economic reasons, and 38 percent for religious beliefs (Peace Now 2005), but a March 2007 survey found that 50 percent of the settlers believe the rabbinical reading of Jewish law is more important than Israeli law (WallaNews, March 26, 2007).17

Regardless of why historical settlers relocated to colonies, they tried to create a new reality in which they, not the natives, would call the shots. Even in the few settler societies that succeeded (e.g., North America), all native peoples eventually rejected the new evolving reality, sometimes by engaging in colonial revolts.

Colonial Revolt

Colonialism historically faced many native revolts. By the late nineteenth century, rulers of colonies of settlement and their corresponding settler states had crushed all the native resistance. They also crushed all the colonial revolts before World War II. After the war, however, the native peoples, mobilized by nationalist leaders, became unified in their demand for independence. Facing the prospects of a wide uprising, rulers typically left colonies of exploitation peacefully, but they refused to leave colonies of contested settlement. The revolts that followed included intense, bitter, and lengthy fighting between rebel forces and metropolitan armies.18

18. For surveys, see Grimal 1978; Holland 1985; McWilliams and Piotrowski 2001; and Springhall 2001.
Like almost all the colonial revolts before 1945, the Palestinian attempts to rise against the Israeli occupation in the period 1967–87 were localized, and Israel crushed them. However, in December 1987 the Palestinians staged a general uprising for the first time, stunning Israelis who until that time had thought they were doing “good works” (qtd. in Peretz 1990, 9) in the Territories and that the occupation was “a success story” (qtd. in Elizur 1997, 170)—not unlike the initial French and Portuguese responses to the general revolts in Algeria and Angola, respectively.19 Like natives in their colonial counterparts, the Palestinians have also demanded that Israel leave the Territories. Mobilized by the nationalist Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas (really an acronym for an Arabic name that means “Islamic Resistance Movement”), they have been inspired by their own revolt against Great Britain in 1936–39, the Algerian revolt against France in 1954–62, and the ongoing clash between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbulla movement.20 So far, Israel has refused to let go of the Territories, and although some periods have been calmer than others, the revolt has continued.

Socioeconomic change often played a role in colonial revolts, especially after World War II. Land seizures and rapid population growth increased the agriculturalist natives’ need for work. Unable to make a living in rural areas, many moved to cities, breaking away from the traditional chiefs, who often collaborated with colonial rulers. Many natives worked in labor-intensive settler-metropolitan sectors of the colony, where wages were very low and conditions often bordered on exploitation. Contacts with the metropole played a causal role in revolts even when they benefited natives economically, raising awareness of and rage over the colonial abuses. The improved education, communication, and transportation that (as noted) rulers had promoted to foster their own endeavors inevitably benefited some natives, but most of the native people remained poor and bitter. The synergetic contribution of these forces made natives more aware of the colonial abuses, more reachable and receptive to the nationalist message, and more effective as fighters.

All of these forces are present in our case, including Israeli land seizures; high rates of Palestinian unemployment and population growth; employment of Palestinians only in labor-intensive, menial sectors in Israel proper and the settlements, for pay that is less than the Israeli minimum wage in Israel proper and less than half of this wage in the settlements; and poor treatment of Palestinians by their Israeli employers. As in other colonial examples, the standard of living for the average Palestinian unavoidably grew as a result of contact with the metropole (Israel) because some

19. See, for example, the assessments by the Israel Ministry of Defense (1982) and General Shlomo Gazit (1988), head of the Ministry of Defense Unit for Coordination of Activities in the Territories in 1968–75, writing a few months before the Palestinians rebelled against the Israeli control in 1987. See also Schiff and Yaari 1990.

Palestinians benefited from this contact, but most Palestinian natives remained poor. These forces have been in play for years, and they remain as potent today as ever (Foreign Workers Committee 2007). The contact with Israel raised awareness of the abuses created by the occupation. When even more settlers arrived in the Territories after 1977, the Palestinians became ever more resentful. Seeking to defuse their rage, Israel sought in the 1980s to establish limited Palestinian autonomy under the village chiefs, through the so-called Village Leagues. Like other rulers, the Israeli government hoped such measures would facilitate its own control, but the Palestinians refused to go along, and they revolted (Aronson 1990; Gazit 2003).

Historical colonial revolts also exhibited similar fighting patterns. Facing a stronger opponent, rebels resorted to guerrilla warfare against settlers and soldiers in the colony and, if feasible, in the metropole, as in the Algerian and Irish cases. Settlers often attacked natives and pushed the metropole to employ a strong hand. Rulers utilized a “divide and conquer” tactic, seeking to make native groups political counterweights to each other. For the most part, the natives were united in rejecting the colonizers, but not all joined the rebels, some deterred by the high cost that participation in the rebellion entailed. Some collaborated with their rulers, serving as paid informers, and some even fought on their side. For example, natives in India fought on the British side during the Great Mutiny of 1857–58. After 1945, natives enlisted in colonial armies fought rebels in Portuguese Angola, British Kenya, French Indochina and Algeria, the Dutch East Indies, and Rhodesia. It was not unusual for rebels to kill collaborators. Some rebel factions also quarreled bitterly over tactics. In colonies such as Algeria, Angola, and the East Indies, they fought each other at times.

Colonial rulers often launched vigorous military operations to quash the revolts once and for all. Unable to hold their ground, the rebels would vanish into the masses. Seeking to limit public support for the rebels, the rulers enacted some reforms, but for the most part they employed harsh methods, including closures, fences, curfews, roadblocks, destruction of properties and infrastructures, rough interrogation, torture, deportation, and detention with and without trial. Many civilians were killed during the fighting. Examples of rulers using these methods included Great Britain in Kenya (1952–56) and Malaya (1948–60); the United States in North America (nineteenth century) and the Philippines (1899–1902); France in Indochina (1946–54) and Algeria (1954–62); the Netherlands in the East Indies (1946–49); Germany in southeastern Africa (1905–07) and southwestern Africa (1904–1907); and Portugal in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau (1961–75).


As fighting in a colony continued, metropolitan fatigue grew at home, leading to soul searching, intense debates over the value of the colonial project, and ultimately political instability. Some people supported the harsh methods employed to crush the revolt and maintain the colonial project, whereas others rejected them as immoral and called for decolonization. In France, for example, the war in Indochina became highly unpopular, and the debate over fighting in Algeria was especially bitter, involving coups staged by supporters of French Algeria (Irving 1975; T. Smith 1975, 1978; Kahler 1984; Merom 1999). In Portugal, opponents of Portuguese Africa staged a military coup and toppled the regime (Chabal 1993; MacQueen 1997; Power 2001). The situation in the Netherlands was chaotic, and the country only narrowly escaped a coup planned by supporters of Dutch Indonesia (Bank 1984; Fennema 1994; Giebels 1996; Penders 2002).

These patterns are also evident in the present case. Much weaker than the IDF, Palestinian rebels have resorted to guerilla war, attacking soldiers and settlers in the Territories and civilians in Israel proper. As in all colonies of contested settlement, the presence of settlers in the Territories has fueled hostility toward Israel. For example, Marwan Barghouti, a top Palestinian leader and rebel commander who is now imprisoned in Israel, told an Israeli reporter: “You [Israelis] do not want to cease building settlements, so the only way we can convince you [to stop it] is by force” (qtd. in Kaspit 2001). Palestinians often refer to their September 2000 general uprising as the “settlements intifada” (Arabic: shaking up) (Haaretz, April 21, 2001), and they support the attack of settlers (CPRS, May 15–19, 2002).23 Settlers have made things worse by seizing privately owned Palestinian land, destroying olive trees and fields, patrolling roads and Palestinian villages, and attacking Palestinians, as in other previous colonial examples. When caught and tried, they have often received light sentences or not been sentenced at all, whereas Palestinians have received heavy sentences for their actions, reflecting the dual system of law in the Territories. In 2005, for example, only 10 percent of Palestinian complaints about settler violence ended up in Israeli court (Z. Schiff 2005; Haaretz, September 17, 2006; B’Tselem 2007a, 2007b, 2007c).24

Like natives and their rulers in most colony examples, some Palestinians have collaborated with Israel, serving as paid informers. The Palestinian rebels, in turn,


23. There are many more examples: Sheikh Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, rejects a state full of settlements (FMEP, November 1998); Palestinian Authority officials say settlements kill their hopes for a state (Haaretz, April 4, 1997), provoke violence (Jerusalem Post, July 22, 2001), and are legitimate targets (MEMRI 2000b); Palestinian editorials call settlers a dirty stain that should be removed (MEMRI 2000a). See also the Mitchell Report 2001; Harel and Isacharof 2005.

24. For further examples of settler violence and its treatment by Israel, see Dudai 2001; Ringal and Ben Haaim 2001; Haaretz (May 16, 2002); December 6, 2004; April 25, 2005; January 16, April 16, August 1, September 12, 14, 15, 19, November 15, 2006); Shragai 2002, U.S. Department of Defense 2002; WallaNews (January 11, 2007); and the ongoing events list recorded by FMEP (various).
have killed many of these collaborators. At times, Palestinians have also quarreled bitterly and even violently among themselves over the leadership of the Palestinian national struggle, as in other colony examples. The rivalry has intensified since late 1987, involving the secular Fatah and the religious Hamas.  

Like other colonial rulers, Israel has used a divide-and-conquer tactic to maintain its control. In the 1980s, it promoted a fledgling unarmed Islamic movement as a counterweight to the PLO, allowing it to attract followers by establishing charities, clinics, schools, and sports clubs centered on mosques (Civilian Administration 1987). Israel apparently also funded these institutions, as the governor of the Gaza Strip, Brigadier General Yitzhak Segev, noted: “The Israeli government gave me a budget, and the military government gives it to the mosques” (qtd. in Shipler 1986, 177). However, in 1987 this movement’s offspring, Hamas, joined the revolt against Israel, and by 1992 it had become so popular that Israeli PM Yitzhak Rabin, the designer of the Oslo process, feared it would become the leading force in the Territories. Returning to divide-and-conquer tactics, Israel now decided to promote the armed, Fatah-based Palestinian Authority (PA) as a counterweight to Hamas. PA chairman Yasser Arafat, Rabin quipped, would fight Hamas more effectively than the IDF could because he would not be subject to the Israeli Supreme Court or to the Israeli human-rights organization B’Tselem.

In the mid-1990s, Hamas rebels attacked many Israelis, but the PA did not confront them head on, fearing a civil war. In response, Israel employed severe collective measures against the Palestinians. Finally, in 1996, the PA gave in and began arresting and interrogating Hamas members, closing Hamas institutions, humiliating Hamas sympathizers, and informing Israel of the whereabouts and plans of suspected rebels. In response, Israel eased sanctions and rewarded the PA economically. In effect, the PA became a paid arm of the IDF, not unlike the Harkis in Algeria or the Ambonese in the East Indies. Chairman Arafat could not hold this position for long, however, without becoming a traitor in the eyes of his people. The dilemma deepened when the revolt intensified in September 2000. Responding to Israeli pressure, the PA tried to stop the rebels from attacking Israel, but forces associated with Fatah occasionally joined the rebels. Blaming Arafat for the situation, Israel severed contacts with the PA in mid-2002 and pressured it to reform its institutions by creating a strong Palestinian PM position as a counterweight to Arafat. Mahmoud Abbas, the nominee that Israel preferred, was appointed as PM, but he did not

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26. On the Israeli support of the Islamic movement in the 1980s, see also Litani 1989, 1992; Schiff and Yaari 1990; Yedioth (June 17, 1994); Mishal and Sela 2000; Sale 2002; and Dreyfuss 2005.

27. On Rabin’s quip and Israel’s reliance on the PA to combat Hamas, see, e.g., Washington Post (March 15, 1993); Makovsky 1996; Reuveny 1997, 2000, 2004; Morris 2001; and Gazit 2003. Rabin’s quip is cited in many sources, including Jerusalem Post (October 4, 2006) and Harel and Ischarof 2005, 47.
confront Hamas. His successor, Ahmed Qurai, Israel said, was “a gimmick without any real power” (qtd. in Harel and Isacharof 2005, 321), so Israel ignored him.28

Chairman Arafat died in November 2004, and elections were set for January 2005. The popular Marwan Barghouti sought to run for office from his prison cell in Israel, but Fatah officials visited him under Israeli blessing and pushed him not to run. With Hamas boycotting the elections, his abstention ensured the election of Mahmood Abbas. Israel pushed Abbas to fight Hamas, but given his lack of authority he was even more afraid to do so than Arafat. In January 2006, Hamas won the elections for the legislature and eventually formed a unity government with Abbas’s Fatah Party. Having lost its divide-and-conquer lever, Israel severed ties with the PA and stopped transferring to it the Palestinian taxes it collected, a major PA revenue source. Running out of funds, the PA began to disintegrate. With each side blaming the other, Hamas-Fatah violence spread in the Gaza Strip, ending with Hamas’s ceasing control in June 2007. In response, Chairman Abbas fired the unity government, formed a Fatah regime in the West Bank, arrested Hamas members, and began closing some of its institutions, as Israel had demanded all along. For its part, Israel began enforcing what seems to be divide and conquer on a grand scale: negotiating an end to the conflict with Chairman Abbas and ignoring Hamas altogether. In July 2007, it moved quickly to strengthen Abbas, helping defeated Fatah forces in the Gaza Strip to move to the West Bank, transferring frozen tax funds to the PA, releasing Fatah prisoners, and cutting down significantly on counterinsurgency operations in the West Bank. At the same time, it warned Chairman Abbas not to renew political cooperation with Hamas.29

Like other colonial rulers, Israel has also used rough measures to subdue the rebellious natives, including closures, curfews, checkpoints, roadblocks, demolition of houses and properties, arrests with and without trials, rough interrogations, deportations, bad treatment at checkpoints, designation of certain roads in the Territories as exclusive for Israeli use (bypass roads), water-use restrictions, and at times use of civilians as human shields (e.g., to check if buildings are booby trapped, to remove suspected objects, and to stand or walk near attacked Israeli soldiers) (B’Tselem 2007b, 2007c).30

In 2006, for example, the IDF killed 660 Palestinians, of which 322 were


29. See Haaretz (May 21, December 16 and 17, 2006; March 27, 2007; June 15, 17, 18, 2007; July 8, 16, 17, 2007); CNN (June 24, 25 and July 8, 2007); International Herald Tribune (July 2, 2007).

civilians; demolished 292 houses inhabited by 1,769 Palestinians; installed 66 lasting and 160 temporary checkpoints; and imprisoned 9,075 Palestinians with trials and 741 without trial (B’Tselem 2007c). By May 2007, Israel had prevented Palestinian access to about 50 percent of the West Bank, employed 540 checkpoints and roadblocks, and barred Palestinians from 435 miles of roads in the Territories used by Israelis. Palestinians have not been allowed to enter settlements; to enter the West Bank from Jordan if they live in the Gaza Strip; to enter the West Bank if they live in East Jerusalem; to move between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; to enter the Jordan Valley, East Jerusalem, and villages along the pre-1967 border unless they live there; to enter Nablus with a car; or to move cargo through checkpoints used by pedestrians and cars. They have also needed permission to expand or build homes and properties, to invest, and to move outside municipal borders. Palestinian citizens of foreign countries with whom Israel has diplomatic relations have occasionally not been allowed to enter the Territories (Hass 2007a, 2007b; World Bank 2007).

Many Israelis have rejected these harsh methods, and some have refused to serve as soldiers in the Territories, a reaction that also occurred in France during the war in Algeria, the Netherlands during the war in the East Indies, and Portugal during the wars in Africa. The fate of the Territories has haunted Israelis since December 1987. Parties have split over the issue; new parties have professed to solve it and then disappeared; governments have changed or collapsed, typically following early elections, unable to resolve the Palestinian problem; and Israelis have resorted to civil strife over it. All of these kinds of occurrences may be seen in other metropole examples. After World War II, endless wars in the colonies and the harsh methods entailed in attempting to suppress rebellions led many in the metropoles to reconsider their rejection of decolonization. The Israeli case is no different.

Partial Decolonization

Colonialism remained intact historically as long as the people in the colony, however grudgingly, tolerated it. When they demanded independence, colonialism almost always collapsed. In the past five hundred years, two waves of decolonization occurred: the first involved settlers in the New World who demanded independence from their metropoles, which they won, often as a result of revolts; the second wave, my primary interest, involved natives in Asia and Africa after World War II and was driven by several forces. In the colony, nationalist leaders mobilized the natives,

31. On instability, fatigue, refusal to serve, debate, and violence, see Peretz 1990; Schiff and Yaari 1990; Kaminer 1996; Arian 1999; Ben Ami 2004; Harel and Isacharof 2005. Vanishing parties include the right-wing Tzomet (Junction), Tehiya (Rejuvenation), Moledet (Homeland), Israel Baalia (Israel on the Rise); and the center-wing Haderech Hashlishit (Third Way), Mercaz (Center), and Shinui (Change). Since 1987, Israel has been ruled by eleven governments (instead of five, had each government been in office the full four year-term mandated by law).
emboldened by German and Japanese conquests of European rulers or their colonies during World War II and by the decline in the rulers’ world status after the war. In the metropole, people came to reject colonialism because it contradicted democratic norms and required funds in order to maintain control of the colony, leaving less money available for the welfare state at home. The economic importance of colonies fell internationally as the importance of global trade and finance grew, and public opinion and organizations such as the UN became anticolonial. The United States also pushed some rulers to leave the colonies. Most decolonization episodes were peaceful, albeit tense, but in colonies where rulers refused to decolonize, the natives revolted, often sparking intense wars. Colonialism eventually stopped making sense, as France’s Charles de Gaulle stated in 1961: “Algeria is costing us . . . more than she is worth to us” (1971, 104).

The Palestinian revolt has triggered similar changes in Israel and abroad. For example, by the 1990s, support for a Palestinian state and the share of those believing a state was inevitable rose. More Israelis came to reject denial of Palestinian socio-political rights and to argue that fighting in the Territories was immoral and hurt the army’s morale and fighting spirit (Peretz 1990; Haaretz, October 5, 2006). Like their historical counterparts, Israeli business elites concluded that the global economy offered better opportunities than the Territories, but that seizing these opportunities required peace with the Palestinians (Haaretz, June 17, November 17, August 7, 1992; January 1 and May 28, 1993; “Bibi Has Business” 1996). External pressure on Israel to resolve the Palestinian problem also grew. In particular, as the revolt intensified in the late 1980s, the United States began to push Israel to open talks with the Palestinians (Quandt 2005). With Israel showing increasing signs of metropolitan fatigue, the Labor Party returned to power in 1992. Rabin, the new PM, commented that Israelis “will have difficulties withstanding an additional war, this is why we have to make concessions” (qtd. in Inbar 1999, 162). Shortly thereafter he approved talks in Oslo, Norway, with the very people he had labeled terrorists in the past, the PLO, thus setting in motion the Oslo process.

As natives did in other colony examples, the PLO has demanded that Israel leave the Territories quickly and permanently. Unlike the large majority of historical decolonization episodes, however, the Israeli pullout from the Territories has been partial and slow so far. The evolution and features of the Israeli partial decolonization since 1994 stand at the center of my discussion in this section.

Hinting at their visions for the permanent outcome of the Oslo process (final status), PM Rabin from the Labor Party and his successor PM Benjamin Netanyahu from the Likud Party said that the Palestinian entity would be less than fully sovereign

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32. Support for a Palestinian state grew from 20 percent in 1987 to 51 percent in 1997. The share of Israelis expecting a state grew from 37 percent in 1990 to 77 percent in 1997. Support for a pullback grew from 40 percent in 1987 to 60 percent in 1993. The share of Israelis approving the denial of Palestinian rights fell from 60 percent in 1984 to 28 percent in 1994 (Arian 1999).
and that Israel would retain control over parts of the Territories. The complex layout created by the Oslo process in the 1990s, which named three area types, reflected this vision of partial decolonization. The Territories are still divided into these areas today. In Area A, the Palestinian cities, the PA has control, but the IDF enters this area frequently in pursuit of or search for rebels. In Area B, Israel fully controls security, and the PA controls civil society. In Area C, which includes the settlements and about 60 percent of the West Bank that surrounds many enclaves of Areas A and B, Israel has full control (Savir 1998; Isaac and Ghanyem 2001; Reuveny 2003).

In the final-status talks in July 2000 at Camp David, Israel made a relatively generous offer: it would cede to the Palestinians most of the Territories now, some of the land a number of years later, and annex the rest. Although the summit did not produce official notes, existing sources, some of which were written by participants, put the share of the land to be annexed at 13–20 percent of the Territories. The Palestinians rejected this offer and did not make a counteroffer. They expected Israel to return to the 1967 line, but Israeli PM Ehud Barak (from the Labor Party) refused. In response to U.S. pressure, toward the end of the summit Barak apparently agreed to cede about 90 percent of the land, but the Palestinians rejected this offer as well, and the talks collapsed. Shortly thereafter, the Palestinians revolted again. By December 2000, Barak had changed his view, accepting a plan suggested by U.S. president Bill Clinton. The “Clinton Plan” called on Israel to pull out of the Gaza Strip and 95 percent of the West Bank and to give the Palestinians alternative land in return for the 5 percent to be annexed. The Palestinians would form a demilitarized state, to which the Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war and their offspring could return, and would control the Arab parts of East Jerusalem. Israel would control the Jewish parts of East Jerusalem. In the talks that followed, Barak sought to retain some control over the Palestinian borders, airspace, and shores; to be able to send forces into Palestine during crises; and to swap land in a ratio that favored Israel two to one in return for land in the Territories that Israel would annex—all of which the Palestinians rejected (Agha and Malley 2001; Morris 2001, 2002; Sontag 2001; Ben Ami 2004). A few weeks later Barak lost power to Ariel Sharon of the Likud Party.

By this time, Israel’s approach to dealing with the Territories had become chaotic, not unlike that of other metropoles facing revolts. In early 2001, PM Sharon rejected the Clinton plan and Barak’s offer (Reuveny 2004). Later in 2001, he reportedly accepted a Palestinian state in about 42 percent of the West Bank (Yediot, January 18, 2002). In 2002, he sought to sign a long-term interim treaty with the PA (Sharon 2002). In early 2003, he rejected Labor’s plan of leaving the Gaza Strip

33. On these visions, see Jerusalem Post (October 6, 1995); “Prime Minister Rabin” 1996; and “The Hebron Protocol” 1997.
34. Before September 2000, Israel and the PA jointly controlled security in Area B, but Israel had the final say.
unilaterally, but in late 2003 he adopted it. Planning also to remove four Israeli settlements in the West Bank (including Homesh), he dubbed the approach “disengagement.” Israel carried out the plan in August 2005, but the IDF has remained in all areas of the West Bank and has entered the Gaza Strip many times since then.\(^{35}\) In early 2006, Sharon fell into a coma, and his successor, Ehud Olmert, pledged to evacuate most of the West Bank, dubbing this plan “convergence.” His party, Kadima (Hebrew: forward), ran on this idea in the 2006 elections and won the largest number of seats; today, however, the plan has all but vanished.\(^{36}\) In the meantime, Israel has expanded settlements, and settlers, assisted by the government, have built outposts (Friedman and Etkes 2007).\(^{37}\) These activities have been going on for years.

There are also reasons to believe that Israel still strives for partial decolonization. In May 2006, for example, PM Olmert told reporters in the United States: “The settlements within the population centers would remain under Israeli control and would become part of the state of Israel” (qtd. in U.S. Department of State 2006, 2). In January 2007, replying to Chairman Abbas’s call for an Israeli return to the pre-1967 borders, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni said: “Since Abbas noted in his speech the 1967 borders, I will say that in 1967 there was no Palestinian state. . . . We are creating something new . . . the borders will be the outcome of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians” (qtd. in News.Nana, January 26, 2007). Reacting to the Saudi peace plan, which calls for normalized ties between Israel and the Arab world in return for Israeli return to the pre-1967 border, Vice PM Shimon Peres said in March 2007 that the plan could work only as a negotiating position; Israel, he said, rejects withdrawal from Jerusalem and a full withdrawal from the West Bank (IMEMC, March 30, 2007; New York Times, March 31, 2007).

Although the partial Israeli pullout differs from the post–World War II norm of full decolonization, it is not unique. Like Israel, some other colonizers were deeply attached to their colonies and refused to decolonize. The Afrikaners, as noted, believed that South Africa was their chosen land and that apartheid came from God. The Dutch believed that the East Indies were “the column upon which the Netherlands rested, the sheer anchor of its national existence” (qtd. in Wesseling 1980, 127). A popular slogan said, “Indies lost, disaster born” (qtd. in Kuitenbrouwer 1996, 21). The Portuguese believed that Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau were crucial for their economy and world status, annexing them in 1951. Henceforth, Portugal referred to these colonies as “overseas provinces” (MacQueen 1997, 11), indicating

\(^{35}\) One of the settlements evacuated from the northern West Bank was Homesh. On the disengagement, see Harel and Isacharof 2005; Meital 2006; and the next section in this article.

\(^{36}\) On the convergence plan and its disappearance, see Haaretz (April 30, May 4, August 18, 2006; April 20, 2007) and Wall Street Journal (April 12, 2006).

\(^{37}\) On settlement and outposts under PM Olmert, see also Haaretz (September 4, 21 and December 29, 2006; January 1, 29, 2007; February 6, 21, 2007; April 11, 2007; June 2, 2007) and WallaNews (October 3 and December 26, 2006).
their status as integral parts of the metropole.\textsuperscript{38} Indochina was an extremely important colony for France; when France tried to regain its status as a world power after World War II, great weight was placed on regaining control of Indochina. Algeria was considered even more important than Indochina because it had been an integral part of France since 1871. French PM Pierre Mendes-France, who supported the leaving of Indochina and made ready for France to leave Tunisia and Morocco, typified the public consensus in 1954 when he stated that he would not negotiate with the Algerian rebels over independence because doing so would amount to negotiation over the unity of France. In the mid-1950s, most French citizens believed that “the only possible negotiation [over Algeria] is war. . . . Algeria is France” (qtd. in Stora 1993, 209, 211).\textsuperscript{39}

Like Israel, these colonizers tried to enforce partial decolonization. France formed puppet states in Indochina, sought to divide Algeria into semiautonomous regions, and eventually offered Muslim Algerians French citizenship. The Dutch and Portuguese tried to form federations with their colonies in which they would keep control over defense and finance. The Afrikaners formed puppet states within South Africa. All the native people in these situations rejected the partial decolonization, as the Palestinians have.\textsuperscript{40}

Why, then, has Israel insisted on partial decolonization? Part of the answer has to do with its deep bond to the Territories. Yet other rulers who were also deeply attached to their colonies ultimately left, and the pro-decolonization forces observed in other metropoles are also observed in Israel. Indicating the length of the road traveled by Israelis since the fall of Barak’s government, support for the Clinton plan, which most Israelis rejected in January 2001, when they brought Sharon to power, was at 64 percent in December 2004 and 2005, and at 55 percent in June 2006 (Harry S. Truman Institute, December 2004, December 2005, June 2006). That Israel is still in the Territories despite these changes suggests another force at play. In cases involving metropoles seeking partial decolonization, it was the settlers who strongly rejected decolonization, at times violently. The Israeli case is, again, no different.

\textbf{Settlers and Decolonization}

The Palestinians have always insisted that the settlements be evacuated. During the Oslo process, the issue seemed manageable because the Labor governments were

\textsuperscript{38} On the Dutch view, see also Baudet 1968; Penders 2002; and van der Eng 2003. On the Portuguese view, see Figuerredo 1975; Oliver and Atmore 1977; Robinson 1979; and Springhall 2001.


inclined to evacuate the settlements in return for peace. Yet, like all the Likud governments, they too made pro-settler statements, aided the settlers, expanded settlements, and refused to discuss the issue with the Palestinians before the final-status talks. This policy, I now argue, has been driven by deep fears that evacuation of settlements will lead to a civil war in Israel.41

Decolonization did push some settler communities and metropoles to the brink of civil war. In the first wave of decolonization, settlers supporting secession fought those rejecting it. For example, in the thirteen British colonies in North America, settlers who were loyal to Great Britain fought on the British side against settlers who favored secession. In 1914, Great Britain did not grant Ireland home rule because it feared a civil war in Ireland between supporters and opponents of the act. After 1945, similar tensions tore apart Portugal and the Netherlands. The case of French Algeria shows just how far settlers would go to stop decolonization. When word got out in 1958 that the French government wanted to leave Algeria, settlers and army units based in Algeria staged a coup and installed Charles de Gaulle in power. When he too decided to leave in 1960, settlers revolted again, attempted to assassinate him, and attacked France. In some cases, settlers even tried to take over colonies to prevent decolonization, as occurred in Algeria, Angola, and Mozambique, but only in Rhodesia did they succeed in doing so, and there only for a few years.42

The Israeli fear that a pullout from the Territories and evacuation of settlements might lead to a civil war can also be traced to the settlers. Given their emphasis on the integrity and sanctity of Israel, they, in particular the religious Zionists, have perceived impediments to colonization as major threats. Like in other colonies, as long as the number of settlers was small and settlements were built far from Palestinian cities, the two parties did not interact often. As the number of settlers grew after 1977 and settlements popped up all over the Territories, however, relations turned hostile, at times because of provocations by the settlers. In 1980, for example, settlers assailed mayors of Palestinian cities who were associated with the PLO. In 1983–84, they planned to blow up Arab buses and the Dome of the Rock Shrine in Jerusalem, believed by Muslims to be the place from which Muhammad left earth to join God. A government report stated in 1984 that settler violence against Palestinians was common (Karp Report 1984).43

41. On the Palestinian demand to evacuate settlements, see Savir 1998; Haaretz (July 7 and 20, 2000); Mitchell Report 2001; Ben Ami 2004; Qureia 2006. On Labor’s inclination to evacuate settlements, see Aronson 1996; Savir 1998; FMEP, September 1999; Yediot (November 24, 2000); Ben Ami 2004. On Labor’s pro-settler posture during the Oslo process, see Maariv (September 27, 1995); FMEP, January 1996; Haaretz (October 13, 1999); New York Times (October 31 and December 12, 1999; May 1, 2000), and Jerusalem Post (November 12, 2000). This section develops and extends my earlier work in Reuveny 2003.


43. See also Haaretz (March 7, 1984); Peri 1983; H. Segal 1988; Weisburd 1989; and Sprinzak 1999.
Settler violence toward Palestinians has also been accompanied by violence toward Israelis whom the settlers perceive as a threat to colonization. In the 1970s, settlers clashed with soldiers sent to dismantle settlements built without approval (Sella and Yishai 1986). In 1982, they staged an unarmed yet violent resistance to evacuation of the Sinai settlements (an evacuation called for by the Israeli-Egyptian peace accord). Shortly thereafter, Israel invaded Lebanon to fight the PLO, but the war’s larger goal was to suppress Palestinian opposition to colonization. The war became controversial in Israel, resulting in street violence (Gilbert 1998; Shaham 1998). As the debate over the Territories intensified in the 1980s, settlers became more militant, referring to a pullout as treason, labeling President Yitzhak Navon, who supported it, a “Quisling” (after a Norwegian official who collaborated with the Nazis), and accusing IDF troops sent to disperse their protests and riots of behaving like kapos (Nazi-nominated Jewish prison guards) (Jerusalem Post, April 10, 1988; Haaretz, June 16,1989). In 1990, settler leaders warned that evacuation of settlements might cause civil war in Israel (e.g., Ben-Nun 1990). By that time, almost 60 percent of the Israeli public (Tediot, June 8, 1989) and many officials had come to believe that a pullout would lead to a civil war.44

In 1993–95, determined to derail the fledgling Oslo process, settlers demonstrated, blocked traffic, rioted, called PM Rabin a traitor, urged the IDF to refuse evacuation orders, and warned of an imminent civil war (Sprinzak 1999; Reuveny 2004). Considering Israel’s moves against this backdrop, Foreign Minister Peres sought a quick removal of settlements, but PM Rabin feared a civil war. For Jews, the thought of civil war brings painful memories; the clash between moderates and zealots during the Jewish revolt against Rome is said to have ruined ancient Israel (Yerushalmi 1982; Harkabi 1989). In the end, Israel postponed the issue of the settlements to the final-status talks, to be held by 1999 (Makovsky 1993, 1996; Savir 1998). Alluding to the historical crisis, Peres explained that the government wanted to “avoid a terrible clash in Israel” (qtd. in FBIS, November 29, 1993, 4). “Any different approach,” he added a few months later, “would split the nation beyond recognition” (qtd. in Makovsky 1996, 141).

Yet this concession did not placate the settlers, who viewed the Oslo process as a sin against God that must be stopped. With this goal in mind, Baruch Goldstein, a religious settler and physician, killed twenty-nine Palestinian worshipers in Hebron in 1994 (“Report Massacre” 1994). After the massacre, PM Rabin sought to remove settlers from the Tel Rumeida hill in Hebron (their presence there had long promoted strife), but he backed down after settlers said the order negated Jewish law and urged the IDF to reject it (Haaretz, March 7 and 30, April 1 and 6, 1994). Some settlers called Baruch Goldstein a holy martyr who had rushed to prevent Israel from falling

44. Officials expressing fear of civil war included Deputy PM Yadin (Tediot, June 6, 1980), Likud officials (Jerusalem Post, February 26, 1983), presidents (Jerusalem Post, September 7, 1983; Independence Day Speech, April 25, 1985), PM Peres (FBIS, June 6, 1986), and Knesset members (“Interviews” 1989). See also Talmon 1980 and Barzillai 1990.
into gentile hands (Yediot, February 28, 1994; Yerushalayim, March 4, 1994; Ben Horin 1995). Nevertheless, the Oslo process continued, and settlers began to debate openly whether Jewish law allowed the killing of Rabin on the grounds that he planned to surrender Jewish land (Lior, Shilo, and Melamed 1996). Rabin was killed on November 4, 1995; his killer, an admirer of Baruch Goldstein, believed that God wanted Rabin killed in order to stop the Oslo process (“Report Assassination” 1996; Yediot, December 11, 1995).

After the massacre, Palestinians attacked Israelis, and Israel turned to the harsh methods that other colonial rulers used to suppress rebellion (Reuveny 1999). As the conflict escalated, public support for the Oslo process fell, and Likud Party leader Benjamin Netanyahu, who rejected the process, became PM in 1996. He delayed talks, and the settlers toned down their crusade, but in 1998 he accepted a plan to evacuate some land. Enraged, the settlers moved against him, and his government fell. The new PM, Ehud Barak, from the Labor Party, sought to resolve the conflict by evacuating most of the West Bank, but the settlers were determined to stop him. Aware of the growing tensions, Barak said the polarization threatened Israeli unity, and President Ezer Weizman said the cracks in the nation were very worrying (Barak 1999; Weizman 1999). In the period immediately before the 2000 Camp David Summit, settlers again protested, rioted, blocked traffic, compared Barak to Hitler and threatened his life, equated a pullout to the Holocaust, and warned of an imminent civil war.45 Many Israelis indeed feared that a civil war was imminent, as did the government. Regional Cooperation Minister Peres, for example, said Israel kept the Gaza Strip settlements in place only to prevent civil strife (Yediot, June 24, 2000), and Justice Minister Beilin said that in Camp David, Barak sought to annex some settlements only to placate the settlers (Maariv, August 18, 2000). In January 2001, 47 percent of Israelis believed that resolving the conflict was less important than preventing a serious break in Israel over the issue (Haaretz, January 21, 2001). A few months later, after Barak had lost power, PM Sharon’s defense minister Ben Eliezer (from the Labor Party) said that Barak had not evacuated illegal outposts because he feared settler violence (Haaretz, June 28, 2001).

In 2001, settlers played a role in bringing to power Ariel Sharon, who had long supported their cause, not unlike the Algerian settlers who brought de Gaulle to power in 1958. In the next three years, they held key posts in his governments, relentlessly pushing it to expand settlements while fighting in the Territories, as Portugal did in Africa. Though Sharon first sought military restraint against the Palestinian rebels, by late 2001, responding in part to settler pressure, he had turned to the harsh methods that other colonial rulers used. In March 2002, settlers pushed him to reconquer the Palestinian areas and dismantle the PA.46 Shortly thereafter,

45. On these antigovernment moves, see, for example, Haaretz (June 11, 20, and 23, July 24, 2000); Maariv (June 4, July 17, and August 11, 2000); Yediot (May 30 and 31, July 24, December 29, 2000).

46. On settlers pressuring Sharon, see, for example, Haaretz (October 17, 2001; March 6 and 29, 2002; April 22, 2002; May 7, 19, 27, 31, 2002), Yediot (June 15 and 22, 2001; January 1, 2002).
Israel recaptured the PA’s areas and restricted Palestinian movement. Sharon argued that he had “no Palestinian partner” for peace talks and severed all contacts with the PA. A few months later he decided to move without Palestinian consent, approving construction of an extensive fence structure around the West Bank.\textsuperscript{47} In the following years, Sharon continued to act without Palestinian consent, but unlike his construction of the fence, these actions would put him on a direct collision course with settlers.

As late as fall 2002, PM Sharon said the Gaza Strip was as important as Tel Aviv for Israel, rejecting the Labor Party’s call to leave the strip (\textit{Jerusalem Post,} October 24, 2004). After Labor left his government in late 2002, he won the January 2003 elections and formed a right-wing government. Yet as the fighting continued, public fatigue grew, which happened likewise in historical instances of metropoles’ struggles to hold onto their colonies. Looking for remedies, Israeli public figures offered peace plans based on an Israeli return to the pre-1967 borders.\textsuperscript{48}

Sensing a new dynamic and perhaps going through some de Gaulle–like metamorphosis himself, Sharon stunned Israelis in May 2003 by calling the Israeli presence in the Territories “occupation” and declaring that it was immoral and bad for Israel, thus essentially accepting Palestinian statehood (CNN, May 27, 2003; “Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon” 2003). In fall 2003, he invited the Labor Party to join his government and declared his disengagement plan. In response, settlers and the extreme-right parties left the government. In a replay of their anti-Oslo crusade, thousands of settlers protested, rioted, blocked traffic, marched in the streets, and threatened to boycott Israeli firms that were assisting Sharon (WallaNews, May 18, 2005). Some vilified him as a traitor and an enemy and called Israeli soldiers Nazis. Heads of military yeshivas in the Territories and settler rabbis said the plan was a sin against God, and they called on soldiers to disobey orders (\textit{Haaretz,} September 7, 2005). Faulting Sharon for tearing apart the nation, many warned of an imminent civil war. Radicals threatened to kill him; some staged the rite of Pulsa Denura (Aramaic), wishing him death in the name of God (\textit{Haaretz,} July 27, 2005). Activists said the late Yitzhak Rabin was waiting for Sharon. Thousands blocked roads leading to the Gaza Strip, and a few threatened to secede from Israel. In the spirit of the Goldstein massacre, one settler killed four Palestinians, another killed four Israeli Arabs, and a few apparently planned to blow up the mosques on the Temple Mount.\textsuperscript{49}

As tensions rose, the ruling Likud Party broke into two camps, one for and one against Sharon’s plan. The head of the Israeli Security Service warned that Jews might attack Sharon (\textit{Yediot,} June 10, 2005). Justice Minister Lapid and Parliament Speaker Rivlin said they feared the tensions would lead to a civil war, and PM Sharon expressed

\textsuperscript{47} On Sharon’s view of the fence and the PA, see Harel and Isacharof 2005; Dolphin 2006.

\textsuperscript{48} A number of peace plans have been offered; they are discussed in the next section.

\textsuperscript{49} On the settlers’ campaign, see \textit{Haaretz} (June 7, 2004; September 10, 12, 13, 2004; November 24, 2004; December 17, 2004; July 18, 2005; August 5, 19, 24, 2005); \textit{Maariv} (November 3, 2004; August 8, 2005); \textit{Jerusalem Post} (July 6 and September 9, 2004); Harel and Isacharof 2005.
a feeling that Israel was on the brink of a civil war. A January 2005 poll reported that 49 percent of Israelis feared that disengagement would lead to a civil war, up from 40 percent in October 2004; and 75 percent predicted exchange of fire during the evacuation (Haaretz, October 11, 2004; Tami Steinmetz Center 2005). The issue was a major feature of newspapers, media talk shows, and government meetings. The Israeli chief of staff warned that the IDF might fall apart, and officials predicted a blood bath that could tear the nation apart (Jerusalem Post, July 6 and September 9, 2004; Maariv, November 22, 2004; Haaretz, February 9, 2005). A June 2005 poll reported that public support for the disengagement plan had fallen from 69 percent in February 2005 to 53 percent (Yediot, June 10, 2005).

In the end, though, the disengagement progressed relatively smoothly, taking less than two weeks. Like most of their historical counterparts who had returned to the metropoles, the evacuated Israeli settlers returned to Israel proper and avoided a large showdown. Many settlers slated for evacuation directed their attention to getting the highest possible financial compensation from the government. Once the Israeli colonial control and the preferential treatment it entailed vanished from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria, the settlers followed, as in other colonial examples. That said, however, the tension in Israel over evacuation of settlements has not subsided. For example, in December 2006 Education Minister Yuli Tamir, from the Labor Party, ordered the reinstatement of the pre-1967 Israeli border in school maps. Exploding with rage, settlers said the minister had declared a war against God and the Land of Israel, thus joining Israel’s enemies. She should recall, they warned, what happened to PM Sharon after he harmed settlements (he went into a coma) (WallaNews, December 6, 2006). PM Olmert, when asked by a reporter why he had not evacuated the illegal outposts despite Israel’s promises to do so, replied, “I do not have enough political power [facing the settlers and their supporters] to go into a wide confrontation over the illegal outposts” (qtd. by WallaNews, December 11, 2006).

Looking back, the much larger West Bank settler community’s fear that the disengagement would bring Israel back to the pre-1967 border seems misplaced. Although Sharon apparently concluded that the occupation was affecting Israel negatively and that the Palestinians deserved a state, there are reasons to suspect that he would not have followed in the footsteps of Charles de Gaulle and evacuated the Territories. Speculating about the outcome of his plan, he said in September 2004: “It is very possible that after the evacuation there will be a long period when nothing else happens.” The disengagement, he added, might lead to decades of stalemate (The Guardian, September 15, 2004). A month later, his close advisor Dov Weisglass was even more forthcoming: “The significance [of the disengagement] is the freezing of the political process. . . . The Palestinian state, with all that it entails, has been removed from the agenda indefinitely” (qtd. in Haaretz, October 8, 2004). It is likely that what Sharon really had in mind, then, was some sort of a partial decolonization, probably not a generous one.
Colonial Revolt or War of Decolonization?

Having demonstrated the colonial attributes of our case, I can now reexamine the questions posed at the beginning of my essay. How will the Palestinian revolt end? Will the Palestinians be victorious, gaining control over Israel proper and the Territories? Will Israel be victorious, forcing the Palestinians to give up their national aspirations? Will the conflict follow the pattern of the post–World War II wars of decolonization, with Israel decolonizing and the Palestinians forming a new state? Will the two sides form a shared, binational state? In line with my general approach, let us turn again to history, this time focusing on the endings of colonial revolts.50

We see that in no case did the natives win control over the metropole. In theory, an ending in which the Palestinians gain full control over both Israel proper and the Territories is not impossible; after all, this outcome was the PLO’s goal until 1988, and it is still the Hamas Party’s goal. In practice, however, the probability of this ending is so low that we can safely ignore it. Unlike this particular ending, however, the other possible endings I have described cannot be ignored.

Colonial revolts historically ended in one of five ways: (1) settler majorities won independence; (2) settler states crushed native revolts and years later granted native minorities equal rights; (3) the colonizer forced the colonies to join a federation, keeping power at the center, but the system eventually collapsed, leading to decolonization; (4) a settler minority and native majority formed a shared state; and (5) a native majority won independence, and the settler minority left, leading to decolonization.

Let us consider examples of each ending. In colonies of settlement such as British North America, settlers and metropolitan forces used extreme methods against natives and became the majority, after which the settlers demanded and won independence, at times following a war with the metropole. The resulting settler state expelled and killed natives, but years later granted the remaining natives equal rights. Russia forced its colonies to join a federation, the Soviet Union, resorting at times to violence in order to keep the union intact; the Soviet federation eventually collapsed, leading to decolonization. In South Africa and Rhodesia, the settler minority won self-government from the metropole and formed a state that excluded the native majority. After years of struggle, the power balance tipped in the natives’ favor, and the settlers formed a shared state with them in return for keeping the properties they had seized from natives in the past. In other colonies of contested settlement, such as Algeria and Angola, the native majority demanded independence, which the settlers and the metropole rejected. The natives then revolted, resorting to long and intense wars that ended in decolonization.

Which of these endings is applicable here? Unlike settlers in British North America and several other settler societies, Israeli settlers have not sought to secede

50. This logic builds on and extends my work in Reuveny 2005.
from Israel and are not likely ever to do so. Nor have they exterminated the Palesti-

nians. Although some settlers and their allies, including PM Sharon, who at one time
believed Jordan was the Palestinian state, have sought to expel or transfer the Pales-

tinians, Israel could not do so even if it wanted to. The North American, Australian,
and other settler societies expelled natives when colonialism was an accepted norm; 
today, it is universally rejected. The world community would likely intervene to stop
such a move, and most Israelis would likely see it as being immoral.

The Russian model also does not apply here. Israel is much weaker than Russia, and
even Russia ultimately could not keep the Soviet Union intact. Can the South
African/Rhodesian shared-state model work in our case? This question is not new.
Theodor Herzl’s 1902 novel Altneuland (Old-New Land) envisioned a democratic
New Society in Palestine. Before 1948, the shared state idea was supported by such
luminaries as Professor Martin Buber and Hebrew University president Judah
Magnes, but the 1946 Anglo-American Commission pushed it aside in favor of a	
two-state solution. After 1948, the shared-state idea was forgotten, but it has resur-

faced recently. Its proponents note that the Palestinian population west of the Jordan
River (including the Israeli Muslim citizens, who are the Palestinians who did not flee
in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and their descendants) will soon outnumber the Jewish
population, though Israel refuses to evacuate the settlements. Thus, Palestinians and
Jews must live together.

Israel has not instituted formal apartheid. As discussed, however, settler leaders
have held key posts in the government, blurring the settler/state divide, and the
situation in the Territories has standard colonial attributes, including segregation. Yet

unlike Africans and whites in South Africa and Rhodesia, who share religion and some
places of worship, Jews and Palestinians differ even in these respects. Most important,
the shared-state solution can work only if large majorities on both sides accept it, but

considerable majorities of Palestinians and Israeli Jews support a two-state solution. Even in South Africa, tensions are rising because whites, who compose 20 percent of
the population, hold 97 percent of the fertile land. In Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia),
this problem has caused civil strife, and the government has retaken lands seized by
whites and returned them to Africans. In August 2005, the South African vice presi-
dent noted that the land-reform process was too slow and that South Africa might
adopt Zimbabwe’s approach (Pogrond 2005). If South Africa, the one historical
colonial case that seems to be moving toward the shared-state ending, is stumbling,
a similar ending in our case looks all the more unlikely.

51. On Sharon’s view, see Aronson 1990; Palombo 1990; and Morris 2001. For recent examples of Israeli
right-wing calls for transfer, see Haaretz (December 12, 2002; September 12 and November 6, 2006);
Maariv (August 8, 2005); WallaNews (December 12, 2005; September 11, 2006). Sharon’s minister of
tourism, Rehavam Zeevi, also supported transfer (Le Monde Diplomatique, February 19, 2003).

52. Approximately 78 percent of Israeli Jews and 63 percent of Palestinians support a two-state solution.
See Haaretz (November 7, 2003; January 7, 2004; January 18, 2005); Jerusalem Media and Communi-
cation Center (2005).
The conflicts in Algeria, Angola, the East Indies, and other colonies of contested settlement are relevant for our case, as we have already seen. In historical perspective, there is no significant difference between, for example, the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale fighting France, the Angolan Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola fighting Portugal, and the PLO fighting Israel. There is not much difference between Ahmed Sukarno leading the Indonesian struggle against the Dutch control and Yasser Arafat leading the Palestinian struggle against Israeli control. Like its colonial counterparts, Israel accepted its border before 1967, but rejected it after occupying the Territories in 1967. From 1967 to the 1990s, it rejected the Palestinian right to a state in the Territories, but later, like other rulers, it gradually softened its position under the weight of the Palestinian revolt. Israel currently accepts the two-state solution but rejects full decolonization.

Will Israel ever decolonize fully? As we have seen, the decision to decolonize historically was the outcome of a cost-benefit analysis that drove, to some extent subconsciously, the national mood in the metropole. The idea of decolonization initially met strong opposition, but Metropolitan fatigue ultimately grew, and most people concluded that the colonial project had become a hindrance. This conclusion led to decolonization.

That this sequence of events happened so many times previously suggests that it possible here. In fact, Israeli metropolitan fatigue has been growing since the Palestinians revolted in 1987. In recent years, Israel has undertaken activities seen as unthinkable previously. In the 1990s, it held talks with the PLO, which until that time was outlawed, and it pulled out of parts of the Territories. PM Barak agreed in December 2000 to evacuate almost all of the Territories and to form a Palestinian state. PM Sharon, architect of the settlement enterprise and opponent of both statehood and a fence around the West Bank (fearing it would become a de facto border), accepted a fence in 2002 and statehood in 2003, stating, in the spirit of France’s de Gaulle and Portugal’s General Spínola, that occupation was immoral and bad for Israel.

Many Israelis have sought an even deeper change. For example, in 2003 former chiefs of the Israeli Security Service called on PM Sharon to resume talks with the Palestinians over a pullout and settlement evacuation even at the cost of settler violence (New York Times, November 15, 2003; Yediot, November 14, 2003). Israeli officials and public figures have offered peace plans that call for Israel to return to, or very close to, the pre-1967 border and to form a Palestinian state.\[53\] Like the French and Portuguese soldiers who refused to fight in Africa, viewing such fighting as

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53. Examples include peace plans suggested by Amoz Oz (famous writer [Haaretz, April 19, 2002]); Ram Caspi (high-powered attorney [Haaretz, March 29, 2002]); Ami Ayalon and Sari Nusseibeh (former head of the Israeli Security Service and president of Al-Quds University in Jerusalem [Haaretz, September 17, 2002; October 7, 2003]); Geneva Plan (Israeli and Palestinian officials and former high-ranking army officers [Haaretz, October 20, 2003]); Dan Ben David (professor at Tel Aviv University [Haaretz, August 2, 2005]); Ari Shavit (high-powered journalist [Ma'ariv, June 17, 2005]).
immoral, some Israeli soldiers, including pilots and members of elite units, have refused to fight in the Territories, and some have reported to the media allegedly violent crimes committed by the IDF against Palestinians.\textsuperscript{54}

By late 2003, polls found that 55 percent of Israelis thought that the cost of the settlements outweighed their benefit, 57 percent supported evacuation of all or most of the settlements as part of a peace accord, and 78 percent said they would not protest such an accord; only 25 percent said that the IDF should guard illegal outposts (\textit{Haaretz}, September 26, 2003). More and more reports on the economic costs of the occupation and the settlements for the average Israeli have appeared in the news media, demonstrating the huge amounts of money they entail (\textit{New Year Supplement} 2003; Swirsky 2004; \textit{Yediot}, June 8, 2007). A resigned Vice PM Olmert said on the eve of the 2005 disengagement from the Gaza Strip, “We are tired from fighting, being brave, winning, and defeating our enemies” (qtd. in Haetzni 2006, 1). A few months later, supported by most Israelis, PM Sharon carried out the disengagement plan that he had rejected only two years earlier.\textsuperscript{55}

In April 2006, a new party, Kadima, won the Israeli elections. For the first time since 1967, a party running on an explicit platform of Israeli pullout from large parts of the Territories came to power. By this point, Israeli officials were often criticizing the occupation. For example, Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni said that the occupation risked Israel’s future as a sovereign Jewish democracy (\textit{Washington Post}, January 22, 2006). Some have argued that the occupation risks Israeli security, diminishing the IDF’s quality by bogging the forces down in fighting insurgents, patrolling roads, manning checkpoints, and policing refugee camps and Palestinian cities (\textit{Haaretz}, August 18 and 22, November 5, 2006; Bar-Joseph 2007). Israeli defense minister Amir Peretz blamed the occupation and the violent confrontations it entails for promoting violence in Israeli society (\textit{Haaretz}, May 9, 2007), and some settler leaders have recognized the ills of the occupation and the need to solve the problems it causes for the Palestinians (Taaub 2007). Even the 2006 electoral victory of the Hamas Party, which does not recognize Israel, has not changed this tendency. In September 2006, 67 percent of Israelis supported talks with the PA if the Hamas Party would participate in the PA government; 56 percent supported talks even if Hamas would control the government (Harry S. Truman Institute, September 2006).

For their part, Israeli leaders have increasingly signaled willingness to meet Palestinian demands. For example, in November 2006 PM Olmert said that in return for peace Israel would evacuate settlements and large parts of the Territories (\textit{Jerusalem


\textsuperscript{55} On carrying out the disengagement, see \textit{Haaretz} (December 20, 2003; February 2, 2004); \textit{Yediot} (December 5, 2004); Harel and Isacharof 2005. On the public support, see \textit{Haaretz} (May 3, 2004); \textit{Yediot} (April 30, 2004; June 10, 2005).
Post, November 27, 2006). Directing his words to the Palestinian people, he said: “You will be able to establish an independent and viable Palestinian State with territorial contiguity in Judea and Samaria—a State with full sovereignty and defined borders” (qtd. in Olmert 2006, 1). A month later he supported Education Minister Tamir’s decision to reinstate the Green Line (the pre-1967 border) in school maps, ignoring a pending “no confidence” vote in the Knesset initiated by the Likud Party and a rabbinical decree forbidding the decision (Haaretz, December 6, 2006). In 2007, Foreign Minister Livni said the Palestinians must be offered a viable state in the Territories (Haaretz, January 13, 2007). During a visit in Egypt, she said Israel does not intend to control the Palestinians forever (Al-Ahram, May 11, 2007). Back in Israel, incoming Israeli president Shimon Peres said hours before he took office, “We have to get rid of the Territories” (qtd. in Yediot, July 15, 2007). PM Olmert said he was willing to evacuate outposts (Haaretz, January 13 and July 17, 2007) and was ready to negotiate without preconditions the Saudi peace plan (Haaretz, May 15, 2007), the same plan that Israel flatly rejected when it was first offered only five years earlier.

The elements that still sustain Israeli colonialism are Palestinian fatigue, fears that a pullout will lead to civil war, and U.S. support. The Palestinian uprising has perhaps lost steam recently. Native peoples historically staged many defeated revolts before attaining decolonization. Only when the settlers nearly exterminated the natives did they break their spirit. This demographic factor does not apply here, and the Palestinian spirit does not seem to have been broken. For example, in October 2006 Palestinian PM Ismael Haniyeh, from the Hamas Party, said the Palestinians have the right to use arms against the occupation (Haaretz, October 16, 2006). In January 2007, PA chairman Abbas made a similar declaration; a few days later he rejected a state with temporary borders called for by the U.S. Roadmap to Peace Plan, insisting on discussing only the final status (Haaretz, January 11 and 14, 2007). In late January, he said his people are desperate, and this desperation works strongly against peace (Haaretz, January 28, 2007). In late May 2007, in the midst of an Israeli air campaign in the Gaza Strip, Hamas leader Khaled Mashal said the Palestinians will continue to resist “Zionist aggression,” regardless of whether the resistance is effective. “What caused Sharon to leave Gaza?” he asked. “Time is on the side of the Palestinian people. We are right, and our cause is right” (qtd. in The Guardian, May 30, 2007). In June 2007, Haniyeh, deposed as PM at this time, stated: “Israel won’t give us anything. Our land, our nation will not come back to us except with steadfastness and resistance” (qtd. by CNN, June 25, 2007). A month later PA chairman Abbas decided that from now on he would focus on issues pertaining to the final status, and the new PM Salam Fayad said he was ready to die for the cause of establishing a territorially contiguous, prosperous Palestinian state in all the Territories (Haaretz, July 16 and 17, 2007). Indicating the depth of their defiance and rejection of the occupation, Palestinians today often refer to Israel as “the Zionist Enemy” or “the Occupation Government” (qtd. in Haaretz, November 20, 2006,
and February 25, 2007). The Palestinians, then, probably have not said their last word.

Consider next the issue of civil war in Israel. Despite the smooth evacuation of settlements in the Gaza Strip and northern West Bank in August 2005, 42 percent of Israelis in February 2006 expected that further evacuations would lead to a civil war (Yediot, February 10, 2006). An October 2006 poll paints a picture of a torn society: 42 percent of Israelis believe that the disengagement has caused a very large division in Israel, and another 40 percent believe that the murder of Rabin has caused the division (WallaNews, October 31, 2006). Although these fears are real, they assume that people will resort to arms to stop the evacuation of settlements. Recent polls suggest, however, that most Israelis support the evacuation of settlements as part of a peace treaty, and most settlers expect the evacuation of settlements located east of the fence, believe that Israelis support it, and say they will leave willingly in return for financial compensation. Fewer than 5 percent of Israelis believe that violence and use of arms are acceptable means in opposing evacuation, and only 5 percent of the settlers say they will resort to arms in order to prevent it. The possibility that settlers will resort to arms to prevent decolonization, then, cannot be ruled out. Some settler societies also did so historically, in French Algeria, the Dutch East Indies, and Portuguese Angola. In all cases, however, the metropole stood firmly in their way. Should Israeli settlers resort to arms, the government would have to choose between decolonization and colonialism. The historical pattern suggests it would probably choose decolonization and quell the unrest.

Finally, the United States has implicitly enabled Israeli colonialism by providing Israel hefty aid and by shielding it from international pressures, but the U.S. government may decide that this policy no longer serves its interest. Those who doubt whether this outcome will occur should recall historical examples: the United States funded the French war in Indochina, but in 1954 refused the French cry for help to save their garrison at Dien Bien Phu, effectively ending French rule; it supported the Dutch war effort in Indonesia, which relied on American arms, but when it became clear in 1948 that the Sukarno-Hatta regime was anti-Communist, the U.S. government forced the Dutch to decolonize, threatening to cut all aid.

The recent U.S. policy toward Israel’s presence in the Territories presents some of these historical features of reversal. For example, in December 2000 President

56. Sixty-one percent of Israelis support evacuating settlements for peace, and 68 percent support a Palestinian state (Harry S. Truman Institute 2006). Seventy-two percent of settlers expect more pullouts (Peace Now 2006d); 93 percent expect them under a Kadima regime, 55 percent under a Likud regime (Yediot, February 20, 2006); 67 percent expect evacuation of settlements east of the fence; 79 percent believe Israelis would accept it; 63 percent say the Disengagement Law (compensating settlers) should apply to the West Bank (Peace Now 2006d); and 49 percent agree that the settlers will leave willingly if compensated (Yediot, February 10, 2006).

57. See survey findings reported in Begin-Sadat Center 1999; Haaretz (November 2, 2000; October 16, 2006; March 3, 2007); Ringal and Ben-Haaim 2001; The Economist (April 13, 2002); Peace Now 2003, 2008.
Clinton, who only in July had blamed the Palestinians for rejecting an Israeli offer of partial withdrawal, pushed Israel to pull out of almost all of the Territories. President George W. Bush ignored this plan, but pushed Sharon to accept Palestinian statehood in 2003. In September 2006, Phillip Zelikow, a top advisor to U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice, explained that progress in the Israeli-Palestinian channel is critical for the United States because the allies whom it relies on in fighting its enemies expect it (Haaretz, September 20, 2006). In December 2006, the high-powered Iraq Study Group concluded that the United States will not attain its goals in the Middle East unless it acts boldly to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the basis of the principle of land for peace and Israeli pullout from essentially all of the Territories (Baker et al. 2006). In July 2007, Bush reiterated his position that the Palestinians deserved a state of their own and called on Israel to evacuate outposts. Referring to the Israeli presence in the Territories as occupation, he said the U.S. government would convene a regional peace conference in the fall of 2007, professing to move the negotiations forward by focusing on issues pertaining to the final status (New York Times, July 17, 2007). A change in U.S. policy toward the Israeli presence in the Territories is possible, then, and even likely because the pro-Israeli U.S. position promotes strong anti-American Arab sentiment; in fact, such a change may already be in the making.

Will the Palestinian colonial revolt become a war of decolonization? By now, it is clear that Israeli colonialism can be reversed; after all, its key architect, Ariel Sharon, evacuated twenty-five settlements in less than two weeks in the summer of 2005. Although Sharon probably hoped this move would lead to some sort of permanent partial decolonization, history suggests that this approach will not end the conflict. Like other colonized people, the Palestinians have rejected it, and there are no reasons to expect that they will change their minds. All these considerations suggest that if we were able somehow to read a history book written fifty years from now, we would probably find historians referring to the current conflict as a war of decolonization rather than as a colonial revolt.

**In Place of a Standard Conclusion**

My essay cannot have a standard conclusion because the Israeli-Palestinian conflict continues and may take unexpected turns. We have seen that the conflict since 1967 is firmly grounded in the history of colonialism, but my expectation that Israel will eventually choose decolonization has only history as its guide, so only the future will tell. Nevertheless, this very history suggests that even if Israel crushes the current uprising completely and establishes a cease-fire by repression, the conflict will continue to simmer and eventually will boil over once again.

Let us assume for a moment that Israel will decolonize eventually. Although the historical pattern suggests that this event will be a clear step toward permanent Israeli-Palestinian peace, the two sides will still not be out of the woods completely.
In my analysis, I have not given much consideration to several complicating factors in the conflict resolution, including Jerusalem, the fate of the Palestinian refugees, Hamas, economic relations, water, transport between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and territorial swaps. Although one article obviously cannot cover everything, the first three factors deserve special attention.

Shortly after the 1967 War ended, Israel annexed East Jerusalem. The Territories, like most other colonies, have not been annexed. The annexation of East Jerusalem did not lessen the Palestinian desire to make it their capital city, just as the annexation of colonial Algeria and Angola to France and Portugal, respectively, did not lessen the efforts of their peoples for independence. The historical pattern suggests that sooner or later East Jerusalem will become the capital city of Palestine.

The issues of the Palestinian refugees and Hamas are unique to our case. Although moral arguments favor the return of refugees to Israel proper, Israelis strongly reject it, fearing their state would lose its character. The only practical solution seems to be that in return for Israeli decolonization and acceptance of some responsibility for the problem, the Palestinians will agree to settle the issue by returning to their state and accepting financial compensation. As for Hamas, we may note that the colonized historically did not seek to gain control over the metropole. In contrast, like some Israelis, Hamas claims both the Territories and Israel proper. Israel and Hamas refuse to hold talks, but there are signs of change. For example, the second half of 1995 was a period of informal Israeli-Hamas truce, and Hamas reportedly participated in Israeli-PLO talks (Jerusalem Post, May 18, 1996). In 2006, Hamas accepted a short-term truce, and their members ran in elections for a legislature formed by the Oslo process, which recognized Israel and offered a long-term truce (Haaretz, February 11, 2007). In 2007, Hamas reportedly accepted a Palestinian state in all of the Territories, in effect recognizing the pre-1967 Israeli borders (WallaNews, January 31, 2007). The former head of the Israeli Security Service, Ami Ayalon, who won the support of almost half of the Labor Party in the June 2007 elections for party leadership (Yediot, September 5, 2000), and the party’s former leader, Amram Mitzna (Haaretz, November 15, 2002), did not rule out talks with Hamas. Recalling that most Israelis also support talks with Hamas, it is perhaps not a bad idea for Israel and its benefactor the United States to invite Hamas officially to join them at the negotiation table. The

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58. There are many other examples. Hamas did not reject talks with Israel in 1994 (Christian Science Monitor, November 4, 1994). Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Yassin (Haaretz, July 24, 2000) and top Fatah official Marwan Barghouti (Haaretz, November 11, 2001) said Hamas would accept a cease-fire if Israel left the Territories. In 2006, the Hamas regime agreed to coordinate daily affairs with Israel. In 2007, Hamas accepted PA chairman Abbas’s call to form a government with Fatah and its call to respect existing Israeli-PLO accords, implying vague recognition of Israel (Haaretz, February 11, 2007). On the Israeli side, Deputy Foreign Minister Beilin considered talks with Hamas (Time, November 7, 1994). Top journalists Samet (Haaretz, May 31, 2006) and Rubinstein (Haaretz, February 11, 2007), former Mossad (intelligence agency) chief Halevy (Haaretz, May 31, 2006), and Foreign Minister Ben Ami (Haaretz, April 20, 2007) said Israel should talk with Hamas. In July 2007, Israel and Hamas informally discussed ways to release Israeli prisoners held by Hamas and Hezbulla in return for releasing Hamas members imprisoned in Israel (Maariv, July 8, 2007).
PLO’s moderation suggests that Hamas’s position may become less radical once it has been brought officially into the negotiation process.

The historical account suggests that decolonization will lead to Israeli-Palestinian peace. The possibility that Palestinian and Israeli renegades will attack the other side following decolonization has no historical parallels, but it cannot be excluded entirely. The issue on the table, then, is decolonization, peace, and perhaps attacks by renegades versus the near certainty of protracted colonial conflict. Facing the prospect of an endless conflict, Israel will probably decide eventually to decolonize and leave the Territories, as essentially all colonial rulers have left their colonies, evacuating most if not all of the settlements it has built there since 1967. The Palestinians will then establish their own independent state. Whether this outcome happens sooner rather than later will depend primarily on the timing and intensity of the next Palestinian uprising should the colonial status quo continue and on the position of the United States.

Recalling that today most Israelis accept the peace plan of former U.S. president Bill Clinton (Harry S. Truman Institute, December 2004, December 2005, June 2006), which in December 2000 they rejected, one cannot help but wonder whether things would have evolved differently had Clinton been stronger politically when he suggested his plan in July 2000 at Camp David. Of course, we will never know; such are the might-have-beens of history. But history is not simply a random process. It can also provide us with valuable guidance about the likely future. Israel will probably decide to decolonize, consigning its unfortunate status as the last colonialist into a well-deserved final resting place in the annals of history.

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