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Imperialism, Noninterventionism, and Revolution

Opponents of the Modern American Empire

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JOSEPH R. STROMBERG

From one angle of vision, nonintervention is *the* essential American perspective on foreign affairs. Honored in the breach more than in practice, nonintervention may nevertheless be the foreign-policy option most consistent with the broadly libertarian values of the liberal republicanism that characterized the American Revolution (Arieli 1964, Bailyn 1967). It is the application of that libertarian heritage to foreign affairs.

Libertarianism, as a full-wrought ideological system, rests on every individual's self-ownership. On this axiom, no one can own another, and all possess equal liberty by virtue of their self-ownership. Equal liberty entails everyone's right to acquire and exchange property, along with a right to defend person and property. Hence, it follows that no one may *initiate* the use of force. It is legitimate to use force only in self-defense, and it is possible to establish firm criteria for what constitutes genuine self-defense (Rothbard 1998, esp. 161–97).

It serves ethical consistency, as well as certain practical results, if the standards that apply between individuals are applied as far as possible to the actions of states,

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armies, and bureaucracies. Nonintervention, sometimes miscalled “isolationism,” is thus the application of classical liberal (libertarian) principles to foreign policy. Hence, libertarians typically wish that the U.S. government restrict its use of force to repelling actual attacks on the territory of the United States (Rothbard 2000, 115–32). Unlike liberals, conservatives, and even some radicals, who argue over how much—and what kinds of—aid to send to which oppressive regimes abroad, or exactly where to apply American military might, libertarians reject the imperial path and all arguments for empire: economic, power-political, or “humanitarian.”

Of course, not everyone arrives at nonintervention by such an organized, ideological route. There are other paths and differing degrees of theoretical rigor. Nevertheless, nonintervention reflects a number of basic themes in American cultural history. One of these is the Puritan, and later typically American, notion of America as a “City on a Hill,” aloof from the Old World’s quarrels yet able to influence the world through the good example of a successful, free, and prosperous commonwealth eschewing militarism and imperial expansion. In the original Puritan view, of course, the example involved a particular kind of Calvinist piety, and this theme could slide over into sundry secular, liberal, or republican missions of wielding state power and armed force to right the world’s wrongs (see Tuveson 1968, Hatch 1977). A recent writer uses the term “exemplarism” for the City-on-a-Hill ideal and sees a tendency for its adherents to turn toward “vindicationism” (armed intervention) when the American example is not embraced (Monten 2005).

Many statesmen of our revolutionary era espoused the cause of nonintervention. George Washington, in his celebrated Farewell Address to the American people in 1796, urged Americans to avoid taking sides in foreign quarrels. America, he said, should maintain liberal and impartial commercial relations with the rest of the world, but “have with them as little *political* connection as possible.” President John Adams practiced successful nonintervention by maneuvering to avoid war with France in spite of strong pressures from within his own Federalist Party. His successor, Thomas Jefferson, also advocated nonintervention, despite partisan differences with the Federalists on other issues. In his First Inaugural, Jefferson called for “peace, commerce, and honest friendships with all nations, entangling alliances with none” (quotations from Washington and Jefferson from Commager 1963, 174, 188, emphasis in original).

Reinforced by geographical isolation from the rest of the world, the traditions of British insularity, and public preoccupation with expansion into contiguous land areas,² nonintervention became the seldom-questioned premise of U.S. relations with established European powers and their empires. Nearer to home, in 1823, the Monroe Doctrine signaled U.S. pretensions to hegemony over the Western Hemisphere, although few interventions came of it until the late nineteenth century.

1. For a general introduction to libertarianism, see Rothbard [1973] 1978; for an important essay dealing with war and “isolationism” from a libertarian perspective, see Rothbard [1963] 2000b. For the ethical foundations of Rothbard’s views, see Rothbard [1982] 1998, esp. 161–97.

2. Whether or not continued expansion into neighboring territories shaped an imperial psychology cannot be dealt with here, but see Vevier 1960.

Despite some lapses, nonintervention was still the accepted rhetorical standard of traditional U.S. foreign policy, and the lapses were deviations *from it*. This is an important point because today's *overseas* interventions enjoy the blessings of the political-intellectual establishment at the outset.

John Quincy Adams summed up the noninterventionist creed in his justly famous Fourth of July Address in 1821:

America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will recommend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her example. She well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standards of freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force.³

As expressed by Adams and others, nonintervention, or strict noninterference in the internal affairs of other nations as well as strict neutrality in conflicts between nations, remained a key force in U.S. public opinion and actual policy up to 1898 and even to 1917. After the disillusioning experience of World War I, nonintervention enjoyed a strong revival in the 1920s and 1930s, only to be buried by World War II and subsequent events.

Already in the early nineteenth century, despite U.S. adherence to nonintervention in overseas territories, there existed a consensus that saw the gradual absorption of contiguous land areas as desirable, convenient, and even imperative for any number of reasons. As historian William Appleman Williams has written, James Madison, “father of the Constitution,” was an especially persuasive and influential theorist of expansion.⁴ According to classical republican political theory, territorial expansion necessarily weakens free, representative institutions, but Madison stood this argument on its head, reasoning that larger territory would diminish the evils of “faction” and thereby make constitutional government safer (Williams 1973, 157–65).⁵

The implications of territorial expansion were not lost on several generations of Americans bent on grabbing the land adjoining their own. Territorial expansion as

3. Printed as frontispiece in Barnes 1953. Adams, of course, did not see anything wrong with ongoing U.S. territorial aggrandizement in the Western Hemisphere, until such territorial increase seemed to benefit excessively the slaveholding South.

4. **Editor's note:** As president, Madison practiced what he preached; see Higgs 2005 for a little-known example.

5. For Madison's core argument, see *Federalist No. 10* in any edition.

such does not immediately involve a nation in the problems of empire in quite the same way that “saltwater,” or overseas, expansion does; and expansion into neighboring lands can in principle be accomplished by peaceful means, such as the (probably unconstitutional) Louisiana Purchase. Nonetheless, the characteristic use of force to take land, as in the Seminole War, other Indian wars, and the Mexican War, began to stretch the republic’s institutional balance early on. Thus, although James Polk set a precedent for “presidential war” by maneuvering U.S. troops into an incident with Mexico, historian William Earl Weeks has argued that U.S. diplomacy with regard to Florida and Oregon had already shifted power away from Congress and into the hands of the executive branch two decades earlier (1992, esp. 181–85).

The bitter struggle between North and South over the status of slavery in the western territories led directly to the War for Southern Independence, revealing the downside of Madison’s expansionist rationale. Northern victory in turn drastically shifted the institutional balance away from that of the original union. As classical-liberal historian Arthur A. Ekirch describes the process in *The Decline of American Liberalism* (1969) and *Ideas, Ideals, and American Diplomacy* (1966), the “agricultural imperialism” of Manifest Destiny helped to engender “civil war,” which in turn strengthened the hand of mercantilism in federal policy—for example, in tariffs, excises, conscription (the supreme violation of individual liberty), paper money, and the like—and weakened localism or “states rights.”⁶

Powerful ideas accompanied this practical retreat from American liberal, pacific ideals. One of these ideas was Manifest Destiny, the doctrine of inherent necessity and righteousness in U.S. territorial aggrandizement by whatever means. Another significant idea was a sense of the superiority of U.S. republican institutions; Madison’s belief that expansion was a positive good led to the view that U.S. ideals and forms of government could usefully be extended by force of arms. This view ironically is similar to later Soviet rhetoric, which held that the extension of the USSR’s influence was the expansion of the area of freedom.⁷

This messianic sense of American mission survived into the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Combined with it was a newer strategic formulation of U.S. “interest,” supposedly “economic” in character. As historians William Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber have shown in *The Roots of the Modern American Empire* (1969) and *The New Empire* (1963), respectively, some U.S. statesmen and businessmen toward the turn of the century came to believe that American prosperity hinged on access to foreign markets for the “surplus” products of American farms and factories, as well as for “surplus” capital. Economic depressions in the 1870s and 1890s were taken as proof of that analysis (see also Gardner 1966; McCormick 1967). Libertarians, stressing Austrian economic analysis and Say’s Law of Markets,

6. On continental expansion, see Wilson 1974 and Williams 1973, 180–342.

7. “Extending the area of freedom”: Andrew Jackson, 1843, quoted in Weinberg [1935] 1963, 109.

would of course dispute this “overproduction” hypothesis, and some would argue that a prior inflation of the money supply by federal policies was at fault. Depressions are not inherent in a market economy, though; they are caused by the state’s disruptive monetary policies.⁸ Hence, the demand for foreign markets to be secured by a vigorous—ultimately imperial—foreign policy came out of faulty analysis, exporters’ self-interested claims, and later, the coherent *weltanschauung* of corporate liberalism advanced by reformers and business groups.

It is especially important to grasp that the same Progressive reformers who sought broad departures from (relative) economic liberty at home likewise sought a more vigorous, imperial foreign policy. Very close in spirit and analysis to English and European “social imperialists,”⁹ the Progressive activists (who overlapped with the businessmen they were supposedly going to regulate for the common good) sought the strong state at home and abroad as the instrument of power and social justice.¹⁰ This point is important because later usage of political labels has thoroughly confused the identities of the contending factions. That the modern liberals’ policies ultimately strengthened a great many objectively (situationally) conservative social groups—Big Business, Big Labor, Big Government, the military, defense contractors, and the like—should never be allowed to obscure the newer liberalism’s ideological role in blessing the policies.

With the increasing acceptance of the theory that the U.S. economy had to expand *as a system* into foreign markets, America’s leaders pushed the country more and more into hemispheric interference and finally into “world leadership.” The supposed expansionist logic was ably articulated by such publicists and statesmen as Frederick Jackson Turner in “The Significance of the Frontier in American History” ([1893] 1920), Brooks Adams in *America’s Economic Supremacy* (1900), Theodore Roosevelt in numerous essays and speeches, and many others of the then “best and brightest.”¹¹

Economists chimed in, especially Charles Conant, John Bates Clark, and Jeremiah W. Jenks, who proclaimed that a general crisis of “overproduction” and falling profits menaced American economic life—a crisis so severe, according to them, that only state-assisted engrossment of overseas markets could allay it.¹²

The Spanish-American War (1898) was the first important conflict occasioned by the new strategy of economic empire. By containing the Cuban Revolution and rendering Cuba a virtual U.S. colony, policymakers secured markets there. Cuba also

8. On the cause of depressions, see Rothbard [1963] 2000a, 3–36.

9. On the reformers’ imperialism, see Semmel 1968 and Ekirch 1969, chap. 11, “The Progressives as Nationalists.”

10. On the practical conservatism of reformers, see Kolko 1967 and Weinstein 1968.

11. For deeper background of Turner’s thesis, see Benson 1960.

12. On the economists’ contribution to the expansionist creed, see “The Origins of the Federal Reserve,” part 2 of Rothbard 2002, 208–34.

proved useful as a “laboratory” for Progressive reformers (Pérez 1985, 1988; see also Gillette 1973). In addition, the war allowed the acquisition of the Philippine Islands from Spain; the added territory, like the earlier acquisition of Hawaii, was seen as an important stepping-stone to the markets of Asia. In a foretaste of things to come, this adventure in formal colonial imperialism soon led to a guerrilla war—the Philippine Insurrection—in which U.S. forces ultimately prevailed by means of overwhelming firepower and atrocities. By the end, some 220,000 Filipinos had perished.

The subsequent Open Door Notes (1899, 1900) represented a statement of American determination to have access to world markets, whether the peoples of the world willed it or not. Directed at the problem of exclusive European spheres of trade in China, the notes nonetheless reflected U.S. official policy toward the world as a whole. Hence, U.S. policy since the notes can conveniently be referred to as Open Door Imperialism. It is worth pointing out that the supposed “open door” swung mostly *one way* and did not imply equal access to U.S. markets for foreign companies and countries; it was to be imposed by force if necessary—another indication of how far the Open Door was (and remains) from true free trade.

Firmly convinced of the need for foreign markets, the rightness of gaining them by force, and the “liberalism” of their aims, American administrations from the late nineteenth century to today have subsidized exporters, lobbied abroad for business, brought down “unfriendly” governments by pressure and force, and ultimately gone to war in pursuit of the Open Door and against all apparent threats to its realization. This multifaceted program has composed the essence of U.S. “liberal internationalism” in the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. First the Central Powers, then the Japanese and Germans in the 1930s and 1940s, then the USSR, the People’s Republic of China, and most recently revolutionary movements in small Third World countries have all somehow failed to play a U.S.-defined economic role and had to be met head on, “contained,” and shown the error of their ways.¹³ World War I, World War II, and the conflicts of the past sixty years display great continuity upon examination of the record.

By the same token, the domestic opposition to U.S. interventionism has shown a moral and ideological continuity that derives from old liberal ideas of *laissez-faire*, peace, and nonintervention. Although the antiwar forces have allowed themselves to be divided by labels and the loss, at times, of historical self-consciousness, nonetheless a rough tradition has persisted from the opponents of the War of 1812, the Mexican War, and the Spanish-American War (who were in this case, more properly, the Anti-Imperialist League, which heroically sought to expose massacres in the Philippines) to the opponents of World War I, World War II, the Cold War, Vietnam, and all the wars since then. The continuity and tradition of the antiwar forces concern me here. I begin with a summary of some early antiwar movements.

13. William Appleman Williams’s *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* ([1962] 1972) probably remains the best one-volume summary. In the post-Cold War world, the issue remains the same, as shown by U.S. targeting of “nationalist” regimes that get in the way of the full realization of the Open Door.

Early Wars, Early Critics, and Opponents

Most American wars have generated dissent well beyond the ranks of traditional pacifist groups, which should not be surprising in view of the cosmopolitan neutrality and pacific inclinations of our original individualist liberalism. These tendencies cut across party lines and narrower concerns. Thus, the supposedly pro-peace Jeffersonians shortsightedly embroiled America in the War of 1812, partly through mercantilist measures of economic warfare (Stagg 1981) that were intended to “coerce” Britain and France and thereby to achieve U.S. aims short of war. The war itself proved to be extremely unpopular in New England, and remnants of the moribund Federalist Party rallied much of New England in opposition to it, even keeping local militia out of the conflict. Denounced as “traitors,” these Federalist activists met in the much-maligned Hartford Convention (1814) and proposed an interesting series of amendments to the Constitution that would have greatly limited the ability of U.S. administrations to wage aggressive and unpopular wars. A high point in the struggle over carrying out the war came with the *defeat* of a conscription bill in 1812—an interesting and neglected precedent!

The Mexican War, too, provoked considerable opposition. Many Northerners viewed the war as simply a means to extend slavery, and they opposed it on that ground. Therefore, opposition tended once again to center in the Northeast. Henry David Thoreau was only one of many protesters, and Congressman Abraham Lincoln’s opposition is well known.¹⁴ Opposition was not confined to the North. Some Southerners, including Alexander H. Stephens, Robert Toombs, John Archibald Campbell, and John C. Calhoun, worried that the war would damage the fabric of the Union.¹⁵

Ultimately, acquisition of new territories contributed to the conflict between North and South and the War for Southern Independence (or “Civil War”). The war brought about the triumph of statism and militarism on both sides of the lines. In many ways the prototype of a modern “total war,” the Civil War generated varying degrees and types of opposition on both sides, from draft resistance to illegal peace movements, a fact almost universally deplored by the majority of (pro-war) historians North and South. In the North, one wing of the Democratic Party, symbolized by the much-reviled (and only recently reevaluated) Clement L. Vallandigham, spoke out against the institutional, moral, and economic costs of the war and took at least a hesitant pro-peace line. The administration responded by resorting to martial law and other violations of civil liberty where these so-called “Copperheads” were strongest. In the South, a sort of Confederate opposition developed, made up of those as

14. Here Lincoln was acting within the Whig policy of measured and somewhat state-directed expansion. Many in the Democratic Party, by contrast, favored grabbing new land as fast as possible and then declaring a general free-for-all for yeoman farmers to settle it. On these contrasting styles of expansion, see Wilson 1974.

15. Southern opponents were usually Whigs. Calhoun had wanted Texas, but he feared the consequences of wider territorial acquisitions. For John Archibald Campbell’s views, see his letter to John C. Calhoun, November 20, 1847, in Duncan 1905, 138–40.

concerned about despotism in Richmond as about that in Washington. Confederate vice president Alexander H. Stephens, Robert Toombs, Georgia governor Joe Brown, and North Carolina governor Zebulon Vance were among those notable for opposition to carrying on the war on the basis of centralized methods. In a sense, men such as Vallandigham and Stephens were the last of the Anglo-American True Whigs, asserting the validity of reserved rights and constitutional procedures even in wartime. (As a result, they have gone down in most accounts as narrow doctrinaires, men of small vision incapable of great feats of “nation building.”)¹⁶

The War of 1861–65 established numerous dangerous and illiberal precedents, including conscription, suppression of dissent, and inflationary war finance. Taken as a whole, the Lincoln administration’s actions, based on Lincoln’s invention of special executive “war powers” out of whole cloth and the rationale of “emergency,” amounted to the “presidential dictatorship” that Edward S. Corwin describes so well in *Total War and the Constitution* (1947).¹⁷ Thus, a host of wartime powers and “exceptions” to the apparent meaning of the Constitution became available for use by later presidents who chose to lead the United States into major wars.

After 1865, American attention shifted to the internal “reconstruction” of the union, economic development, and westward expansion. The latter involved the familiar series of Indian wars, broken promises, and unrelenting pressure against resisting tribal peoples; it likewise provided another reason for maintaining a regular standing army in a period (for the United States) of international tranquility. In fighting the Indians, defined from the outset as undifferentiated “savages,” officers and men acquired attitudes that would carry over into the Philippine Insurrection and other interventions. Except in the West itself, the Indian wars were regarded as marginal affairs, and they attracted little protest save that by humanitarian groups, especially in New England.

1898: Colonialists, Informal Imperialists, and the Anti-Imperialist League

Mainstream historians have tended to present the Spanish-American War as a sort of “youthful fling,” an atypical and aberrant adventure in imperialism, as the United States was getting on the path of constructive world leadership. Other historians, including Charles A. Beard and William Appleman Williams, see 1898 as a major turning point in U.S. diplomatic history and the first important result of a foreign-policy consensus that emerged in the late nineteenth century. For the revisionists, the war with Spain was the first war for the informal Open Door Empire. Certainly it seemed so to foreign observers, including Rudyard Kipling,

16. On “Civil War” dissent, see Ekirch 1972, 90-106. On state building—North and South—during the war, see Bensel 1990.

17. For the U.S. military’s longstanding commitment to waging total war, see Weigley 1977.

the poet laureate of British imperialism, who urged the Americans to “take up the white man’s burden.”

Represented by the McKinley administration as an altruistic crusade to relieve Cuba from the oppressions of the corrupt and decrepit Spanish Empire, the war was initially quite popular. Later, as the fighting died down and administration’s intentions became clear, public opinion became much less unified. U.S. official determination to establish a protectorate over Cuba, make a formal colony of the Philippines, and maintain a more “forward” posture in Asia raised the issue of republic versus empire in many minds (see, for example, British-Canadian liberal Goldwin Smith [1902]). But it was the desire of the Filipinos, not consulted by the Americans and Spaniards, to achieve self-rule that had the most adverse effects on popular perceptions of U.S. policy. Reports of the ugly, brutal counterinsurgency could not be kept from getting back to the United States. The issue of annexation of the Philippines stirred the most important opposition to McKinley’s imperial program (for an overview, see Stromberg 1999, 169-201, and 2001).

In June 1898, a small group of old-line liberals and reformers met at Boston’s famed Faneuil Hall and founded the Anti-Imperialist League; veterans of abolitionism, liberal Republicans, and civil service reformers, these men brought their uncompromising classical liberalism to bear on the issues raised by overseas imperialism. Well-known members of the league included the retired Boston textile manufacturer Edward Atkinson, former secretary of the Treasury George S. Boutwell, writer Mark Twain, industrialist Andrew Carnegie, philosopher William James, and others. The league quickly began to distribute cheaply printed propaganda against U.S. policy, especially in the Philippines. By the end of the year, its activity was beginning to have an effect.

Atkinson, perhaps the league’s most radical and active figure, proceeded to mail antiwar pamphlets to the soldiers in the islands. The War Department denounced the action as “seditious” and had the material seized in transit. In interesting contrast to more recent times, at least some of the press defended Atkinson’s right to print and mail his pamphlets. Unfortunately, although the league had a clear and consistent critique of war and empire, its leaders, as Leonard Liggio has noted, “were paralyzed by their upper social position from bringing forward and educating those who sympathized with their views” (1966b, 22).

As a result, no mass-based anti-imperialist movement was built up. Opposition to empire was, of course, broader than the league; it also included rank-and-file Democrats and Populists. In the election of 1900, however, William Jennings Bryan, as Democratic presidential candidate and symbol of populism, failed to turn the administration’s imperialist ventures into a real campaign issue. The election was fought and lost by Bryan largely over economic issues; hence, contrary to many historians’ judgment, McKinley’s reelection was *not* a “popular mandate” for imperialism.¹⁸

Even if Bryan was unable or unwilling to exploit the issue, he did remark the analogy between two contemporaneous counterinsurgencies—British suppression of

the Boer Republics in South Africa and what Americans were doing in the Philippine Islands—and the McKinley administration made no secret of its support for the British side in South Africa (Noer 1978, 87).¹⁹

In addition, misleading epithets as well as failure to recognize divisions within the imperialist camp have obscured what was at issue in 1900 and thereafter. Writing as if “*imperialism*” means only the formal annexation of colonial territories, many historians conclude that, with the exception of the Philippines, U.S. policy has not been imperial. Because the advocates of formal colonialism were eventually defeated after the Spanish-American War, it has been easy to think that imperialism in general was repudiated. Hence, “the splendid little war” has been seen as a mere aberration from the U.S. norm.

Informal empire, synonymous with the Open Door, involved bringing to bear U.S. power everywhere in the world, especially against weaker, less-developed countries in the interest of keeping markets open (whatever the natives’ wishes).²⁰ This practice was, in effect, an attempt to have the political and economic benefits of empire without paying the full costs (conquest, war, and colonial administration) and without, it was thought, seriously compromising American ideals of self-determination. As Williams writes, within a few years after 1898, the imperialists who had favored outright colonialism had largely been won over to the informal Open Door view of empire; and the “anti-imperialists” who in fact opposed only colonies had likewise coalesced with the informal empire men. This consensus on a moderate, even anticolonial strategy of empire accounts for such frequent mistakes as the view that Bryan “shifted” dramatically in his position upon becoming secretary of state. For libertarians and other revisionists, the key is *not* whether a policymaker or businessman favored mere expansion into foreign markets, but whether or not he favored state actions (subsidies, loans to exporters, military intervention, and ultimately war) to penetrate and secure such markets. The critical distinction is that between a mercantilist policy favoring certain exporters, manufacturers, and contractors (at the expense of the people who are taxed to sustain unnatural expansion) and the policy of genuine free trade, which eschews both hindrances and supports. It is important to keep this distinction in mind because much of the literature speaks of “expansion” and “expansionists” without discussing clearly the actors’ ideas of the role that the state should (or should not) play.²¹

In any event, the imperialists prevailed, using a combination of arguments that today seems bizarre, even ludicrous. The then in-vogue Anglo-Saxon racism and an imperialist interpretation of social Darwinism were given as evidence that

18. Bailey calls it a “spurious mandate” (1974, 478–79).

19. On U.S. support for Britain in South Africa, see Clymer 1975, 158–61.

20. For the British experience with informal empire, see the classic article by Gallagher and Robinson, “The Imperialism of Free Trade” (1953). For a reply that stresses the difference between “free-trade” imperialism and mere free trade, see MacDonagh 1962.

the United States, in hardy racial tandem with Great Britain, was destined to give order to a chaotic world in line with our perfect *and therefore exportable* republican institutions (on this theme, see Horsman 1981). Missionaries foresaw hordes of new converts being brought within their grasp by the extension of U.S. influence. Last but not least, exporters, manufacturers, and investors continued to argue that U.S. prosperity depended on foreign markets. Spread-eagle orators such as Senator Albert Beveridge and President Theodore Roosevelt tended to use all these expansionist theses interchangeably.

The anti-imperialists responded with a restatement of the classical-liberal position. The sociologist William Graham Sumner, known for his strong laissez-faire and social Darwinist views, wrote *The Conquest of the United States by Spain* ([1899] 1965) to show how the crusade against the ramshackle Spanish Empire was leading America down the un-American path of conscription, taxation, conquest—the very evils that Spain had exemplified. For Sumner, Atkinson, and other anti-empire men, the fundamental issue was that imperialist foreign policy would necessarily undermine freedom at home in addition to the harm that might be done abroad. Unfortunately, no one vigorously pushed such views in the election of 1900 and afterward. Because empire had not yet proved very expensive, struggle could not yet take shape around the issue of costs.

Developments up to 1914

After McKinley's assassination in 1901, the archimperialist Theodore Roosevelt as president sought the expansion of U.S. political and commercial influence in Asia, Latin America, and even the Mediterranean. The Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, for example, envisioned regular American interventions to “keep order” in the Americas. Roosevelt's mediation of the Russo-Japanese War helped establish Japan as the major Far Eastern power, something his successors may have regretted. U.S. backing of the Panamanian Revolution in order to secure territory for the canal, U.S. participation in the Algeiras Conference called to settle the first Moroccan crisis, and Roosevelt's sending of the Great White Fleet around the world reflected an aggressive policy of Open Door Empire, expressed with a special beligerent exuberance.

The administration of Roosevelt's hand-picked (and later repudiated) successor, William Howard Taft, was known for the concrete, if less flashy, imperialism of “dollar diplomacy.” When Woodrow Wilson came into the White House in 1912, as the beneficiary of the Republican Party split, foreign policy underwent little change. Wilson, on record many times as believing in the “righteous conquest of foreign

21. Even Williams tends to be a bit unclear on this point, as is McCormick (1967), who otherwise has written a very useful and important book. Marina notes that “it is a mistake to consider anyone who believed in developing American commercial interests as an imperialist” (1968, 100).

markets,” differed from his predecessors only in minor matters of tactics. From an anti-imperialist standpoint, the only hopeful development was the appointment of William Jennings Bryan as secretary of state. Bryan’s reputation as a “pacifist” held out some hope for a change of emphasis. In 1915–16, however, Wilson’s intervention in the Mexican Revolution dispelled such illusions.

The “Great War” and Its Opponents, 1914–1920

The outbreak of the general European War in August 1914 caught Americans by surprise. The administration pledged U.S. neutrality in word and deed, and Americans congratulated themselves on not being involved. Unfortunately, numerous ideological and material forces worked against consistent nonintervention from the start. One of these forces was the pervasive Anglophilia of leading northeastern political and commercial circles. This Anglophilia extended deep into the administration, strongly influencing Wilson himself (with his admiration of the British political system). Anglophilia, Anglo-Saxon racism (the opiate of the northeastern elite of the day), and the idea of the United States and Great Britain as joint guarantors of an orderly world predisposed many influential Americans to the English side. Ties of kinship, culture, and political ideas allowed pro-British elements to depict the war as a heroic struggle of “democracies” against the autocratic Central Powers and obscured the imperialist rivalries that had actually caused the debacle.²²

Great Britain’s blockade of Germany and its interference with neutral shipping led to U.S. protest, as did the German countermeasure—the U-boat. Unhappily, the administration’s response to these events was less than neutral. It protested mildly and ineffectually against British violations, but held the German Reich “strictly accountable.” Bryan resigned in June 1915 rather than sign an especially strong note to Germany. Ironically, U.S. “stretching” of blockade rules during the War for Southern Independence gave color of law to the current British violations (see Baxter 1928). Anglophile feeling likewise contributed to an unbalanced policy. In addition, Germany’s U-boats directly took the lives of civilians of both belligerent and neutral countries, making for more emotion against Germany. (The Allied starvation blockade of Germany—continued out of sheer vindictiveness for months after Germany’s surrender—was less dramatic [see Raico 1989].) American acquiescence in British sea-warfare rules left the Germans increasingly unable to get supplies of all kinds; in this situation, advocates of unrestricted submarine warfare carried the day in the German cabinet. The sinking of the *Lusitania* was simply the most dramatic incident in the new style of seaborne warfare for which Great Britain and Germany shared responsibility.²³

It is probably worth noting in passing that those who sailed into the “war zone” at least had the choice not to do so, whereas those sent later to the trenches of northern France, supposedly in response to U-boat excesses, had no choice—an important

22. For a good summary of U.S. policies in World War I, see Raico 1999b.

fact to keep in mind in evaluating the U.S. decision to go to war, over U-boats or anything else.

It was not fundamentally German “atrocities” in Belgium or on the high seas (matched, we must recall, by Allied deeds), however, that led U.S. leaders to choose war; it was their very definition of U.S. political and economic welfare as a function of foreign trade. German victory and Allied defeat seemed, in several ways, to preclude an orderly “liberal-capitalist” world. In the short run, U.S. recovery from a prewar recession had been boosted by Allied war orders (because the British blockade prevented Germany from placing significant orders). When Allied cash ran low, the bankers, including the very influential J. P. Morgan, brought pressure on the administration to reverse its position and allow large loans to the Allies. Once this reversal had taken place, the fortunes of the bankers and many exporters required Allied victory; and they, in turn, could make the persuasive, if uneconomic argument that the health of the “nation” depended on Allied victory. This belief was very important inside the administration (see Williams [1962] 1972).

In a broader sense, however, the administration saw Allied victory as essential. “Free-trading” imperial Britain was for Anglophile U.S. statesmen a model power with which cooperation was quite possible. The German Reich, in contrast, seemed autocratic and irresponsibly and erratically imperialist, bent on exclusive spheres of influence (the antithesis of the Open Door), and willing to use unconventional weapons such as U-boats (which were less “acceptable,” somehow, than mass slaughter on land). Victory of the Central Powers, with Germany at their head, might forever block access to foreign markets necessary for U.S. prosperity and therefore for U.S. political stability. Identifying state-subsidized and state-defended export markets with national well-being and the federal government with liberalism, Wilson and others easily persuaded themselves to crusade for “democracy,” prosperity, and the Open Door, all at once. (Real personal and economic losses suffered by the citizenry were compatible with this definition of economic well-being.)

The whole set of German actions, as seen through the *weltanschauung* of Open Door Empire, led Wilson to ask for war; German actions, however remote, were seen as threatening an ambitious conception of U.S. welfare.²⁴ Opponents of U.S. entry into the war understood and attacked these motives at the time. Liberal and socialist “isolationists” pointed out the antisocial character of war to save bankers’ investments and to continue the profits of munitions makers.²⁵ These critics differed among themselves on many points, but they *did* agree that the European war was not our affair; for them, U.S. participation would only add American lives and treasure

23. For British prewar plans to outfit Cunard liners as auxiliary cruisers (secretly armed) and for the argument that Churchill and others at the Admiralty connived at the sinking of the *Lusitania* to bring America into the war, see Simpson 1972. For more on Churchill’s role, see Raico 1999a.

24. Williams defines *weltanschauung* as a “definition of the world combined with an explanation of how it works” (1973, 20).

to those already being senselessly wasted. Drawing on the popular “isolationism,” which had survived intact the beginnings of Open Door Empire, and appealing to the nineteenth-century tradition of continentalism, antiwar spokesmen had a potentially much larger constituency than the Anti-Imperialist League had in 1900. The obvious scale of possible involvement in the world war ensured that entry into it, unlike entry into the marginal war in the Philippines, would be strongly contested.

The war issue cut across ideological and class lines. Of the liberals, those closest to the administration, such as Herbert Croly of the *New Republic*, backed the war as a crusade compatible with liberalism and reform, only to see—as the antiwar radical Randolph Bourne caustically remarked—their reasons for supporting the war disappear one by one. (Certainly, *classical*-liberal values were undermined.) Other liberals, such as Oswald Garrison Villard of the *Nation*, Bourne, and the radical libertarian writer Albert Jay Nock, consistently opposed the war, its conduct, and its repressive aftermath. Not surprisingly, these liberal critics held pronounced laissez-faire views on foreign and domestic policy. Likewise opposed to entry into the war and close in spirit to these publicists was a small group of Progressives in Congress, including Senators Robert A. LaFollette of Wisconsin and George W. Norris of Nebraska, Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin of Montana, and former senator Richard F. Pettigrew of South Dakota (later indicted by a federal grand jury for speaking out against the war). These latter-day Progressives were concentrated in midwestern and western farm states, the major mass base of the country’s “isolationist” voters.

One reason for strong noninterventionist sentiment in the Midwest was the presence of great numbers of German Americans there. Since the mid-nineteenth century, German immigrants and their descendants had strongly embraced liberal values of peace and antimilitarism. Many of their forebears had fled Europe to avoid the war system, and in 1914–17 they constituted a significant force for peace, especially as regarded a war that would pit German Americans against Germany, whatever the Reich’s alleged misdeeds. Opposition to British imperialism as a world system and support for the impending Irish Revolution led another large mass into the pro-peace camp. (The identification of German Americans and Irish Americans as “isolationists” persisted until the virtual effacement of pro-peace forces during and after World War II.) Certain prominent pro-British “100 percent Americans,” such as Theodore Roosevelt, raised a great hue and cry about “hyphenates” (British Americans apparently suffered no such handicap) and their potential “disloyalty” to pro-British interventionist policy.

When the vote on war came in early April 1917, six senators stood against the pro-war tide: Asle J. Gronna, LaFollette, Harry Lane, William J. Stone, James K. Vardaman, and George Norris, along with fifty representatives, including Jeannette Rankin, Majority Leader Claude Kitchin, and Meyer London (the only Socialist member). Following rapidly on the declaration of war, the administration, realizing

25. For a postwar example of the literature against munitions makers, see Engelbrecht and Hanighen 1934.

the continuing unpopularity of the war with many Americans, enacted the most repressive “espionage” and “sedition” laws since 1798 (or since Lincoln). The mildest criticism soon became criminal, and the executive branch launched a virtual terror campaign against “pro-German,” antiwar, radical, and even liberal elements. The wave of repression embraced strict press censorship, suppression of speech, and “war socialism” (that is, government-sponsored cartelization, conscription, and sacrifice of everything to the state—in a word, the very evils that classical liberals had always associated with war). As Bourne famously wrote at the time, “War is the health of the state.”

Once the war had begun, politics split along the lines of the war itself, with “war liberals” and “war socialists” opposing antiwar liberals and socialists. The Wilson administration used the “emergency” as an excuse to crush the radical left generally (socialists, the Industrial Workers of the World, and so forth), as did local governments and vigilante groups. (Most of our numskull state “criminal anarchosyndicalism” laws and loyalty oaths date from World War I.) The war strengthened statism in all respects and created a “know-nothing” mass base of hysterical “patriots,” many of whom later flocked into the American Legion and the so-called Ku Klux Klan (KKK), which dated from 1915.

The antiwar socialists, symbolized by Eugene V. Debs (sentenced to ten years in prison for denouncing the war), were especially vocal dissenters from war policies, counseling draft refusal and stressing economic motives for the war. Along with the socialists, the radical liberals (Bourne, Nock, Villard) and traditional pacifists also maintained the dangerous posture of “disloyal” opposition.

The Interwar Years: Heyday of “Isolationism”

As Bourne predicted, the great crusade for democracy, “the war to end war,” soon ran up against harsh reality, and the outcome was a general disillusionment that had many facets (some negative, such as the “revived” KKK). The most important reaction was a general revulsion against war and grand crusades that was to last for two decades and that required the Franklin Roosevelt administration’s most extreme duplicity to overcome in 1940–41. The immediate result was a vast broadening of the pre-1917 antiwar coalition. Disillusioned “war liberals” and other former Wilson supporters now joined the loose aggregation of pro-peace “ethnics,” midwestern and western Progressives, laissez-faire liberals, and socialists to scuttle the imperialist Treaty of Versailles and to keep the United States out of the League of Nations.

Because this debate was crucial and its character is often misapprehended in the literature, it is important to acquire a revisionist view of its contours. Rather than accepting the conventional “isolationist versus internationalist” dichotomy, it is more instructive to divide the 1919-20 debaters into at least four camps.²⁶ Of these, “pure pacifists” held the least political clout. At the political center stood the corporate-liberal advocates of Open Door Empire, many of whom, like Wilson, now espoused

great-power cooperation through the League of Nations to make “stability” possible (that is, to preserve an unjust status quo in the face of revisionist powers and colonial revolutions). To their “right” and “left” stood two distinct sets of anti-League, anti-“internationalist” figures usually lumped together as bitter-end “isolationists” out of step with the necessities of twentieth-century life. On the right were unilateral imperialists, such as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who fully accepted the political-economic program of empire, but thought that the United States could dominate the world economy better by acting alone as much as possible. On the left were the laissez-faire liberals and Progressives, who, as Williams emphasizes strongly, were genuinely committed to the self-determination of all peoples, embracing the right of revolution. Senator William E. Borah of Idaho, who had been a moderate supporter of war in 1917, emerged as the chief spokesman of the anti-imperial “isolationists” in the debate over the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles.²⁷

Heirs of the Anti-Imperialist League, the true “isolationist” critics opposed the treaty for its perpetuation of Western imperialism, including U.S. imperialism, and its establishment of the groundwork for a new world war by its treatment of Germany and other nations. In this analysis, the whole point of the League of Nations was the use of collective force by imperial powers against change in the status quo (stigmatized as “Communist” revolutions on the Bolshevik model, whatever the local focus and causes, or as simple “aggression” by unreformed autocracies). Wilson’s interventions in Mexico, in the world war, and—perhaps most revealing—against the Bolsheviks in Russia were of a piece, designed to preserve and extend the Open Door (on Russia, see, for example, Williams 1967).

“Isolationist” spokesmen such as Senators LaFollette and Borah bitterly attacked the concert of imperialist powers involved in Russia as wrong in practice and in principle. The attack on the Versailles settlement was another aspect of the battle for nonintervention and peace. Senator Borah was especially outspoken on this whole set of issues.

The defeat of the treaty reflected public reaction against the “oversold” world war, which had failed to create a better world, as did the election of President William G. Harding, who pledged to return America to “normalcy.” In this climate, scholars and publicists alike took a closer look at the war’s causes, course, and consequences. Focusing on economic and power motives, the “literature of disillusionment” was the intellectual counterpart of the struggle against the diktat of Versailles waged by the congressional “Battalion of Death.” The extreme libertarian essayist Albert Jay Nock wrote *The Myth of a Guilty Nation* (1922), assailing the war’s official theory, which

26. Williams rightly observes that the use of the term *isolationists* to characterize opponents of intervention has “crippled American thought about foreign policy for forty years” ([1962] 1972, 107). The term is used here solely for convenience.

27. On Borah, see Pinckney 1960. Williams explicitly refers to Borah and his associates as “laissez-faire liberals” ([1962] 1972, 122-27), and, relatively speaking, this description is true enough.

was published originally as a series in *LaFollette's Magazine*, published by the senator. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, a continuing barrage of "revisionist" literature came out in a fairly favorable intellectual climate.

Among the more important works were Harry Elmer Barnes's *The Genesis of the World War* (1929); Sidney B. Fay's *The Origins of the World War*, 2 vols. ([1928] 1966); C. H. Grattan's *Why We Fought* (1929); Walter Millis's popularly written and much-read *Road to War* (1935); H. C. Engelbrecht and Frank Hanighen's *Merchants of Death* (1934); English economist J. M. Keynes's very influential work *Economic Consequences of the Peace* (1920); and Charles Callan Tansill's *America Goes to War* (1938). Liberal and radical journals such as Nock's *Freeman*, H. L. Mencken's *American Mercury*, Oswald Garrison Villard's *Nation*, and the formerly pro-Wilson *New Republic* opened their doors to all manner of "revisionist" and "isolationist" writers. In addition, illustrating the continuity of "isolationism" and anti-imperialism, Barnes, probably the most indefatigable and hardest hitting of the revisionists, was associated with the interwar Vanguard series of books dealing with growing U.S. political-economic dominance of undeveloped nations.

The net effect of the revisionist literature and resurgent "isolationist" opinion was a climate favorable to lower military spending and nonintervention. A large section of the public now saw World War I as a "European" power struggle and viewed U.S. entry as brought about by special economic interests, very effective British propaganda, and irrational ideologies. The revisionist literature shifted at least part of the "war guilt" from Germany and Austria-Hungary to France and Russia and, secondarily, to England (some were not so kind to Britain!). With wartime hysteria and myths dispelled (including the myth of unique German diabolism), it was easier to maintain that the United States *could* and should have remained neutral. The implications for future policy were clear.

Concern that practical nonneutrality had helped to embroil the United States in World War I led to renewed scholarly work on neutrality in international law and to legislation designed to make the U.S. neutral *in fact* in the event of another sea struggle between rival empires. With the failure of the feeble official arms-limitations efforts of the 1920s, "isolationists" and pacifists turned their attention to neutrality. The famous Nye Committee of the mid-1930s investigated the munitions industry, providing much intellectual ammunition for those who held that the arms firms had been a major force for getting the United States into the war. Senator Gerald P. Nye himself supported legislation to curb arms sales and other intercourse with belligerents potentially dangerous to neutrality. The Neutrality Act of 1935 was in line with such "timid isolationist" reasoning and allowed the executive to proclaim the existence of a state of war, after which an embargo automatically applied to the warring powers. Despite good intentions, such provisions were probably inappropriate means to preserve neutrality.

"Belligerent isolationists," such as Senators Borah and Hiram Johnson and Representative Hamilton Fish, stood for strict neutrality but opposed any embargo,

relying instead on international law and American power to protect our genuine neutral rights.²⁸ In this quest, they drew on the writings of Edwin M. Borchard and William Potter Lage (1937), leading authorities on international law, who believed neutrality to be both a desirable and a practical pursuit. Unfortunately, true neutrality was to prove inconsistent with the premises that presidents and policymakers embraced, and mere legislative tinkering could not forever restrain a president bent on risking intervention for the Open Door.

Besides neutrality, other causes reflected the American public's peaceful inclinations. One of these causes was the partially successful campaign by the pacifists, liberals, and liberal clergymen to eliminate the compulsory Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC) on American college campuses (see Ekirch 1972, 217–33). Even more expressive was the campaign for the Ludlow Amendment, which would have required a popular referendum on war, except in case of actual invasion of the United States. Rejected on a close vote in Congress in January 1938 after the administration put great pressure on the members, this proposed constitutional amendment (ridiculed as unwieldy and unrealistic) eloquently bespoke the current state of opinion on intervention (on the Ludlow Amendment, see Jonas 1966 and Ekirch 1972, 248).

“Isolationist” feeling pervaded the country, but it was concentrated in a broad belt consisting of the new Northwest and a large part of the old Northwest (or “Middle West”). The “isolationist” stronghold consisted especially of Ohio, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, North and South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Wyoming, and Idaho. According to one study, not only did “isolationist” voting patterns correlate fairly well with German and Irish ancestry, they also reflected better education (see Smuckler 1953).

The Coming of World War II and America First

Despite the popular “isolationist” mood of the 1920s and 1930s, U.S. policymakers continued to think within the *weltanschauung* of Open Door Empire and the (related) frontier-expansionist philosophy of history. So strong was government support for extension of U.S. business abroad that Williams writes of “the legend of isolationism” ([1962] 1972, chap. 4). Certainly, at the level of policymaking, little support existed for principled nonintervention. Herbert Hoover, first as secretary of commerce under Presidents Harding and Coolidge and then as president, vigorously pushed U.S. foreign trade and investment while pursuing a proto-New Dealish program of economic cartelization wherever possible at home (on Hoover, see Rothbard 1970).

Although routine interventions took place in Latin America and the U.S. military roamed as far away as China, some advocates of Open Door Empire attempted to pursue their goals as peacefully as possible. Hoover was particularly moderate and finally chose peace over war in Asia, even at the risk of losing the “China market,” the traditional

28. For a discussion of “timid” versus “belligerent” isolationists,” see Jonas 1966, 42–69.

mirage of Open Door enthusiasts. (He later found himself in the “isolationist” coalition, opposing New Deal foreign and domestic policies.) The Great Depression retired Hoover and brought into office an administration pledged to restoring prosperity.

As the New Deal’s domestic failures became evident, policymakers turned more and more to foreign markets as a panacea. By the late 1930s, concern with keeping markets open in the face of Japanese competition, as well as that of Germany and Italy (whose businesses were penetrating even Latin America), predisposed Roosevelt to military solutions. In addition, the “shot in the arm” of increased military spending doubtless appealed to an administration whose recovery programs had hardly dented the Depression. Roosevelt’s request for increased naval spending in 1937 thus reflected a growing anxiety over domestic recovery, foreign markets, and the possible necessity of war to sustain both. Rapidly abandoning his semi-“isolationist” posture once war broke out in Europe in September 1939, Roosevelt moved gradually but purposefully to involve America in the war on the British side. Constrained by the climate of opinion, he ran as a virtual “peace candidate” in 1940 (as had Wilson in 1916). Once reelected, however, he sought one pretext after another to enter the war (or wars, inasmuch as the Sino-Japanese War and the European War were still only tangentially connected) and put great pressure on Japan in the Pacific.²⁹

Alarmed by “peace candidate” Roosevelt’s behind-the-scenes moves toward intervention, concerned citizens, including Yale students influenced by Borchard (the theorist of pure neutrality), founded the America First Committee (AFC) in September 1940 to counter the drift into war. By bringing the issues into open debate through the printed word, radio, and mass rallies, the AFC sought to nullify the propaganda of such well-financed pro-interventionist groups as the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (widely regarded as an administration “front”).³⁰ Although the AFC failed in its stated objective of preventing U.S. entry into World War II, it was a significant movement in several respects. It attempted to fight an anticipated intervention on the basis of historical lessons from a previous war. It was a broad coalition of antiwar forces, liberal and conservative, united on a few principles (analogous to Students for a Democratic Society from about 1965 to 1970); it rested on a genuine popular base, unlike the religious, pacifist, and left-wing groups that also opposed war in 1940–41. As a mass-based movement consciously in the American noninterventionist tradition, the AFC substantially slowed the Roosevelt administration’s interventionist course and provoked public debate (a so-called great debate) over foreign policy. Despite failures of strategic vision and leadership, the AFC deepened Roosevelt’s dilemma of how to intervene against the wishes of a large segment of the people, a dilemma from which only an event such as the attack on Pearl Harbor could have delivered him.

29. See Williams [1962] 1972, chap. 5. Important critical studies include Beard 1948; Tansill 1952; Barnes 1953; and Russett 1972.

30. On the AFC, see the classic study by Cole (1953) and the excellent study by Stenehjem (1976). For an unfriendly account of the AFC from which, nonetheless, useful facts can be extracted, see Adler 1961, 273–80. See also Doenecke 1972.

For its part, the administration did its best to avoid presenting the war issue squarely to the citizenry and pictured each stage of intervention as a last-ditch measure to keep out of war. The AFC—in cooperation with liberal “isolationist” groups such as the Keep America Out of War Congress (which was supported by such notables as Oswald Garrison Villard, Charles Beard, Harry Elmer Barnes, Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana, and Senator Nye of North Dakota)—tried to alert the public to the interventionist character of such successive measures as Lend-Lease, “neutrality patrols” (actually secret convoys), convoys, repeal of the Neutrality Law, and the draft extension bill. Thus, in early 1941, Amos Pinchot and Charles Lindbergh testified against Lend-Lease in congressional hearings. (Beard and Norman Thomas also testified against it.). When Roosevelt announced his “neutrality patrols” in April 1941, the AFC held two mass anticonvoy rallies in New York, each attended by forty thousand people. Another such rally in Philadelphia was addressed by John T. Flynn, Thomas, Lindbergh, and Senator Wheeler.

Interventionist moves accumulated quickly. In May, FDR announced more “neutrality patrols” and proclaimed an “unlimited state of national emergency.” In July, full convoys began, and U.S. forces occupied Iceland. By September, an undeclared naval war was beginning in the North Atlantic, bearing out the “isolationists’” claims that supplying the Allies would lead to convoying the supply ships, which in turn would lead to shooting and bring war that much closer. Shooting incidents involving the *Greer*, the *Kearsage*, and the *Reuben James* failed to bring the pro-war fervor the administration apparently hoped for, but they did underscore the seriousness of the situation in the North Atlantic.³¹

Unfortunately, the national AFC leadership in Chicago took increasingly weak stands in the face of Roosevelt’s initiatives and thereby undercut the hopes of the movement’s mass base in the old and new Midwest and of the “isolationist” intellectuals. The AFC leadership was replete with retired officers and businessmen such as General Robert Wood, a Sears-Roebuck executive, who were conventional, unimaginative, and conservative; those qualities carried over into the AFC’s strategy and tactics. Thus, for example, the AFC’s failure to take a principled stand against conscription and militarism allowed extension of the draft in August 1941 by only one vote; this extension in turn enabled the administration to pursue confidently a collision course with Japan (see Liggio 1966b, 24).

Despite the weaknesses of the national office, the AFC possessed intelligent and articulate spokesmen. Of these “liberal isolationists,” perhaps none was as tireless an activist or as perceptive a critic as John T. Flynn, the political writer who headed the New York City chapter of the AFC. An anti-imperialist since 1900, Flynn, like Barnes, shows the unity of noninterventionist movements. As head of the New York City

31. For an account of the naval incidents, see Beard 1948, chap. 5, and Russett 1972, 77–83. Russett makes an explicit comparison with President Johnson’s Gulf of Tonkin incident.

AFC, Flynn developed a very “forward” strategy involving congressional lobbying, use of media, and analysis of the interventionist forces.

In his neglected books *Country Squire in the White House* (1940) and *As We Go Marching* (1944), Flynn insightfully analyzed the support for foreign war. *As We Go Marching*, possibly the single most prophetic American political book of the mid-twentieth century, dealt with the New Deal’s marriage of welfare and warfare as America’s coming “genteel fascism,” openly comparing the New Deal with Italy’s fascist corporative-state economy. Flynn stressed the temptation of “democratic” politicians to save the economy from depression through military spending and even war, a motive he saw as propelling Roosevelt’s interventionist coalition. He sagely noted that “defense” was the one “pump-priming” boondoggle that powerful anti-New Deal congressional conservatives would back unthinkingly. Thus, Flynn developed a revisionist analysis of the connections between power, economics, and war similar to later new left discussions.³² Other “isolationists” were aware of and responded to the administration’s concern with access to foreign markets, which they knew to be an important motive for intervention (see Doenecke 1976).

War came finally at Pearl Harbor after months of U.S. pressure on Japan, and it came from a quarter that the “isolationists” and the general public had tended to underestimate, leading to charges that the government had consciously sought war in the Pacific as a “back door” to the war in Europe (see Tansill 1952). Shortly after Pearl Harbor, the national board of the AFC voted to dissolve the committee and to support the war now that it had come. With the major mass-based antiwar front done in by its residual “patriotism” and nonradical leaders, antiwar forces generally were buried by wartime emotions and by firm, if “moderate” repression (which fell hardest on West Coast residents of Japanese ancestry).

A number of circumstances contributed to the failure of nonintervention in 1940–41. The defection of liberals was a major blow. Disillusioned with World War I, liberals, exemplified by the *Nation* and the *New Republic*, had become strongly non-interventionist. With the outbreak of war in Europe, however, and the propensity to follow Roosevelt, whose domestic New Deal many liberals supported, perhaps the majority of these liberals reenlisted as Wilsonian interventionists.³³ Soon such staunch liberals as Flynn and Barnes found themselves excluded from the liberal press for their noninterventionist views. As the major national media came to support intervention, the lack of respectable outlets soon greatly handicapped the “isolationist” cause. In addition, the existence of small “fascist” and pro-Nazi groups, such as the German-American Bund, the Silver Shirts, and the Coughlinites, played up by the interventionist press, hurt the AFC by their attempts to infiltrate it. These attempts lent color to the interventionists’ charge (inevitable anyway) that to oppose

32. On Flynn, see Stenehjem 1976 and Radosh 1975, 197–229 (“John T. Flynn and the Coming of World War II”). See also Flynn 1940 and [1944] 1973.

intervention was to be “pro-Nazi” (just as opposition to the war in Vietnam was stigmatized as “Communist”).³⁴ Finally, in 1940, Senator Borah’s death deprived “isolationism” of the spokesman best equipped to deal with a wide range of issues from within a conscious framework of anti-imperialism.

Even in defeat, however, the “isolationists” had raised once again the fundamental questions of freedom versus empire. In addition, Roosevelt’s duplicity, which pro-New Deal historians later admitted and justified, presented still relevant issues of democratic procedure and ethics (for a short discussion of such issues, see Radosh 1967). Lyndon Johnson’s “credibility gap” was very much in an established tradition. Use of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for political spying dates back at least to Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency, however much his successors emulated him. In focusing attention and debate on such abuses along with the larger issues of war and peace and republic versus empire, the much-maligned “isolationists” remained true to a vital American tradition. Unhappily, they lived to see some of their direst predictions come true as World War II and the Cold War fastened on the United States the features of a garrison state, even in “peacetime.”

Because the attack on Pearl Harbor rallied the nation behind the government, open antiwar activity ceased almost completely, in contrast to its continued presence during World War I. Traditional pacifists maintained witness against the war, serving as forced laborers in conscientious objector (CO) camps or doing time in prison. (At least two COs gained prominence later as revisionist historians.) One of the few important war-time protests was the Peace Now movement, led by George Hartmann.³⁵ Peace Now called for serious negotiations toward a cease-fire, as opposed to the official Allied goal of “unconditional surrender,” in order to end the massive destruction, especially through terror bombing, that continued war would bring. The pro-war media—liberal, conservative, and Stalinist—roundly denounced Peace Now as “seditious” and “fascist,” as did even some pacifist leaders who disliked Peace Now’s “impure” coalition of pacifist and “isolationist” elements. (For A. J. Muste, “right-wing” activists could not possibly *really* be for peace.)

Aside from draft resistance and Peace Now, some opponents of the war and its actual conduct managed to express themselves in obscure “little magazines”; notable were Frank Chodorov’s *analysis*, Felix Morley and Frank C. Hanighen’s *Human Events*, and Dwight MacDonald’s *Politics*, for overlap of right-wing and left-wing antiwar critiques. In addition, World War II revisionism began even before the war’s end, as pamphlets and more complete critical histories came out in the late 1940s and early

33. On this metamorphosis, the best study is Martin 1964.

34. For accounts that lay to rest the myth of AFC “fascism,” see Jonas 1967 and Stenehjem 1976, chap. 7, “Anti-Semitism and Profascism in the NYC-AFC: Fact and Fiction,” 121–41.

35. Martin has rescued Peace Now from oblivion in “The Bombing and Negotiated Peace Questions—in 1944” (1971, 71–124).

1950s (Flynn 1944; Neumann 1945). These works raised the question of whether or not the “isolationists” had been right, but unlike the situation for the World War I revisionists, the new wave of revisionism worked in a completely hostile climate.

Cold Wars and Hot Wars: Nonintervention’s Nadir

Having successfully overcome fascist threats to the Open Door, the U.S. government focused attention on the remaining threats to American hegemony and the Open Door; these threats were the Soviet Union, whose expansion into eastern Europe might close those countries to U.S. economic penetration, and the revolutionary movements in the colonial possessions of the Western empires. These movements, including the Chinese Revolution, were conveniently grouped together as “communism” by U.S. policymakers, who blamed the USSR for them.³⁶

The new Truman administration, which had unleashed the atom bomb with no second thoughts at all, now proceeded to push for encirclement of the USSR with bases around the world, a mass standing army sustained by peacetime conscription, greater air power, and a host of other “defense” measures designed to maximize the Open Door Empire.³⁷ Presenting its power-political, economic, and ideological crusade as purely a reaction to Communist “aggression,” the administration asked Congress and the people to support a set of warlike policies in peacetime in supposed defense of a rather nebulous “free world” (meaning *all* states, however oppressive, that did not profess to be Marxist).

This program took some doing, even though Pearl Harbor and the whole war experience had discredited nonintervention seemingly forever. Americans had elected a Republican Congress in 1946; some of these men were unrepentant “isolationists,” and a great many more were simply reluctant to spend their constituents’ money on new crusades. Thus, the administration had to “oversell” its program as a great crusade for liberty and as part of a life-and-death struggle against “communism,” and thus the Truman Doctrine was born. In a paradoxical reversal of recent ideological stereotypes, such opposition as there was to the early Cold War program came from a rough coalition of “old right” noninterventionists and (numerically fewer) left liberals such as Henry Wallace (Stromberg 1976).

Fighting a clearly losing battle, the noninterventionists opposed the Greek-Turkish aid bill of 1947, the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and, finally, the Korean escapade, but they dwindled in numbers as events unfolded, until no one in politics upheld nonintervention. “Isolationism” became the cause of a handful of despairing writers and revisionist historians on the fringes of American politics. Nonetheless, as they went down to defeat, the “isolationist” remnant articulated a position that in hindsight seems prophetic.

36. On the nonrevolutionary character of Stalin’s foreign policy, see Kolko 1970.

37. For background on the Truman Doctrine, see Barnet 1972, 119–45.

Congressmen Howard Buffett (R., Nebraska), Frederic Smith (R., Ohio), and Lawrence Smith (R., Wisconsin) vied with one another in denouncing the Truman Doctrine as “imperialism.” Radical libertarian publicist Frank Chodorov wrote that the Truman policies would turn the United States into a “Byzantine empire of the West”; the country would become a fully statized society in which educational and social policies would ultimately be geared to creating a garrison state. Senator Taft, arguing against NATO, asserted that it would promote war in the long run and would immediately obligate the United States to arm western Europe. Felix Morley, one of the most persistent critics, offered the mid-1950s warning of an economy dangerously addicted to “defense” spending to create full employment (Stromberg 1978).

Somewhere between 1947, when the right-wing “isolationists” largely opposed the Truman Doctrine’s interventionism (while the China lobby section of the right supported it) and 1953, when Robert Taft died, a series of changes occurred that, taken together, compose what Rothbard has called the “transformation” of the right wing. The years 1949-51 were especially critical for the decline of “isolationist” ideas and spokesmen. The so-called “fall” of China, the rise of Joe McCarthy (who made a career out of turning the Cold War liberals’ anti-Communist crusade against them), and the Korean War convinced the politically active public, including Congress itself, that communism was indeed a monolithic menace and that reasonable men could debate only the means and degree of intervention, not the principle.

Although Congressman Buffett and Senator Taft denounced Truman for initiating an unconstitutional presidential war, the right was divided on the war. One wing, represented by Hoover and Joe Kennedy, called for immediate withdrawal and for reduction of U.S. “defense” perimeters to modest dimensions. Another wing adopted the imperialist position of General Douglas MacArthur, the China lobbyists (loyal chiefly to Chiang Kai-shek) and McCarthyites. Sundry patriots, confused by official claims that U.S. survival was at stake, demanded military solutions at any price. Finally, many right-wing figures, including Taft himself, wavered confusedly or opportunistically between the “isolationist” and the unilateral imperialist positions. (The latter took inspiration from Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge Sr.)

The evaporation of the “isolationist” remnant during the Korean War meant that the last significant group that stood for nonintervention was now gone from American politics. Just as mainstream liberals had embraced intervention in 1940-41, they enthusiastically supported the new war, which liberal policymakers had initiated and which seemed to embody the interventionist ideal of “collective security.” As Carl Oglesby has written with regard to Vietnam, the dissembling of the Cold War liberals, in and out of the administration, led many one-time “isolationists” (who failed to develop a critique of the political description of the war) to demand “victory.” The problem, then, lay in the premises of policy, but by the 1950s only a few marginal

commentators such as Flynn and Lawrence Dennis kept up anything like a consistent “isolationist” critique.

From 1950 until the mid-1960s, the noninterventionist cause seemed completely discredited. Save for the much-persecuted Communist Party itself and a few isolated noninterventionists, the entire political spectrum embraced Cold War policies. Blaming Cold War setbacks, such as the “fall” of China and the stalemate in Korea, on internal Communist subversion, the New Right dissented from establishment policy and demanded greater military intervention abroad and greater police power at home. Thus, on the face of it, an opportunity to limit U.S. globalism was lost when Taft failed to win the Republican presidential nomination in 1952.

The Eisenhower administration, in practice, was more moderately interventionist than its predecessors or successors. Influenced by the former Taft supporters in his administration, Eisenhower restrained Secretary of State Dulles and Vice President Nixon, who advocated direct U.S. military involvement to aid French imperialists in Vietnam, and submitted the matter to Congress, where caution prevailed. Despite this moderation, “defense” budgets stayed well above “normal” peacetime levels, interventions took place across the globe, and the premises of foreign policy remained the same. Indeed, the strategy adopted by the Eisenhower government seems profoundly immoral because it relied on atomic bombs as the key to budgetary “savings” under such slogans as “the New Look” and “more bang for a buck” (see Gaddis 1982, 127–63).

Domestically, the Eisenhower years saw great advances in state-fostered corporatism, in which the new “military-industrial” culture played a major role.³⁸

New Frontiers, New Wars, and a New Opposition

On the left, dissent was limited to a self-restricted sort of liberal and liberal-pacifist campaign to ban future nuclear testing as opposed to a radical questioning of overkill or interventionism on principle (for a summary, see Wittner 1969). The election of John Kennedy, a youthful, “vigorous” leader pledged to moderate reform, created a situation in which liberals felt they could serve their consciences and the state. Kennedy would “get things done—lots of them—in contrast to the “do-nothing” Eisenhower presidency.

Even foreign-policy matters failed to spoil this cozy social-democratic idyll because Kennedy’s concern with counterinsurgency, efficiency, and adolescent competition with the Soviets seemed simply the export, albeit sometimes by force, of American liberal ideas and institutions. Even the Cuban Missile Crisis, itself ultimately the result of U.S. unwillingness to accept the Cuban Revolution, failed to curb the crusading fervor of Cold Warriors, liberal and conservative, though it may have added

38. For Eisenhower’s corporatism, see Griffith 1982; for the “galloping” corporatism of the period, see Wiarda 1997, 139–40; and for the politics of defense spending, see Lotchin 1992.

to an already strong emphasis on “winning” in the undeveloped countries or Third World.³⁹

Significantly, the new administration called itself the “New Frontier”; unfortunately, even the choice of slogan reflected continued commitment to the by-now-traditional policies of Open Door Empire and the frontier-expansionist philosophy of history. By the 1960s, the peacetime garrison state predicted and feared by the last “isolationists” had become a functioning reality. The interpenetration of government and favored corporations had become so thorough that to separate the personnel of the state and the corporations at the highest level became well-nigh impossible. As C. Wright Mills (1956) put it, top leadership was in the hands of a “power elite” whose economic and bureaucratic interests pointed in the direction of further interventions.⁴⁰

Barnes had predicted in 1953 that only a major foreign-policy disaster could reopen public debate and force Americans to reconsider revisionist history and non-interventionist alternatives. Vietnam was that disaster. It is crucial to understand that that ugly conflict grew out of established policy and was in no sense a “mistake” or well-intentioned blunder, any more than 1898 was a foreign-policy “aberration” with no long-range consequences. Begun by Kennedy, carried on and escalated by Johnson, clung to for dear life by Nixon, the Vietnam War ironically proved so costly that even its would-be political and economic beneficiaries came to regret it.

At the same time that the national-security managers were preparing and implementing intervention in Indochina, a new opposition was emerging outside the Cold War consensus. Beginning in the late 1950s and early 1960s, more as a radical “mood” and style than as a body of doctrine, this new left, at its best, raised issues of individual autonomy and responsibility and rejected the social-democratic old left policy of accommodation with big government. The new left had also begun to question U.S. Cold War policies when the war in Vietnam confronted it with a need for thoroughly *radical* revision of inherited establishment-liberal views.⁴¹

Left liberals, pacifists, and even radicals had focused so much attention on nuclear weapons and great power conflict that the “brushfire war” in Southeast Asia caught them without a ready analysis and political response. When Lyndon Johnson, long a dedicated interventionist (after the school of Franklin Roosevelt), ran as a virtual “peace candidate” against the overtly warlike Barry Goldwater in 1964, the nation and many intellectuals as well voted for Johnson and imagined in doing so they served the cause of peace. As Johnson widened the war with ground troops and

39. For a critical review of Kennedy’s foreign policies, see Walton 1973. For JFK’s primary responsibility for the Cuban crisis, see chap. 7, 103–42. For more on the Kennedy administration’s enthusiasm for a proactive strategy of counterinsurgency, see Miroff 1976.

40. On the “new class” of national-security managers, see Barnet 1972, 36–50, and 1973; and Liggio 1972.

41. For early examples of a new left mood, see Mills 1958, where Mills calls attention to World War II and Korean War atrocities, including terror bombing, and presents a noninterventionist alternative; see also Lens 1964 and the many works of Paul Goodman.

massive bombing, war critics failed to assess matters radically and got bogged down in side issues.

The university and college teach-ins, which began in 1965, were sidetracked by pseudo-issues of stopping the bombing and engaging in negotiations. As a result, the administration was able to confuse and silence its critics by making ultimately meaningless gestures such as Johnson's "bombing pause" and the Paris "peace" talks. In this situation, the old right "isolationist" remnant could play a vanguard role by educating the incipient antiwar movement regarding the continuity of U.S. imperialism and its tactics, from the bloody Philippine Insurrection to World War II terror bombing of German and Japanese civilians, and regarding the consequent necessity for radical and total opposition to the U.S. presence in Vietnam.⁴²

This relearning process took place especially in the brilliant new left journal *Studies on the Left* and the radical libertarian journal *Left and Right* (edited by Rothbard, Liggiio, and H. George Resch), both of which dealt extensively with politics and revisionist history. In these two journals and in *Liberation*, *Viet-Report*, *Ramparts*, and elsewhere, radical activists made clear to the broader "movement" the reasons for demanding unconditional U.S. withdrawal from Indochina. In one of the dialectical ironies of the corporate-state system, the universities became the center of opposition to the military-industrial-university complex. As great masses of American youth were "channeled" into expanding universities by the threat of the draft, the very precariousness of their temporary student deferments forced them to take the war and the draft seriously. Designed to produce technicians and bureaucrats for the state and the military, the system of channeling at the same time helped to generate a base for antiwar activity.⁴³

Infusing antiwar activity with the spirit and tactics used by the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee in the struggle for blacks' voting rights in the South, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) emerged in the mid-1960s as the major hub of actual antiwar action. Scorning the ritualistic "anti-Communist" rhetoric of the old left, SDS focused on the war as a moral evil to be opposed and fought it with demonstrations, sit-ins, direct confrontation, and propaganda. By 1967, SDS had adopted the radical and libertarian stance of draft resistance; supposedly "nonideological," it was instinctively operating out of a highly libertarian, native American radicalism.⁴⁴

By March 1968, the broad antiwar movement had begun to constrain policy-makers. Faced with mounting opposition at home and a major setback in Vietnam—the Tet Offensive—Johnson announced he would not seek reelection. Unfortunately, the antiwar movement remained altogether too campus bound and did not appeal

42. On the "vanguard role" of the old right, see Liggiio 1970. On teach-ins, see Menashe and Radosh 1967.

43. On Selective Service, see Hess and Reeves 1970; for the infamous Selective Service System memo on "channeling," see 193–200.

44. On SDS, see Sale 1973 and the article "SDS: The New Turn" (1967). Also see Miller 1987.

to ordinary Americans in American terms, as had the AFC. The nomination of two look-alike pro-war centrists, Nixon and Humphrey, offered little choice anyway on the chief issue of the decade.

Nixon won, in part, on the strength of a pledge to end the war by means of his “secret plan.” The secret apparently was that Nixon intended to prolong the war as long as possible and become a Great Statesman. Still confined largely to the universities, unable to communicate to the mass of Americans, the antiwar movement became increasingly divided. The vacuum left by early new left nonideological looseness was filled by warring varieties of Marxism because a theory, *any* theory, seemed necessary to explain the war and its continuation. (The disciplined, doctrinaire, and wrong-headed Progressive Labor Party did more than its share to destroy SDS as a viable antiwar organization.)

Mass marches in Washington, D.C., especially in 1970, met with mass arrests by the government, but helped corner the war makers morally. Along with the news media, which now shed some of their Cold War complacency and “patriotic” self-censorship, the marches dramatized the war issue effectively. Unfortunately, with SDS split into multiple groups, the mass of antiwar activists lost direction and cohesiveness. A madness and “paranoia” descended on the movement, exemplified by the bombings and the suicidal tactics of the Weathermen. The contributions made to this state of mind by agents provocateurs and the serious campaign of repression undertaken by FBI, Army Intelligence, and other agents under Nixon have received less discussion than they deserve.

Watergate is perhaps best understood as an attempted internal coup by Nixon and his circle intended to crush all real opposition in the name of national security. The exposure of Watergate, the Huston Plan for police surveillance of everything, and the cover-up served to illustrate eloquently the potential for totalitarianism inherent in the imperial presidency. The war and Watergate together constitute irrefutable evidence that noninterventionists have correctly apprehended the dangers of statism and empire almost from the founding of the republic. Although it may be too early to assess properly the long-run accomplishments of the anti-Vietnam War movement, we can see that a generation was educated to the nature of war, the dishonesty of its leaders, and the corruptions of power.

Conclusion: Left and Right, the Prospects for Nonintervention

Whatever the lessons of Vietnam, they were insufficient to overcome the institutionalization of the war party in the state, academe, and economic life that accompanied the highly artificial Cold War political consensus. From the caretaker administration of Gerald Ford to the administration of George H. W. Bush, the same assumptions reigned—a broad and ambitious conception of “national security,” coupled with geo-

politics, atomic cultism, and an abiding interest in applying the latest technologies to war.

The Soviet implosion widened the field in which U.S. policymakers could play, and few cared to admit that if anyone had “won” the Cold War, it was *state power*, plain and simple. The first Gulf War, coming after the Soviet collapse, did not define a new foreign policy. From the early 1990s to the present, policymakers and policy advocates have offered Americans basically two choices: either liberal imperialism, with humanitarian intervention, transparency, and a new conception of “openness” far surpassing a mere open door, or the proactive, routine intervention advocated by neoconservatives proposing big historical gambles and American-led world revolution.

The broader public cannot afford, however, to leave such matters to historical gamblers. A “neo-isolationist” critique, combining the “right-wing” insight that U.S. intervention corrupts America with the “left-wing” insight that U.S. intervention corrupts the world, might engender a powerful ideological front, forcing a political realignment and a real debate on foreign policy. This debate would involve a searching critique of all standing American ideas of destiny, world mission, and the like; a similar critique of the whole problem of American security in the world; and finally, a thorough critique of the allegedly compulsive nature of overseas trade.

Fortunately, there exist foundations on which to build. One is the survival, despite a half century of mobilization, of a genuine American civil society (Porter 1994, 293). Further, historian Leonard P. Liggio has stressed the continuity—obscured by divisions into left and right—of the social support for peace and nonintervention. War and empire present much the same issues over the long haul, and a homegrown American radicalism, a broad libertarianism, and “isolationism” have reasserted themselves at crisis points in our history (Liggio 1966).

As noted, antiwar forces of left and right have failed to block or even to slow the institutional growth of the entrenched war party. The lack of cooperation between antiwar forces across lines of left and right has compounded this failure. One cause of such disaffection is that peace activists often insist on defining peace in terms of a “just” world (Mueller 1991, 25). This strains communication between them and right-wing noninterventionists, who either believe that the world cannot be changed so fundamentally or oppose the particular changes proposed by left-wing peace advocates. Short-run agreement on a pragmatic definition of peace as the absence of war might improve communication between different sorts of antiwar activists.

It is likewise important that those opposed to empire and its attendant wars understand their own heritage and predecessors. Here, for examples, is Senator Calhoun, addressing the Democratic Party on its embrace of President Polk’s unitary-executive war with Mexico:

I, then, opposed the war, not only because it might have been easily avoided; not only because the President had no authority to order a part of the disputed territory in possession of the Mexicans to be occupied by

our troops; not only because I believed *the allegations upon which Congress sanctioned the war untrue*; but from high considerations of policy—because I believed it would lead to many and serious evils to the country, and greatly endanger its free institutions. (2003, 642, emphasis added)

Calhoun went on to decry the increase of executive patronage and power resulting from the war, as well as the imperial spirit, and he explained to the Democrats, point by point, how their support for this war undermined their professed political principles (2003, 642). The points are well taken, and whether or not most moderns like Calhoun, his statement of the issues remains trenchant. It could as easily be the statement of a contemporary senator with some sense of the constitutional tradition—perhaps Robert Byrd (D., W.Va.)—addressing George Bush’s Republicans in 2005.

Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that it does not matter much at this point who takes up noninterventionist ideas as the basis of policy. If today’s Democratic Party should happen, any time soon, to take up the ideas of Borah and Taft, it would be all to the good. That way, at least, we would indeed have a choice and not an echo.

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