When you look at Americas transportation network broadly, there can be little doubt that getting government out of the passenger train business would likely improve safety.
Though government officials talk ceaselessly about safety, its clearly not their top priority.
If you want proof, consider the U.S. Department of Transportations fuel-economy standards for cars and light trucks.
Dating back to the 1970s, the Corporate Average Fuel Economy regulations, which continue to get ratcheted up, are intended to increase the overall fuel economy of all the cars and light trucks on U.S. roads.
To meet these standards, automakers had to reduce vehicle weight, making them less crashworthyand increasing deaths.
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration estimated in 1991 that road fatalities were up some 2,000 per year and serious injuries were up 20,000 per year as a result of vehicle downsizing in the 1970s and 1980s.
Are these casualties a sign that safety is Washingtons top transportation priority, or are they a sign that another agendaopposition to fossil fuels, perhapsis at work?
Make no mistake: If a private transportation company were to announce that it was going to reduce safety to save fuel a national outcry would ensue.
The White House, Congress and the media would go nuts. But, strangely, when government does it there is silence.
The war on fossil fuels continuesand has been stepped up by the Obama administration as it pursues its green energy agenda.
That, of course, is what the Keystone XL pipeline controversy is all about: administration opposition to fossil fuels.
Without such pipelines, however, energy companies are forced to ship oil products by truck and railroad, which are significantly more accident-prone than pipelines.
Is this another demonstration of Washingtons commitment to safety?
There are reasons that private transportation companies as a general rule pay more attention to safety than government, whose actions are mired in politics.
Private companies have strong commercial incentives to focus on safety. Not only does safety attract passengers, it also reduces insurance premiums. And in the case of a serious accident, a company can be on the hook for a fortune.
In contrast, Amtraks liability in any incident, including the recent Philadelphia derailment that killed eight passengers and left more than 200 others injured, is capped by law at $200 million.
Thats a lot of money, but in the world of liability awards its small potatoes not a huge incentive to make safety the top priority.
Another reason a privately owned and operated passenger rail system would likely have a better safety record is because private managementfreed from the political reinswould spend money more wisely.
Several existing technologies can prevent trains from going at excessive speeds. Some trigger crew alarms. The most advancedPositive Train Control, which weve heard much about since the Philadelphia derailmentcan also apply the brakes.
Amtrak in 2008 was ordered to install PTC on its busiest routesthose in the northeast corridor, connecting Washington, Philadelphia, New York and Boston.
The job was never completed. Part of the reason is because Congress also requires Amtrak to operate rail service in areas where there arent enough passengers to cover operating costs. Money that should be spent on safety upgrades was used instead to subsidize these routes.
Getting government out of the rail passenger business would free management to align service with passenger demand, and focus on quality and safety, rather than satisfying political constituencies.
|Gabriel Roth is a transport and privatization consultant and a Research Fellow at the Independent Institute. He is the editor of the award-winning book, Street Smart: Competition, Entrepreneurship, and the Future of Roads.|
Street Smart examines private, market-based alternatives for road services, both in theory and practice. The book explores at least four such possible directions for private services, including testing and licensing vehicles and drivers; management of government-owned road facilities; franchising; and outright private ownership. The book further traces the history of private roads in Great Britain and the United States and examines contemporary examples of entrepreneurial innovation in road pricing, privatization, and marketization in environs as diverse as Singapore, California, Ghana, Norway, and England.