While the prospect of a future limited nuclear exchange on the South Asian subcontinent is not pleasant, the Indian and Pakistani nuclear programs pose little immediate threat to the United States. Neither of those nations is actively hostile to the United States (unlike other nations, such as Iran and North Korea). India and Pakistan probably do not yet have warheads deployed on missiles. Even if they did, neither country has-and will not have for some years to come-a missile that can hit the United States.
On the other hand, if the United States guarantees Pakistans security, India-the most likely of the two nations to develop such an intercontinental missile-could become more hostile to the United States. In addition, it could cause Russia to provide a nuclear shield for its long-time friend India. Those developments could reignite the Cold War between the two nuclear behemoths and scrap any hope for further U.S.-Russian reductions in nuclear arms.
Mandatory economic sanctions against both India and Pakistan in the wake of nuclear tests will only unnecessarily antagonize both nations and diminish U.S. influence when it is most critically needed. As usual, other rich Western nations are reluctant to tie trade and security issues, leaving the United States to carry the burden of playing the role of bad cop. In addition, using sanctions as a message to dissuade other nations from conducting nuclear tests is unlikely to have much effect. Those nations that are either undeclared nuclear powers (Israel) or the closest to becoming such powers (North Korea and Iran) will probably not be deterred from testing if they deem it to be necessary for their national security. Congress and the president would probably repeal the sanctions law before they would impose sanctions on Israel in retaliation for a nuclear test. The United States has little influence with the unfriendly governments in Iran or North Korea and cannot ratchet sanctions up much higher than the fairly comprehensive measures that have already been imposed on those nations.
More important, mandatory economic sanctions on both India and Pakistan interfere with possible U.S. efforts to prevent an upward spiral in tensions that could lead to a nuclear disaster. The United States should no longer deny reality--that is, pretend that undeclared nuclear powers are not nuclear states. Also, it must recognize that, eventually, both India and Pakistan will probably deploy their nuclear weapons.
Rather than impose sanctions, the United States should encourage India and Pakistan to adopt confidence building measures similar to those established by Russia and the United States during the Cold War--for example, creating a hotline connecting the capitals of the two nations and a conducting a regular dialogue on security issues. In addition, the United States could share with both nations some of its technology for ensuring the safety and command and control of nuclear weapons. This technology transfer might reduce the chances of nuclear accidents or accidental launches. Finally, the United States might even share future technology developed to simulate nuclear explosions so that India and Pakistan would have no need for further underground weapons testing. Instead of taking actions that pretend to halt proliferation already well underway, the United States should maximize its influence to mediate tensions and promote stability between two new members of the nuclear weapons club.
|Ivan Eland is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center on Peace & Liberty at The Independent Institute. Dr. Eland is a graduate of Iowa State University and received an M.B.A. in applied economics and Ph.D. in national security policy from George Washington University. He has been Director of Defense Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, and he spent 15 years working for Congress on national security issues, including stints as an investigator for the House Foreign Affairs Committee and Principal Defense Analyst at the Congressional Budget Office. He is author of the books Partitioning for Peace: An Exit Strategy for Iraq, and Recarving Rushmore.|